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PREFACE
One of the many distcrticns that war produces is that
each belligerent believes himself to be the sole
possessor of trust and justice. We know of no case
in which those who have gone to the extreme of a
military confrontation have ever recognized in their
opponents the slightest degree of reason. When
situations become critical belligerents do not display
toward neutral parties the understanding and tolerance
that they so fervently claim for their own cause. Be-
cause of these special considerations, we venture to
presume that neither Arabs nor Jews will be satisfied
with our statement, since combatants consider only
their allies as friends. And we, in all truth, are
not their allies, but are certainly their friends.
Columbian Ambassador
Julio Caesar Turbay Ayala,
General Assembly,
June 27, 196?.
The treatment of this topic is designed to show how
the United Nations was employed in a situation of crisis
and to trace the interactions of states, international law
and organization which culminated in the passage of Resolution
214.2. Our three foci of investigatory interest are political,
legal and organization&l . We have sought to allow each
approach its position in accordance with their salient or
secondary natures at different junctures in the institutional
playing-out; of this crisis.
A realistic study of the relationship between these
factors would begin with a review of the policies and
iv
behavior of the area and superpower states which were parties
to the crisis. Our particular concentration here is upon
the upswing toward war. Our framed reference is chiefly
political. The Arab-Israeli conflict is one whose elements
are of long standing. The next section treats each issue
of this conflict in its legal form and explores the case
which each of the direct parties makes, and whose conflicting
tension is reflected in the United Nations and its resolutions.
The third section traces the activities which occurred in the
United Nations from the period prior to the outbreak of war
through November 22, 196?. Here we are concerned with the
relationships between states, international law and organiza-
tion in the unfolding interplay which led up to the adoption
of Resolution 2i|2. The concluding section expectedly sum-
marizes and draws judgements upon the points presented
earlier.
Our central view is of the United Nations as a vehicle
or instiniment of political conflict or its resolution. Al-
though the United Nations has been used as a vehicle or tool
of great power policy in the past to manage or contain
crises, this was one case in which the situation slipped
out from under great power control and posed an obstreperous
life of its own before the passage of Resolution 2I|.2 which
suggested the general ou.-clines for a potential peace settle-
ment .
VLa Rochefoucauld once wrote: "Quarrels would not
last long were the wrong all on one side." In keeping with
this we have not conducted our inquiry on the assumption
that either party to this conflict is "guilty" or "inno-
cent," have not attempted to indict or absolve either side
to this dispute; rather, if there by any single motivating
force to this inquiry, it is that what has been termed an
Arab-Israeli death embrace not become a nuclear death embrace
for us all
.
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1CHAPTER I
THE SIX DAYS' WAR: BUIIDUP AND HOSTILITIES
Perhaps the most widely quoted article on the
proximate origins of the Six Day War, by Charles W. Yost,
carries the thesis that "no government plotted or intended
to start a war in the Middle East in the Spring of 196?."
Rather, Yost finds it "more likely that they blundered
into it" propelled by the dynamic of "common intolerance
and mutual harassment
.
""' While there is no lack of in-
triguing speculation which lays the burden of more- or- less
premeditated guilt at the hands of either Arab or Israeli,^
Yost's judicious approach is not only most analytically
comfortable for our purposes, but appears to conform most
satisfactorily to the unfolding events as we perceive
them. If this be so, then each party to the crisis con-
tributed in some measure to the proximate origins of the
crisis. It is the task of this section to delineate
these contributions, if this be the proper word. The
reader is reminded that we are concerned here only with
proximate causes to the war. The grievances in this
dilemma are, unfortunately, of near historical standing,
so much time has passed without an equitable settlement.
However, the long-standing crimes and injustices involved
are of less interest to us here than the eveniJs and attitudes
2which, occurring in 1966 and 196?, led up to the war. It
is in this rough sense that we use the word "proximate"
to inform the reader of our intent and interest.
Similarly to the others, the Israeli contribution
was crucial. There are certain events with which Israel
may be charged for being liable and certain attitudes
and motifs in Israel policy which we shall discuss here;
the events first.
On November I3, 1966 the regular troops of Israel
launched a massive retaliatory attack on the Jordinian
village of Es-Samuand environs, Jordanian civilian and
military casualties included 18 killed and 5^4- wounded
while nearly 200 homes and other structures were
3demolished, the majority totally so. The representative
of Israel pointed out that 71 raids had been conducted
against Israel since January, 1965 (II4- from Jordanian
territory in the preceding 6 months) across both Syrian
and other borders, that Israel was holding Arab Govern-
ments accountable for inciting or stopping these in-
cursions, that the action was a limited and local one,
and that every state possesses the right to protect its
citizens from such terrorism and sabotage.^ Regardless of
the merits or their lack thereof concerning Israeli
retaliation policy, criticism here centers upon the size
and strength used, the target chosen and the ramifications
which were either not foreseen or, if foreseen, simply ignored.
3The reprisal raid was the biggest since the 1956 war
and not Syria, but more moderate Jordan, was the principal
victim of these raids. ^ It appeared that Israel had not
chosen Syria because of mounting Soviet interest there,
the recent defense pact with the United Arab Republic
and the higher Israeli casualties which the more rugged
Syrian terrain would have brought. The more moderate,
isolated, American- influenced and accessible Jordan was
chosen instead. In consequence. King Hussein's position
was strongly besieged, both from within and without, the
United States exposed and embarrassed, Arab moderates
undermined, Arab extremists emboldened and Russian in-
fluence heightened. Arthur J. Goldberg, chief United
States Delegate stated that Es-Samu was a raid "the nature
of which and whose consequences in human lives and in
destruction far surpass the cumulative total of the various
acts of terrorism conducted against the frontiers of
Israel."^ On November 25 the Security Council adopted
resolution 226 (1966) by a vote of li;-C-l which stated
that the membership "censures Israel for this large-scale
military action
. , . [and]
. . . emphasizes to Israel
that actions of military reprisal cannot be tolerated
and that if they are repeated, the Security Council will
have to coi:sider further and more effective steps as
envisaged in the Charter."*'' The vote was unusually lop-
sided (only New Zealand abstained), the language of the
1^
resolution was unusually blunt and forceful, the possibility
of sanctions raised and even the United States joined in
the condemnation. This was doubly unusual, not only be-
cause the United States was censuring Israel, but because
heretofore the United Nations had censured only acts of
member governments; this time it was censuring the Govern-
ment itself
.
The second incident, on April 7, 196?, grew out of
divergent interpretations between Israel on the one hand,
and the United Nations and Arab states on the other hand.
Israel claimed that the Syrian- Israeli General Armistice
Q
Agreement had given her near- complete sovereignty over
9the demilitarized zones. Included among Israel's per-
ceived rights in these zones was the right of cultivation.
Any number of observers and Security Council resolutions
attest to this and other Israeli activities in the de-
militarized zone.^^ Both the stand of the Arab states
and the "authoritative" interpretation of various of the
provisions of the Israel- Syrian General Armistice Agree-
ment written by Dr. Ralph Bunche, converged upon the
point that: "Questions of permanent boundaries, terri-
torial sovereignty . . . and the like must be dealt with
in the ultimjate peace treaty and not in the Armistice
Agreement."
"^"^ According to the Syrian view, when Israel
began such cultivation, it initiated an activity which
conceivably could prejudice in Israel's favor the claims
5to these lands, since title to them could be decided only
when and if peace and agreement came.^^ On April 3 the
Israeli press announced the cultivation of certain dis-
puted sections of the Israeli- Syrian demilitarized zone.
On April 7 such plowing began, Syrian small arms fire
commenced and the battle escalated such that jet aircraft
fought just outside Damascus with the Israeli pilots
reportedly buzzing the city itself after dispatching six
Syrian aircraft.^-^
Israel termed this a reprisal while the Arab states
called it a deliberate provocation to incite a new war."""^
The deep pursuit of Syrian aircraft in this second, large-
scale and dramatic action by Israel upon bordering Arab
states was cause for concern in Damascus, Amman and Cairo.
Moreover, an Arab state had been invaded without any
military response from the U.A.R. with which it had had
a formal treaty of mutual defense since 1966. Repeated
massive reprisals of this type could only place a leader
such as Nasser, whose ascendant leadership had been slip-
ping, in a position such that he would feel it necessary
to respond massively in kind. Walter Z. Laqueur, a fair
observer, but one sympathetic to Israel wrote:
Moreover, Israel's policy of retaliation had lately
exacerbated the conflict. But for Samu and the
battle of 7 April, there would not have been a war
in 1967. . . . Had Israel refrained from major
raids, the storm might have passed it by, and left
the Arab leaders entirely absorbed in their own
6bitter conflicts. Then in a few years time, someArab governments might be readier to resign them-
selves to Israel's existence. 15
Then there is the matter of Israeli bellicosity in
speech in early and mid-May. On May ?, Prime Minister
Levi Eshkol said that Israel would "adopt suitable
counter-measures against the foci of sabotage and their
abettors." On May ll|, Eshkol stated that Israel would,
concerning border incursions, "respond at a place, time
and by a method of OUR choosing . ""''^ A dispatch from
Jerusalem published on May li; in The New York Times
reported a highly placed Israeli source as threatening
"military action aimed at overthrowing the Syrian regime"
unless Syria ceased her support and incitement of in-
cursions by the Palestinian guerrilla organization,
18
Pateh. Finally, on May the usually authoritative
Jerusalem Post Weekly reported ultimatum- like statements
from the Israeli Prime Minister and Foreign Minister pre-
dicting an inevitable "major military clash" with Syria,
The dispatch continued very specifically:
Military experts here believe that Israel is prepared
to risk Egyptian intervention in its determination
to put an end to Syrian aggression.
The anticipated clash is not thought likely to
assume the dimensions of a full campaign but to be in
the nature of a military expedition intended to take
the wind out of the Syrian's sails once and for all."^"
Not that Syria or Pateh were innocent of provoking
Israel so that this sort of situation came about, but
certainly Israel, at this tim^, was considering an
7extraordinary retaliation. Just below the level of a "full
campaign," but at or above the threshold which might
stimulate an Egyptian response. One line of interprets-
tion attempts to explain away this Israeli contribution
by claiming that a Western wire service sent a "garbled"
account of official Israeli thinking at that moment which
was then printed by newspapers in the rest of the world. 20
While it is entirely possible that this occurred, such an
interpretation does not explain the appearance or content
of the dispatch domestically printed in the usually
authoritative Jerusalem Post Weekly and cited above. On
May 19 Secretary-General U Thant said:
Intemperate and bellicose utterances by officials
and non- officials ... are unfortunately more orless routine on both sides of the lines in the
Near- East. In recent weeks, however reports
emanating from Israel have attributed to somehigh officials in that state statements so
threatening as to be particularlv inflamatory inthe sense that they could only heighten emotions
and thereby increase tension on the other side ofthe line.^-"-
It is extremely likely that such Israeli statements
could have persuaded not only the Damascus regime but also
Nasser that a major military strike was in the offing
which could endanger Damascus itself.
The first proximate Arab contribution to the Six Day
War began with the Fateh raids from Syria. In early 1966
a more radical regime came to power by a coup in Syria.
Armed forays by Fateh commandos into Israel proper usually
ebbed after Israel retaliated, although public opinion
and concern in Israel reached newer heights after the
raids inevitably began again. Israel charged that Syria
was violating her United Nations Charter obligations and
the 191+9 Armistice Agreement by permitting unlawful borde
crossings and the use of force.22 gyria retorted that
she had no authority to obstruct the drive to redress
and self-determination promised to the Palestinian Arabs
by the U.N. Charter, but denied them by Israel. ^3 in-
cursions and incidents increased in number as late 1966
and early 196? passed; Israel reported eight incidents
attributed to Syrian- based groups in the twenty- five
day period between April ll|. and May 8, 196?,^^ Prim.e
Minister Eshkol spoke of "ever- fresh graves" in a speech
on May 15.^5 Merits of all cases aside, the policy of
Syria to promote and encourage such activities to emanate
from her territory was both unrealistic and adventuresome
Syria was militarily weak in comparison to Israel. It is
dangerous to conduct a campaign of violence against a
stronger opponent who is known to respond violently when
in this sort of a position. U Thant could have had this
in mind when he stated on May 19 in the same report which
noted Israel's verbal bellicosity that Fateh activities
"are a major factor ... [in aggravating the situation
and increasing tension] in that they provoke strong
9reactions in Israel by the government and population
alike.
The second proximate Arab contribution to the Six Day
War centers upon the United Arab Republic's decision to
terminate its consent for the continued presence of United
Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) stationed in the Sinai
3ince 1957. This action and the ramifications which
followed stemmed from the actions we have described above.
On May I3 Nasser stated that he received reports from
both Syrian and Soviet intelligence that "there was an
enemy plan for the invasion of Syria" and decided "not
to accept this silently. "^"^ Nasser was under multiple
pressures: his military venture into Yemen was debil-
itating Egypt's never strong economy, PL 48C wheat pur-
chases from the United States had been cut off, and he
had come under withering Arab criticism for not reacting
to earlier Israeli incursions against Jordan and Syria.
Nasser's successes had soured and his influence and
prestige were slipping. If Syria were attacked she cer-
tainly could call for Egyptian assistance under the
Treaty of Mutual Defense of November, I966. It is
important here to understand the Arabs' conviction con-
cerning Israel's willingness to "try it [armed conquest]
again" as well as their determination never to be caught
militarily unprepared and off-guard as was the case in
1956 against the combined British- French- Israeli
10
operation. A display of determination and force then
would serve not only his position in the Arab world, but
possibly to deter Israel from invading Syria. Israeli
observers believed, on the other hand, that Moscow and
the Syrian regime had "bluffed" Nasser into serving the
29
more radical and warlike policy of Damascus. But,
unquestionably, both Arabs and Israelis would take
Nasser's posturing for cant so long as buffering UNEP
forces were stationed on Egyptian territory.
On May 15 Nasser put U.A.R. armed forces on alert
and began moving them ostentatiously through Cairo to
the Sinai. On May 16, 2200 hours GMT, the Chief of Staff
of the United Arab Republic Armed Forces, General Fawzy,
sent a written message to Ma jor-General Rikhye, Commander
of UNEF, requesting withdrawal of "all UN troops which
install observation posts along our borders." Secretary-
General U Thant notified the Permanent Representative of
the United Arab Republic of compliance with his country's
request by letter on May 18.
The alacrity by which this decision was reached has
provided fodder for a major and long- las ting controversy.
The Secretary- General held that the "consent and coopera-
tion of the host country is essential to the effective
operation and , . . very existence" of any UNEF- type
force; that just as "Israel exercised its sovereign right
to refuse the stationing of UNEF on its side" so, the
11
United Arab Republic Government should not then "be told
that it could not unilaterally seek the removal of the
forces. "^^
We choose at this point not to enter into a dis-
cussion of the various other legal positions concerning
the Secre tary- General
' s action. But a few comments on
certain aspects would be in order. First, Alastair
Buchan then Director of the Institute for Strategic
Studies (London) suggests that Nasser did not expect
UNEF to be withdrawn so meekly, and that there was doubt
expressed even in Israel that Nasser wanted so rapid a
31
withdrawal.-^ Buchan tells us that Dag Hamraarskjold had
left Nasser "in no doubt that the Secretary- General would
not withdraw UNEF simply when Egypt requested it" and
that "an exchange of views would be called for towards
harmonizing the positions. "^^ The public commitments of
the United Arab Republic and U Thant's unexpected behavior
made it difficult for Nasser to back down when he got more
than he bargained for. Secondly, the total withdrawal of
UNEF placed the UAR and Israeli troops in an eyeball-to-
eyeball confrontation situation the likes of which had net
been seen since 1956 when Israel claimed the massing of
Egyptian troops in the Sinai as a casus belli . Third,
Sharm El Sheikh was now openly devoid of neutralizing
forces and beckoned to be occupied by U.A.R. troops— an act
which placed them in a position to thrgaten the passage of
12
ships thi*ough the Straits of Tiran.
On May 22, Nasser announced the re- imposition of a
blockade of the Straits of Tiran to ships flying the
Israeli flag and ships of other countries carrying
strategic goods to Israel. This too had been one of the
casus belli in 1956.^-^ Egypt claimed the waters were
exclusively Arab; Israel claimed the rights of a littoral
state; Egypt invoked the belligerent status which flows
from a continuing state of war; and Israel (with other
maritime nations including the United States) claimed the
right of innocent passage. Israel had repeatedly warned
through the 7/oar3 that free and unimpeded passage was a
vital interest of the state and that an attempt to change
that status would bring war. Nasser himself estimated
the chances for war at 100 percent after the closure of
Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.
Once again we point out that while this is not the
appropriate place to weigh the various legal positions,
a number of points do need to be made. First, this was
a step which separated Egypt from Syria; it certainly was
of no immediate protective value to Damascus. Secondly,
prior to Kay 22, Nasser's moves had been spectacular, but
innocuous; now, under the taunts of other Arab States-^
It
Nasser took a step v;hich galvanized Israel-'-' and escalated
the crisis to a level at which war was nearly inevitable.
Finally, Nasser's offer to take the Straits question to
the International Court of Justice, statements that he
would not attack first, but wished merely a return to the
pre- 1956 situation coupled to Israeli hesitation, and
great power urgings of caution and restraint all seemed to
point to a spectacular diplomatic success for Nasser which
might isolate Israel, damage its "credibility" and, once
Israel accepted this perceived limitation of sovereignty,
psychologically "appeared to be the beginning of the end,
the slow strangulation of the Jewish state. "-^"^ Finally,
there is no way of calculating the intensity of the long-
repressed Arab feeling toward Israel which inundated and
unified the Arab world while providing more fuel for the
unintended, but now raging, irreversible flames. How-
ever, according to some analysts, Israel would have to
39accede to this.'^ Whether or not Jerusalem or Cairo
literally meant what they said, in the dangerous world of
international politics it is more than likely that con-
tentions, and especially actions, will be looked upon
gravely and that adversaries will act in response to them.
It is also worthy to note that with the signing of the
Jordanian- UAR Defense Treaty on May last of factors
present before the Israeli attack in 195^-- the multiplica-
tion of raids into Israeli territory, border troop build-
ups, a blockade at Tiran and the defense agreement with
Jordan- -all had recurred.
The Individual Soviet contribution to the crisis
stemmed from Moscow's interest in deterring an Israeli
invasion, thereby to assist her favored regime in Damascus.
The nature of the Soviet role beyond this is not clear.
Information was passed on to Nasser concerning alleged
Israeli troop concentrations and, it appears, that certain
assurances were conveyed to Nasser prior to his closure
of the Straits of Tiran on May 22.^^ The Soviet role
must be explained within the context of general Soviet
interests in the Middle East. For while Russia is com-
petitively interested in increasing Soviet influence in
the Middle East and minimizing that of the United States,
there also exists a cooperative interest among the super-
powers in avoiding extra-area escalation to nuclear war.
Soviet policy toward Israel is aimed toward threats and
political pressure to make Jerusalem give up its gains and
not at the physical annihilation of the state. Moreover,
the continued existence of Israel induces continued coopera-
tion on the part of Arab states with the Soviet Union to
blunt the perceived threat of Israeli expansion while being
useful to polarize a previously Western domain. Within this
context it would be reasonable to guess that Soviet efforts
to protect the Damascus regime would coincide with Nasser's
aims for leadership in the region. Hie muscle- flexing and
sabre-rattling of pre-May 22 days would appear to conforra
to these wishes, although at least one report has it that
15
Nasser merely informed the Soviets of his request to have
UNEP withdrawn and acted despite their cautioning>^ But
the closure of the Straits and the events which unfolded
thereafter do not appear to have been within the control
of the Russians.^
The Soviets did encourage Arab initiatives at the
beginning while later exercising only the weakest con-
straining influences. This attitude was of crucial value
in creating the crisis. Russia supported Egyptian
mobilization in the Sinai, dampened proposals for the
United Nations' involvement in the situation, tried to
bully Israel and acted in a restrained manner only in the
avoidance of a superpower confrontation. While the
Soviets underestimated Israeli determination and strength,
it overestimated the United States' restraining influence
on Israel, and the Arab capacity to handle the full war
situation which came about. So, amidst the quick pace of
developments and spectacular successes extracted by Nasser,
the Soviet Union found itself swept along, not unwillingly
at first, by its public and private commitments to Arab
states. What other reason, for example, is there for
awakening both Nasser and Eshkol at 3:00 A.M. on May 2?
to deliver notes to pajamad Heads-of-s tate which attempted
to moderate the situation somewhat ?^-^ The Soviets had an
interest in encouraging i;ho initial events of what turned
cut to be a full-scale subsystem confrontation; they exercised
16
little or no moderation over events as they unfolded;
and, consequently, the major reactions and counter- reactions
occurred in Cairo and Jerusalem, Amman and Damascus rather
than Moscow, Washington or New York.
The major individual contribution of the United States
to this crisis lay in Washington's unwillingness, hesitancy
and erraticism in acting. Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles and President Dwight D, Eisenhower in 195? had con-
veyed both in letter and speech their assurances to Israel
that the Straits of Tiran would remain open to unimpeded
Israeli shipping despite the pullback of Jerusalem's troops
and then withdrawal by UNEF forces.^ Half-hearted sug-
gestions and attempts by the United States in 196? to
assist the opening of the Straits to free and innocent
passage came to naught. And it soon became apparent
that the only power that would reopen the Straits to Israel
would be Israel herself. On the other side of the coin,
the UAR and Israel were left without an intervening or
mediating power between them, given this United States
policy. On his trip to the United States on May 26,
Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban found President Lyndon
Johnson sympathetic, but in no mood to be hurried into a
new theatre of hostilities given the then- current commit-
ii6
ment in Viet Nam.^
Much American behavior during this period underlines
the general (and in this case specific) indecisiveness of
17
American policy which flows from tho "pattern of limited
commitment, limited objectives
. . . limited understanding."^''
The prime conditioning factor of United States Middle East
policy is its recognition and support of the State of
Israel. This has precluded the realization of any real
policy of "even-handedness." David Nes, United States
Charge d' Affaires in Cairo in 196 7 through the June war,
has alleged that despite such tens ion- constraints as oil
investments and the global- strategic position of the area,
U.S. commitments were not as limited as one would believe.
During the months before the June I967 hostilities
the military intelligence requirements required by Wash-
ington from American embassies, the Central Intelligence
Agency and military intelligence staffs in the Middle East
were largely based on Israeli needs, not on American in-
terests. The effectiveness of the Israeli air strikes on
June 5> 1967 was assured at least in part by information
on Egyptian airfields and aircraft disposition provided
through American sources. With political and economic in-
forniation, it has long been State Department practice to
provide the Israeli Embassy in Washington with copies of
all our reports from Middle East embassies considered to
be of interest. Geoffrey Kemp, a student of arms control
policy and security in the region concluded that the
de facto aim of the Western powers' arms policy has been
18
not equilibrium, but to provide sufficient arms to Israel
such that she "would be in a marginally superior military
position over any combination of local Arab countries . "^"^
Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco stated that the
United States "has supported the security and well-being
of Israel for two decades, with a constancy rarely sur-
passed in the history of relations between nations," On
the other hand, for reasons of transportation and com-
munication, land bridges, oil and strategy the United
States seeks friendship and influence with the Arab
states. It is the contradiction between these policies
which traditionally projects a "floundering" U.S. diplomacy
in the area and helped stymie potential United States
influence in this particular case.
There followed a number of "forceful initiatives "^'
by the United States which included on May 3I a UN draft
resolution (S/7916) which criticized UNEF's hasty departure,
questioned the legal grounds for the Straits blockade and
urged a "breathing spell" during which the Gulf of Aqaba
would be at least temporarily reopened. The United States
also attempted to reopen the Straits to Israeli shipping
at first, by an international naval task force to test the
blockade, and then by a declaration of maritime powers
which stated the right of innocent passage for ships
through the international waterways of the Strait of Tiran
and Gulf of Aqaba coupled with their willingness to "assert"
19
this right for their own ships. The first initiative
failed and the second was formally alive though unofficially
nearly dead by the start of the war.
An interesting insight is provided by David Nes,
former acting chief of the United States mission in Cairo
from February I967 until literal hours before the June
war— an insight denied us in the Soviet case of how con-
trol of the crisis slipped out from under the U.S., and
may even have been accelerated by American behavior during
the slide toward war. According to Nes, President Lyndon B.
Johnson's administration had long and evasively delayed the
firm extension requested by Egypt of a $150 million a year
PI48O food plan which was absolutely central to planning,
national diet, foreign exchange and to internal economic
development. Nes holds that the original plan was "sold"
to the American Congress as a manner of influencing Nasser
to behave in ways compatible with United States aims. But
at the end of the original three-year program period.
Congress balked at approving an extension on the grounds
that "the U.S. had failed to receive the advantages on
which the plan had been predicated. "^^ Nes holds that
because Johnson chose to respond evasively rather than to
provide a candid explanation of congressional difficulties,
"there was created in the Egyptian mind a feeling that our
basic policy of friendship and normal relations had changed
to one of hostility,"' ' Next, in the economic area
20
Washington postponed releasing for domestic development
projects the United Arab Republic pound reserves which were
held by the United States, and placed pressure on the
international bank to prevent the U.A.R. from utilizing
drawing rights to hard currency to which Cairo was
entitled. Washington was the only creditor of Egypt
(among whom Nasser counted most of the V/estern powers)
which refused to reschedule the U.A.R. debt.^^ In addi-
tion, the "refusal" of the U.S. to continue discussing
certain large development projects important to Egypt,
such as nuclear desalinization and Suez Canal moderniza-
tion (which Washington had previously looked upon with
favor), coupled with "Uhe distinctly cool U.S. response to
Nasser's request to mediate the Yemeni problem and to an
invitation extended to Secretary of State Dean Rusk to
visit Cairo— all of these cumulatively added up to a new
official view of U.S. intentions:
All of these were minor irritations in themselves
but taken together, they created an impression with
the Egyptian leadership that the U.S. was endeavor-
ing to force them into international bankruptcy, was
isolating them in the Arab world and was, in effect,
pursuing a policy designed not only to undermine
their position in the area, but also to create
opposition within Egypt which might result in the
overthrow of the Nasser regime.
There is good reason to believe that backed into
a corner as it were, by the series of American actions
end inactions, by interpreting them as signs of
hostility. President Nasser and his principal govern-
mental advisors felt that they had to break out of this
encirclement through some sort of dramatic political
action. The action that they finally took is, of
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of course, well-known and part of history resultingin the hostilities known as the June 117.SS ^
In consequence, American influence in Cairo fell t(
an extremely low ebb: Nasser would not even receive the
State Department's special emissary, Charles Yost, who
arrived in Cairo on May 29; nor did he respond to Johnson's
handsigned messages:
On his [Nasser's] desk lay an unanswered letter hehad received from Johnson the previous week "Ihave received a nice letter from President Johnson,"
ne Informed the French Ambassador in Cairo, "an^ Idon't intend to answer it for the time being. "5b
Just at the crucial moment when American influence
was at its lowest, the need for its focused exercise in
Cairo was at a height. Moreover, the chosen behavior
of the Soviet Union left the responsibility for peace-
keeping to the U.S. The point may be illustrated by
sequential newspaper dispatches during late May:
So far, Moscow has played a passive role, a passivity
that hinders Washington by leaving it the burden of
resolving the current crisis. This handicap is
significant at a time when Moscow's voice carries
great weight in Arab capitals while Western influence
in Egypt and Syria is at a low ebb. 57
The diplomatic problem for the United States became
one of not only holding the Israelis in check, but
finding some face-saving way for Mr. Nasser to retreat
on his blockade .5°
The essence of the problem as seen at the White House
therefore is to find a face-saving formula by which
the United Arab Republic can avoid or rescind its
blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba.
. .
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Not only did the United States face the problem of
lack of influence in Cairo, but in Jerusalem as well. It
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seems surprising that despite Israel's vital dependence on
Washington's good graces for vast military, and especially
economic gifts and aid, that Washington did not have more
of a voice in Israeli decision- making, but such was the
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case. One crucial moment was the Israeli cabinet meeting
which followed Abba Eban's talk with President Johnson:
The Johnson administration had been fearful that
Israel's military leaders might persuade Premier Levi
Eshkol and the cabinet to approve an offensive to
try to force President Gamal Abdul Nasser to lift his
blockade of the Strait of Tiran to Israeli ships.
. . .
The object of greatest White House interest
today was the meeting of the Israeli cabinet, which
it was felt, might provide the major test of the
President's persuasiveness with Abba Eban.
The Administration has hesitated, therefore, to
offer any new commitments of support for the Israelis
fearing that such commitments would poly encourage the
most militant quarters in Jerusalem.
Two points need to be made here. First, on a theo-
retical level, when a small state perceives a sufficient
threat to a vital interest which is not viewed as effec-
tively countered by its great power protector, the small
state may act alone. Second, despite the reduced nature
of the world due to modern communications, the final de-
cision for war was made in Jerusalem, and there was little
Washington could do about it. Such is the delicacy of
civilization's web. So is this crisis crucial to human-
kind.
The United Nations played a v;eak and steadily de-
clining role in the crisis until the outbreak of war. For
various reasons, the Security Council did not hold its
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first meeting on the Middle East situation until May 2i^,
was not consulted on the Ul^P withdrawals, and met for
eight days, until June 3 without formulating a position
on the Straits question. Vnile the United Nations may be
criticized for failing to exercise any influence of sig-
nificance on the developing crisis, criticism for con-
tributing to the war must be shared between the area and
great powers: both the Arab States and Israel chose to
cajole and threaten each other rather than demand Security
Council action during this period; the great powers pre-
sented increasingly rigid and visible disagreement on
substantive matters. For example, while the Soviet Union
as late as May 29 questioned the necessity for the Security
Council even to deal with the Middle East situation,^^ the
United States, once its forceful initiative on the Straits
of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba came to naught, refused to
alter its public stand and awaited the outbreak of war.
In this developing crisis the United Nations did not
appear to have an independent political role concerning
the peace and security of the world. Rather, its inability
to affect significantly the course of events indicates
mirror- like the reflective nature of small, and especially
great power disagreement, and the symmetrical United Nations
paralysis which occurs when great power aims conflict than
converge. This inay be opitcmized in the UNEF withdrawal
issue: while the UAR requested their withdrawal, Israel
2k
was unwilling to permit UNEF stationing on her side of
the cease fire line and the United Nations lost consider-
able of the effectiveness which it possessed in the area.
Great power disagreement and lack of coordination in the
Security Council did not permit the reinstitution of such
a force in the Middle East, In fact, during this upswing
phase preliminary to conflict, the great powers by their
staunch support of their client states, and consequent
rigidity of position reduced the chances for compromise
and accommodation at the area level, thereby assisting in
the unintended drive toward war.
On June 5, I967 the armed forces of the Israel Govern-
ment swung into action as Abba Eban said, to
. . .
repel the attempt which was mounted three weeks
ago to procure our encirclement and strangulation and
thereafter to work with our neighbors to build a
better and more stable system of relationship. These
are our objectives; these are our aims, ^3
Militarily, the fulfillment of these aims began with
unbelievably devastating air sweeps directed at the air
forces first of Egypt, then of Syria, Jordan and Iraq. The
advance planning and superbly trained initiative of the
Israel Air Force staff and pilots destroyed the bulk of
the Arab aircraft on the ground the very first day. Accord-
ing to General Mordechai Hod, Commander of the Israel Air
Force, i^-lO Arab planes were destroyed on the first day, 19
on the cjecond day, Ik on the third and 9 on the fourth. ^
Simultaneously, Israel infantry, armor, helicopter and
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then airborne troops struck at the Gaza Strip and penetrated
as deeply as forty miles into the Sinai Peninsula on the
first day.^^ Khan Yunis and el Arish in Gaza and northern
Sinai were captured on the first and second days (June 5
and 6), respectively. On June ? the Mitla Pass was blocked
and the final fate of thousands of Egyptian fighting men
and their vehicles, now fleeing, sealed. Parachutists
took Sharm el Sheikh and were deploying up and down the
Suez Canal by June 8. Egyptian manpower losses in the
Sinai campaign were put at 11,500 officers and soldiers
killed, over 5,000 captured and 80 percent of Egyptian
equipment lost (destroyed or intact). Israeli losses were
put at 275 officers and enlisted men killed and 800
wounded.
Fighting began between Israel and Jordan on June 5.
Against perhaps the most stubborn and courageous of Arab
resistance, fast wheeling Israeli forces captured the
cities of Jenin, Rair^llah and Nablus by late June 7 aided
by the efforts of their air force now helpfully concentra-
ting on Jordanian and Iraqi armor. A coordinated attack
by Israeli artillery, armor, aircraft and infantry
simultaneously began the encirclement and isolation of
Jerusalem on June 5. Early on June 7 the assault on the
Old City began, climactically seizing the Wailing Wall,
a feat which released a floodtide of emotions among
Israelis, before the Israeli force pressed on to Bethlehem
26
and Hebron. By the evening of June 7 when the representa-
tlves of both Jordan and Israel accepted the cease-fire
in the Security Council the entire West Bank was in
Israeli hands. The Jordanian Government estimated its
losses at just under 7,000 killed, wounded, missing or
captured (the majority killed). Israel losses against
Jordan exceeded those in the Sinai operation: 299 were
officially listed as killed and 1,1^.57 wounded by the
Jerusalem Government. Losses of Jordanian equipment were
proportionately high.^®
Until June 9, action on the Syrian front was com-
prised primarily of artillery and air bombardments broken
only by minor Syrian armor and infantry attacks on
June 6. Following the Jordanian collapse, Israeli troops
wheeled north while its air force concentrated its operations
against the Golan Heights. The offensive against Syria
was delayed by Israel because of uncertainty over Security
Council activity which might cause Israel to suffer
casualties in vain, and perhaps by Soviet sabre-rattling
which threatened intervention. The buildup of Israeli
troops actually was ordered into operation after Israeli
and Syrian representatives in the Security Council had
formally agreed to a cease-fire.
Where fighting occurred on the Maginot Line- like
Syrian front, it was fierce and casualties relatively heavy
on both sides; the technology of air strikes and artillery
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mingled with frequent age-old hand-to-hand combat in
trenches and prepared positions especially at the northern
Syrian stronghold at Tel Pahar.^^ Rotable indeed was the
Israeli advance in the northern Kfur Szold-Banias region
where the Israelis fought up a rootless mountain behind
mine removers and bulldozers preparing the way for the
tanks which followed. The fall of Kuneitra on June 10
signified to the Syrians that little if any help could be
expected from the rea- and that the Israelis were on their
way to encircle and trap them. A headlong retreat by the
remaining Syrian forces began which, while it saved their
lives and provided additional troops for the defense of
Damascus, literally left only mobility as a restraint on
the Syrian territory Israel could seize. Syrian losses
were put at approximately 2,50C killed and 5,000 wounded.'''^
With the conclusion of the war Israel found itself
controlling about i|.7,C00 square miles of Egyptian,
Jordanian and Syrian territory in contrast to the pre- June 6,
1967 Israel of about 8,000 miles. An additional one
million Arabs now lived in areas under Israeli control.
The war was quick, furious, rapidly moving and militarily
decisive. Certainly there could be no question of the
paramountcy of the armed forces of a modernized nation, in
comparison with those of developing states within the
then-parameters making up the Middle Eastern international
system. Arab losses were great not only in terms of land.
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but also in terras of a particular type of man. The armed
forces compose a significant percentage of the modernized
manpower pool available to the Arab world. William Polk
has estimated that the loss of 25,000 to 30,000 such men
"amounts to perhaps five percent of the modernized labor
force of the Arab countries. In terms of a rough comr
parison with the United States. This would be a loss of
approximately five million men.""^-^ We can only acquire
glimpses of the psychological exhilaration, despair,
accommodation and intransigence engendered by the war.
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CHAPTER II
LEGAL POSITIONS OF DIRECT PARTIES
A "Just and Lasting Peace" between Arabs and Israelis
is the dream of all men in all lands, not just the dream of
men who inhabit or are concerned with the Middle East. But
the Arab- Israeli conflict, the Palestinian problem, the
question of Arab or Israeli aggression—however one's
position on the compass of sympathy or bias affects the
semantic choices mianifesting his perception of the
problems— the problem has been with us for more than two
decades. Not only that, the fact that the conflict is
geographically embedded in an area of significance par-
ticularly vital to the West, the facts of transit-
communications linkage between continents, oil and simple
geostrategic position all being descriptive of the Middle
East lends a note of real possibility to the escalatory,
holocaustic scenarios of Great Power nuclear confrontation
depicted as springing Medusa- like from the maws of this
problem.
Oddly enough this eruption may have unrecognizably
carried within itself the seeds of settlement which could
grow into peace-- certainly not strong and sturdy at first,
but peace nonetheless. Arthur Lell has written wisely:
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?r,% r nevertheless a recurring
affairs, that the worse the
^
situation becomes, the more drastic are the remedies
^^e n^^r'^^'^'^r'^^^ international c_ity.Th paradox is only superficial. Clearly, conflict ^
^«.1n.1ti ^^TL^'^^l ""^^ situation has deterioratedseriously and therefore demands a basic solution.
^
It was this sort of sentiment-- that after the bitter
harvest of more than two decades of war, belligerency,
guerrilla or terrorist activity, this hemorrhage of men,
treasure and emotion "had become a burden to world peace,
and that the world community should finally insist on the
establishment of a condition of peace, flowing from the
agreement of the parties."^ The United States, though it
tended to protect the interests of Israel in the United
Nations, recognized this while the Soviet Union was still
singularly engrossed in the more immediately gratifying
though arid effort to condemn Israel for "aggression."^
But the United States was hardly alone in its perception.
During its session of June 6, 196?, seven members of the
Security Council--Argentina, Canada, China, Ethiopia, Japan,
The United Kingdom and, surprisingly, Mali joined the United
States in agreeing to the necessity either to face up to
the fundamental problems at the root of the conflict, and
to attempt to solve them, or expect to meet the problem
in a crisis situation again.^ Such a feeling certainly
provided much of the motive drive which eventually resulted
in the November 22, 196? Security Council Resolution,
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Such an approach certainly is consistent with the
basic mission of the United Nations as set forth in its
Charter. Certainly it is consistent not only with Article 1
which sets forth the purposes of the organization, but also
with Article 2 which describes the principles in accordance
with which members shall act. Among other purposes and
principles the former calls for the United Nations to
"maintain international peace and security," to settle
breaches of the peace "in conformity with the principles
of justice and international laW and to act as "a centre
for harmonizing the actions of nations" toward these ends;
the latter speaks to the peaceful settlement of inter-
national disputes such that "security and justice are not
endangered" while refraining from the threat or use of
force. The principle is also consistent with Article 2I4.
which confers on the Security Council "primary responsi-
bility for the maintenance of international peace and
security." Nor need we but mention this principle's
conformity with Articles 33 and 2k which has to do with
the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" as well as with
Article i;0.
As for the rest, the content cf the hope for "A
Just and Lasting Peace" will unfold simultaneously with
our discussion.
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To the victors belong the spoils and throughout the
Arab- Israeli conflict, the most sought-after spoil has
been land. With her lightning conquest, Israel greatly
increased the amount of land under her control. The Gaza
Strip, crowded hothouse of Palestinian misery and re-
sistance; the Sinai Peninsula, historical defensive buffer
for the possessor state, natural offensive threat to the
state denied its possession; the West Bank, vessel for
Jerusalem and vital strategic dagger; and the Golan Heights,
threat to Israel, pride of Syria— all were taken in the
Israeli Blitzkrieg- type campaign. For the first time in
Israel's history, virtually every prior threatening area
was in her hands and her jagged, indefensible boundaries
now were straightened and more manageable. In a sense,
land is a "zero'-siim" quantity in the Middle East equation.
And what Israel had won, Arabs had lost. Not just the
Palestinians this time— Arabs. Syrians, Jordanians,
Egyptians and Palestinians now shared a common experience
which to them irrefutably proved again the threat which
an expansionist-minded Israel posed. Israel was forced
to disgorge its 1956 conquests by a United States President
who believed in conformance "to the strong aentiment of the
world coirmiunity as expressed in various United Wations
resolutions relating to withdrawal."^ In 19^7, no such
conformance was insisted upon.
1^0
The Israeli case is as follows: by "going to war"
the Arab Governments had automatically repudiated the
armistice agreements and its demarcation line. Israel
will not withdraw from the conquered areas until the Arabs
ceased their claim to a legal state of war, nonrecognition
of the sovereign equality of Israel, hostile actions and
continual threats against Israel's existence and agree to
free passage through international waterways for ships of
all nations. Once before, in 1956, the Israelis had with-
drawn from territory on the basis of promises and under-
standings rather than a binding peace treaty negotiated
directly and without the intermediaries of even the closest
friends. Therefore, Israel felt justified in retaining
these conquests until peace actually came.^ At first
espousing no territorial claims, Israeli officialdom
quickly changed its mind.^ Remembering on the one hand,
the United States' 1957 position that the Charter precluded
"using the forcible seizure and occupation of other lands
as bargaining power in the settlement of international dis-
putes" and the American commitment to "remedying" Israel's
"legitimate grievances" concerning the Gulf of Aqaba and
the Gaza Strip° and, on the other hand, the promises and
understanding which never materialized after Israel's un-
conditional withdrawal, Israel felt justified in acting
differently this time. This time Israel would not withdraw
1^1
except as part of a firm conditional agreement, negotiated
on a face-to-face basis, in which such questions as the
Arab claim to a state of war, borders, recognition and
refugees would be dealt with.*^ Jerusalem was not about
to entrust its security either to a great power or an
international organization which had proved unreliable
in the past. At the moment of crisis, the United Nations
had been paralyzed while the United States vacillated.
Israel would retain control of the occupied territories
until a peace settlement was negotiated and her terms met.
In the meantime, Israel constructed the Bar- Lev line of
fortifications along the Suez Canal, sprinkled Nahal
fortified kibbutzim in the West Bank and annexed Jerusalem.
There are two separate points to the Arab position
concerning Israeli troop withdrawal. The first point
relates to the maintenance of armed military forces in
foreign territory without the consent of the host state;
the second point concerns the inadmissibility of
acquisition of territory by war-- the more familiar "no
fruits of aggression" principle according to Charter
articles I and II.
International law prohibits the maintenance of armed
military forces on the territory of another state without
that state's consent. Article IC of the Covenant of the
League of Nations and ths 1926 Kellogg-Briand Pact were
cited by Secretary of State Stimson and recognized by the
k2
League in the Stimson Doctrine in which the United States
refused to recognize any alteration of rights steimning
from the Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchuria in
1931.-^^ The principle, "no fruits of aggression" is
firmly rooted in contemporary international law.
Moreover, the Arab case continues, Article 5i of
the United Nations Charter accepts the inherent right of
state self-defense upon armed attack only "until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security." The interpretive
content of phrases such as these are subject to wide
differences. It appears that territorial occupation by
military forces of another state must cease when peace
and security are restored, even if the case is put forvard
that such occupation was initially justified as a defensive
measure. Arab states insist that the first step toward
establishing peace, on the basis of the principle, is the
withdrawal of Israeli forces. However, Israel insisted
on withdrawal only as part of a more complete settlement.
Principle certainly requires that Israel not retain its
occupied areas as a bargaining weapon, claims the Arab
case. For if Israel extracted territorial or political
concessions as a result, a premium would be put on
aggression which, in effect, would "permit the aggressor
to use the fruits of his aggression to gain the ends
for
which he went to war."-^"^ This could only encourage
aggression generally in other parts of the world and
specifically, according to the Arab view, by an Israel
whose design had always been perceived as expansionist.
The precedent of Israel striking the first blow and being
allowed to retain the fruits of its conquest while in con-
sequence dictating the terms of a settlement to its liking
could only weaken the foundations of the United Nations
and international law, claims the Arab case. Moreover,
Israel's current unilateral dissolution of the Armistice
Agreements and Commissions was disputed by Secretary-
General U Thant who in 196? pointed out:
• • • there has been no indication either in the
General Assembly or in the Security Council that
the validity and applicability of the Armistice
Agreements have been changed as a result of the
recent hostilities or of the war of 1956; each
agreement, in fact, coni;ains a provision that it
will remain in force "until a peaceful settlement
between the parties is achieved." Nor has the
Security Council or the General Assembly taken any
steps to change the pertinent resolutions of either
organ relating to the Armistice Agreements or to the
earlier cease-fire demands. The Agreements provide
that by mutual consent the signatories can revise or
suspend them. There is no provision in them for
unilateral termination of their application. This
has been the United Nations position all along and will
continue to be the position until a competent organ
decides otherwise .-^^
Related to, yet beyond the principle of withdrawal
from occupied territory lies the more specific principle
of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.
We shall shortly review the case of Jerusalem. Israeli
statements have made clear that there will be no return
to the status quo ante in the Gaza Strip, Sinai, the West
Bank or Golan Heights if Israel's current alms are ful-
filled. But simple military occupation of territory
legally that of another state gives no title to that
occupied territory. This was affirmed in the Pan American
Conference of 1890 through the Buenos Aires Declaration
of 1936"'"^ and Lima Declaration of 1938"'"^ and finally,
the Bogota Charter of the Organization of American States
in I9I4.8. Plebiscites rather than force or occupation
were required for territorial transfers under V\foodrow
Wilson's Fourteen Points and applied in some of the peace
settlements."^^ Article 10 's guarantee of territorial
integrity for members found in the League of Nation's
1
7
Covenant carries this implication. ' The Kellog-Briand
Pact of 1928"^^ concurred in this. Territorial acquisitions
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were rejected by the Atlantic Charter. Finally, it may
be pointed out that:
The Charter of the United Nations contains no
collective declaration of non- recognition of ter-
ritorial changes effected through non- pacific means,
but the members of the United Nations have pledged
themselves to suppress acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace (Art. I, par. 1), to settle
their disputes by peaceful means (Art. 2, par. 3)
»
to refrain from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrioy or political independence
of any state (Art. 2, par. and to refrain from
giving assistance to any state against which the
United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement
action (Art. 2, par, 5). It is hardly possible that
recognition of illegal acquisition could be com-
patible with these obligations.^^
The case of Jerusalem is such that it requires
separate treatment. On June 7 after bitter fighting
Israel announced the capture of Jerusalem's Old City and
its environs since 191^.3 governed by Jordan. On June 28,
1967 the state of Israel announced its unilateral annex-
ation of these conquered territories. Much of what has
been previously written concerning withdrawal from con-
quered territories applies here. But because of its
annexation, unlike other conquered territories and primarily
because of Jerusalem's special significance as an eternal
city, holy to three faiths and host to their shrines, this
sector of land, this city and its environs takes on a
special significance of a nature dissimilar from other
21
areas
,
For 3,000 years, control of Jerusalem has been
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acquired by conquest. Disputes and friction--at least
among Christians concerning shrines and their control were
2 3
not unknown to the city. In the twentieth century.
Articles I3 and of the League of Nations mandatory
agreement for Palestine made special mention of the city's
unique religious character and of the mandatory's respon-
sibility to protect the rights of all religious character
and of the mandatory's responsibility to protect the
rights of all religions, their Holy Place, access, worship
and control of them,^^ In 1937, the Report of the Peel
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Coxnmisslon recommended an enclave to include and surround
Jerusalem and Bethlehem under continued British control,
but because of its religious character, separate from
the rest of the proposed partitioned Palestine. The
Anglo-American Committee on Palestine and Related Prob-
lems recommended in 19i|6 that while "international
guarantees" should protect the interests of the three
faiths, the continuing mandatory (British) government
should closely supervise holy places and their vicinity.
On November 29, l9i^-7, the General Assembly of the
United Nations passed Resolution 181 (II) better known as
the Palestine Partition Resolution. Part III of the
resolution began: "The city of Jerusalem shall be estab-
lished as a corpus separatum under a special international
regime and shall be administered by the United Nations"--
a point which only carried out the proposal of the majority
report of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP).^^
The spiral of deterioration in Palestine made faint any
possibility of implementation. The de facto holdings of
Israel (the New City) and Jordan (the Old City) were
formalized in the Israeli- Trans Jordanian Armistice Agree-
2 7ment of 191+9 which created a status quo which lasted
until 1967.
The General Assembly reconfimed its commitment to
internationalization by passing Resolution 19i; (III) on
December 11, I9I18, Resolution 191; (III) created a Con-
ciliation Commission for Palestine and deemed that the
city and its environs should receive "special and
separate treatment from the rest of Palestine" while being
placed "under effective United Nations control. "^^ On
May 11, 19ii9, the General Assembly admitted Israel to
United Nations membership by Resolution 273 (III). This
resolution specifically recalled the General Assembly's
"resolutions of 29 November 19i;7 and 11 December I948"
which sanctioned the internationalization of Jerusalem
and the right of the Palestine refugees to compensation or
return. The resolution continued by "taking note of the
declaration and explanations made by the representative
of the Government of Israel before the Ad Hoc Political
Committee in respect of the implementation of said
29decisions," The post-1967 Arab case points out here
that Jerusalem has been annexed and the Palestinian
refugees not offered the choice of return or compensation.
Especially concerning the refugees, Jerusalem vigorously
placed the blame for the stalemate upon the Arab states.
Just one year later, on December 9, 1914-9 , the General
Assembly approved by a two- thirds margin Resolution
303 (IV) which reasserted internationalization as a goal
for Jerusalem and directed the Trusteeship Council to plan
for and seek implementation of this goal.-^^ The Trustee-
ship Council attempted to put forward a plan for a
demilitarized, neutralized, internationalized corpus
separatum under United Nations auspices, but failed to
arouse the necessary Jordanian or Israeli support. ^-^
A modified statute which instead was more congruent with
the Jordanian- Israeli position was submitted to the
General Assembly but no further action was taken. The
General Assembly did not act on the question of Jerusalem
again until I967,
Both Israel and Jordan strengthened their de facto
if not de .jure presence in Jerusalem by placing educa-
tional, medical and government institutions in the area.
Both Israel and Jordan annexed their areas. Jordan
annexed its sector of Jerusalem in I9I4-9 and proclaimed
the city to be its second capital in 1959. In 1950
Israel's Knesset proclaimed Jerusalem to have been the
capital of the State since independence; in I953 the last
ministry, the Foreign Ministry, was moved from Tel Aviv
to Jerusalem. The United States still retains its
embassy in Tel Aviv, as do the Soviet Union and many other
states as an expression of the nonrecognition of the
designation of Jerusalem as Israel's capital. The con-
struction of a new $7 million Knesset building in Jerusalem
on August 30, 1966 indicated the Israeli intent to stay. 33
Following Israel's annexation of Jerusalem and its
environs on June 27, 196? (which included the taking of
k9
substantial West Bank territory nine miles north to Kalandia
airport and to within one mile of Bethlehem to the south, 3^
the General Assembly in its fifth emergency special session
passed Resolution 2253 (ES-V) on July 1967 by the over-
whelming vote of 99-0-19. The Assembly expressed its
deep concern at the situation in Jerusalem in consequence
of "the measures taken by Israel to change the status of
the city," considered "that these measures are invalid,"
called for Israel to "rescind" these measures and to
"desist forthwith" from such future actions while calling
on the Secretary- General to report on the resolution's
implementation within one week.^^
Open Israeli determination to retain Jerusalem re-
gardless of U.N. action or world opinion contributed to
another groundswell of sentiment which Israel was unable
to stem despite later conciliatory efforts. On July ll].,
a second Pakistan- sponsored resolution, 22Sk (ES-V), was
adopted by a General Assembly vote of 99-0-18. Having
received the report of the Secre tary- General, the Assembly
deplored and took note of the "non-compliance" by Israel
with Resolution 2253 (ES-V) and reiterated its call to
Israel to "desist" from future alterations in the status
of Jerusalem while requesting the Secretary-General to
report on implementation.
The Israeli case, like virtually every facet of
this conflict, has its roots deep in esjiotion and the
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question of security. To wit— David Ben Gurion, after
referring to Jerusalem, "by decree of our history our
capital"^^ continued:
Jewish Jerusalem is an organic and inseparable part
of the State of Israel, just as it is an inseparable
part of Jewish history, Jewish religion, and the
Jewish soul. Jerusalem is the very heart of the
State of Israel. M-0
An emotion of another type is revealed by Walter
Eytan
:
The people of Israel as a whole can never forget the
. . .
[19i|-8]
. . . siege- -any more than they have
been able, since Lhe Babylonian exile, to forget
Jerusalem itself. Having, as they see it, with their
own forces alone saved Jerusalem from the Arab
attempt to destroy it, they can never agree to
see the city subject to a foreign, even if an
"international" regime. Despite all anxiety for
the Holy Places, the United Nations and its members
did nothing to protect Jerusalem, apart from passing
resolutions. Israel resented this bitterly at the
time and resents it to this day. The Jews of
Jernisalem would not dream of relying for protection
on an "international" governor and police.
This attitude, with which the official policy of
the Israel Government conforms, has led Israel into
conflict, or at least open disagreement with other
countries, and at times with the United Nations
itself
The objective of Israel, then, was national control
of the eternal city, in direct contradiction with the
professed goal of 19i|. (Ill), (19i|8), which v;as to grant
Jerusalem and its environs "special and separate treatment
from the rest of Palestine."
The constant overlayer in Israel's position is that
of the special interests and rights of her claim to
Jerusalem.^ Below this surface constancy changes in
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position have occurred in consequence of Israeli- Jerusalem
holdings. While she held only the New City with its
largely Jewish population, the Government of Israel
addressed the U.N. about self-determination and functional
internationalization. Self-determination was necessary
because no "regime for the protection of religious interests
can' endure amidst a discontented, aggrieved and turbulent
population." Rome- like functional internationalization
was opposed to territorial internationalization; the safe-
guarding of holy shrines did not necessitate the inter-
nationalization of Jerusalem in toto
,
merely an official
U.N. presence to supervise their protection, ensure free
access and the like.^^ Just as such an arrangement did
not violate Italian rights and sovereignty, so the same
would be true for Jerusalem and its inhabitants, went the
Israeli approach.
Later, after winning all of Jerusalem, Israel policy
changed. According to vhe Israeli thesis, the Jordanian
attack violated the Armistice Agreement between the two
parties and released Israel from any of its obligations.
According to Foreign Minister Abba Eban, "the term 'annex-
ation' ... is out of place. The measures adopted . . ,
[re: 27 June 196?] . . . relate to the integration of
Jerusalem in the administrative and municipal spheres, and
furnish a legal basis for the protection of the Holy
Places."^
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This theme was carried forward while an opening was
presented to the Christian countries on 11 September 196?
when Abba Eban informed Secretary- General U Thant by
letter
:
This does not foreclose the final settlement of
certain important aspects of the Jerusalem situation
which lie at the origin of the international interest
in the city. I refer to the need to secure appropriate
expression of the special interest of the three great
religions in Jerusalem. ... I am confident that in
an atmosphere of international tranquility substantial
progress could be made toward this aim, which has
hitherto had no concrete fulfillment .^5
Meanwhile, the Personal Representative of Secretary-
General U Thant to the area reported conversations with
Israel leaders which included the Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs in which "it was made clear
beyond any doubt that Israel was taking every step to
place under its sovereignty" the newly conquered Jerusalem;
that it was the "declared objective" of the Israel Govern-
ment "to equalize the legal and administrative status" of
all inhabitants of Jerusalem, and that the "process of
integration was irreversible and not negotiable."^
The Arab case is also at base emotional, and to
comprehend it fully we would need "to borrow from religion
its deep feelings and from poetry her sweet tunes.
"^''^
Jerusalem is venerated by both Moslem and Christian Arabs.
Though too rooted deep in emotion, the Arab position here
relies also upon a legal basis. The very backbone consists
of the already cited Resolutions l8l (II) of November 29, 1911-7
53
which called for "a corpus separatum under a special inter-
national regime
. , . administered by the United Nations,"
and 1914- (III) of 11 December 1946 which instructed the
Conciliation Commission established by the same resolution
to submit proposals for "a permanent international regime
for the Jerusalem area "providing maximum local autonomy
for distinctive groups consistent with the special inter-
national status of the Jerusalem area." In addition,
Resolution 3G3 (r/) (19i+9) which, never having been re-
pealed, supplanted or modified, continued to stand as the
official position of the United Nations. The international-
ization of Jerusalem which 3^3 (IV) recommends provides
at least a temporary congruency to U.N. and Arab goals
while creating tension between the objectives of Israel
and the world body.
Arab policy too has changed. From the outright
rejection of the partition resolution and the international-
ization which was part of it, Arabs came to accept inter-
nationalization. Until the 196? war, the Arab case rested
chiefly upon the dissimilarities between the Israeli and
the U.N.'s conception of Jerusalem's status. Following
the 1967 War, the Arab position broadened. Resolutions
2253 (ES-V) and 2251| (ES-V) indicated that the world cora-
inunity considered Israel's action as invalid and -called
for their rescission.^^ Even the United States did not
recognize the step of annexation as valid. Arab
inhabitants of the old city were opposed to civil incor-
poration into the Israel administrative system* This they
saw as a violation of accepted international administra-
tive and legal structure in that territory. Inhabitants
also complained that the United Nations Charter and Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights were being violated
so long as the population of East Jerusalem was denied
the rights of self-determination.^"'' While the Israel
Government points to the exclusion of Jews from the
Wailing Wall prior to the 196? War, Arabs point to an
alleged two-hour prayer service conducted by the chief
Rabbi of the Israel Army in the Ha ram Al- Sharif Mosque on
August 15, 1967» a provocation which "infringed upon the
inviolability of a Holy Place venerated by all Islam."
In addition, the charge was made that on August 12, 196?,
the Israeli Minister for Religious Affairs stated that
The occupational authorities considered the Mosque
of Omar and its outlying buildings as their property
either by past acquisition or by recent conquest.
He also expressly proclaimed that those authorities
were determined sooner or later to rebuild their
temple on the Dome of the Rock itself.
If any single controversy pervades the others in
this Gordian knot of complexity, it is the disagreement
over interpreting the state of war and concept of
belligerency. Whether we are dealing with issues of
innocent passage, borders or recognition, the question
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of war and belligerency arises. The controversy is between
what might be termed the "classical concept" and the
"more modern view" of the state of belligerency in relation
to the Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab
States. These are the only legal instraments which govern
the relationship between the Arab states and Israel.
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 62 (19l|.8)
which called upon the states to conclude Armistices as
"provisional measures," negotiations resulted in Armistice
Agreements between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt,
Lebanon, Jordan and Syria on the other, between February 2[(.
and July 20, 19ij.9.^^
The Arab case holds that a state of war continues
until terminated by a peace treaty. In this classical
view a state of war persists during an armistice or truce.
The Armistice Agreement itself is cited as evidence. For
example, Article ii of the Agreement reads, "the principle
that no military or political advantage should be gained
under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recog-
nized; "and Article 9 reads "no provision of this Agreement
shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions
of either party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement
of the Palestine question" [emphases mine]. The Arab
position also notes Article 1 which reads in part: "No
aggressive action by the armed forces-- land, sea or air
—
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of either party shall be undertaken," while noting the
Israeli lightning dash across the Negev to the Arab
fishing village of Om Rashrash (now Elath) on the Red Sea.
The Egyptian- Israeli Armistice Agreement is dated February 2^,
19if9; Ben Gurion authorized "Operation Fait Accompli" which
took Om Rashrash on March 10, 19^9.^^ Article VIII of the
same Armistice Agreement notes that "the village of El
Auja and vicinity ... [as defined later in the Article]
. . ,
shall be demilitarized and both Egyptian and Israeli
armed forces shall be totally excluded therefrom." On
September 21, 1955, two companies of Israeli infantry
entered and occupied the El Auja demilitarized zone.^^
Commercial Cable Co. v. Burlson (19i;9) found that
"an armistice effects nothing but a suspension of
hostilities; the war still continues . "^^ Also Oppenheim
is most often cited by the Arab case:
Armistices or truces, in the wider sense of the term,
are all agreements between belligerent forces for a
temporary cessation of hostilities. They are in no
ways to be compared with peace, and ought not to be
called temporary peace, because the condition of war
remains between the belligerents themselves, and
between the belligerents and neutrals, on all points
beyond the mere cessation of hostilities .57
If this general trend of analysis is accepted, then
a traditional state of war continued to exist between the
Arab states and Israel since the conclusion of the 191^9
Armistice Agreements. Plxercising the rights of a bellig-
erent is not against the terms of the General Armistice
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Agreements in the Arab view.
Israeli's collusion with Britain and France in 1956
is put forward as leading to an aggression which was a
clear violation of the Charter and inconsistent with
Israel's claim to be a peace-loving member of the United
Nations, as are Arab charges of military action by Israeli
forces carried out against neighboring Arab states since
19il.8.^ Finally, if the Charter is obligatory upon the
Arabs, so too it is upon the Israelis. The international-
ization of Jerusalem and the right of the Palestinian
refugees to return or compensation are two points on which
U.N. resolutions have not been implemented, the Arab case
selectively points out, despite Israel's assurances to the
contrary. Resolution 273 (III) of May 11, 1914-9 by which
Israel was admitted to United Nations membership specifically
noted, "The declaration by the State of Israel that it
'unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations
Charter' while specifically recalling Resolutions I8I (II)
of November 29, 19i|7 and 19^ (III) of December 11, I9I4.9,
the latter of which called for the compensation or return
"at the earliest practicable date" of the Palestinian
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refugees— a pledge which has not been fulfilled.
The Israeli position claims "a more modern view which
treats an armistice more as a peacy treaty. "^^ The view is
that in certain cases an armistice takes the place of a
treaty to all practical purposes. Because of the longer
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time period between an armistice and a peace treaty, that
intervening time may be treated differently; Israel sug-
gests the de facto termination of the state of war in
place of merely the cessation of hostilities. To wit,
Security Council Resolution 95 of September 1, 1951
stipulated
:
• . . that since the Armistice regime, which has
been in existence for nearly two and a half years,
is of a permanent character, neither party can
reasonably assert that it is actively a bel-
ligerent. ^1
Further, the Israeli position points out as a matter
of principle that "the very existence of a state of war
is utterly incompatible with membership in the United
Nations and the obligations imposed by the Charter. "°
The basic premise is that the Armistice Agreements did
mean what was written and that, for example, according
to Article I of the Israel- Syrian Armistice Agreement
as well as the Egyptian- Israel Armistice Agreement:
No aggressive action by the armed forces-- land,
sea or air, --of either Party shall be undertaken,
planned or threatened against the people or the
armed forces of the other. ^3
According to Article 2 of the Charter, member-states
are called upon to "settle their international disputes
by peaceful means" in addition to "refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state" or acting in a manner inconsistent
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with the United Nations' purposes, while the use of force
is legitimate in the case of individual or collective
self-defense^^ if under U.N. authority during armed
attack. Israel was admitted to United Nations member-
ship on May 11, 19l^.9. Since a state of war with a
"sovereign equal" under the Charter is outlawed, Israel
has the clear right to demand not only that the Arab
states which are fellow signatories to the Charter drop
their claim of being in a state of war with Israel, but
also abandon their charge that Israel has no right to
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exist. Finally, continued Arab threats against the very
existence of the people and state of Israel are immoral,
contradictory to all canons of law and ethics, and un-
paralleled in the contemporary world.
Israel claims that her sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity and political independence should be recognized
consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter,
Her boundaries remain undetermined, cease-fire or armistice
demarcation lines. According to the Israeli position
because the Arabs, by their agression, violated the
original 19/4-7 partition recommendation Israel no longer
felt constrained to her old UN-demarcated boundaries in
the course of protecting herstslf , Moreover the Israelis
were attempting to implement l6l (11) by setting up a
Jewish state, v;hile the Arabs nevei* attempted to create
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an Arab State. The Arab States were ready to assent to the
1914.7 partition resolution in 19l;9. Because of the Arab
states' aggression and fighting which followed, Israel
came to occupy larger areas of Palestine than originally
planned. In 196? Israel swelled in size even more. Israel
is not interested in territory except as a means of ensuring
security.
The Arab position disputes the legal right of the
United Nations in the late 19i|-0's to have decided the
disposition of territory iramemorially Palestinian and
notes the inhiei'ent right of an indigenous population to
determine by itself its own government and constitution.
In returning to the origins of the case it also notes
that in reference to the Balfour Declaration which was
merely a statement of policy until incorporated into the
mandate of Palestine:
The most significant and incontrovertible fact is,
however, that by itself the Declaration was legally
impotent. For Great Britain had no sovereign rights
over Palestine; it had no proprietary interest; it
had no authority to dispose of the land. The
Declaration was merely a statement of British
intentions and no more.^*^
So, according to the Arab position, the Balfour
Declaration was issued without Palestinian participation
or approval while the right of the United Ilations to
dispose of and treat the Palestinian territory and Arabs
(the former in large bulk Arab-owned, the latter by a large
majority Arab) as they did, erodes the legality of the
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State of Israel from the moment of its conception. The
original partition was illegal, the land Israel holds
rests solely on military conquest (19i|3 or 196?). Jus
ex in.juria non oritur (rights do not arise from wrongs)
and military conquest does not confer lawful sovereignty.
To the Arab view, the question of sovereignty, secure and
recognized boundaries and the like are inadmissible in
keeping with the postulate that a poisonous tree can pro-
duce only poisonous fruit.
Security Council Resolution 21^2 (196?) affirmed
the necessity "for guaranteeing freedom of navigation
through international waterways in the area." Certainly
to solve this problem v/ould put an end to one of the
longest- lasting and most critical points of contention
between Israel and Arab states. It was the denial of
such freedom concerning the Straits of Tiran which proved
to be a proximate causative factor igniting the Six Day
War. Similarly since 19ij-8, Egypt placed a variety of
restrictions upon free Israeli transit of vessels and
cargoes through the Suez Canal. Any lasting peace
settlement must come to grips with the problems associated
with the waterways
,
The Suez Canal controversy svrirls around divergent
interpretations of a number of documents and principles.
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The documents include: (1) the Constantinople Convention
signed on October 29, 1888;^"^ (2) the Egyptian- Israel
Armistice Agreement of February 21^, I9k9;'^^ and General
Assembly Resolution 2322 of September 1, 195l.'^-'- The
principles are those of territorial sovereignty, that the
Suez Canal is an international waterway and, finally, that
the Suez Canal is a neutral waterway. The Israel case is
one which extends the principles of internationality and
neutrality while restricting that of territorial sovereignity
and placing one set of interpretations upon these documents.
The United Arab Republic case is one which extends the
principle of territorial sovereignty while restricting
those of internationality and neutrality in their exegesis,
naturally coming forth with divergent interpretations.*^^
The reader is reminded of our earlier discussion of
belligerency, which is central to the task at hand.
Israel claims that the U.A.R.'s varied restrictions
and closures upon the transit of Israeli ships and cargo
through the Suez Canal is in violation of international
law, the Constantinople Convention, the 19i].9 Armistice
Agreement and Security Council Resolution 2322 (1951).
Freedom of the seas and in particular innocent passage
through international waterways is looked upon as a corner-
stone of customary international law, one which would lead
to an identity of attitudes between almost every "maritime
nation" and Israel. "^-^ Article I of the Constantinople
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Convention sweepingly reads: "The Suez Maritime Canal
shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time
of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without
distinction of flag." The Israeli case holds that the
grant is wide and broadly construed that there can be no
doubt. as to its meaning, that the contravention of passage
for Israel's ships and cargoes is therefore illegal. The
Israeli case holds that the Rhodes Armistice Agreement not
only suspended the hostilities between Egypt and Israel,
but also put an end to this state of war, it being the
purpose of the agreement to terminate the acts of bellig-
erency. Inspections of cargo for contraband and
blockading the canal to Israeli vessels was held to be
irreconcilable with the intent of the Armistice. It was
such a line of reasoning which led to the passage of
Security Council Resolution 2322 (1951) if its language
be a guide. The resolution called upon Egypt:
To terminate the restrictions on the passage of
international commercial shipping and goods thiK)ugh
the Suez Canal wherever bound.
The resolution recalled the "pledge" in the Armistice
Agreements against any further acts of hostility between
the parties "and considered violations inconsistent with
the objectives of peaceful settlement and permanent peace
while stating that after the two-and-a-half year existence
of the Armistice
:
Neither party can reasonably assert that it is
actively a belligerent or requires to exercisethe^right of visit, search, and seizure for anylegitimate purpose of self-defense.
On the other hand, the Egyptian case notes that
Article X of the Constantinople Convention provides that
there may be measures which the territorial sovereign
"might find it necessary to take to assure by their own
forces the defense of Egypt and the maintenance of public
order." The Egyptian position notes the limitation on
Article X placed by Article XI which requires that such
measures "shall not interfere with the free use of the
canal." The pull of territorial sovereignty, inter-
nationality and neutrality are particularly and para-
doxically strong here. In his classic work, Baxter writes
that while free passage is guaranteed to all vessels, the
United Arab Republic may take defensive measures in time
of war so long as these do not interfere with free passage
for nonbelligerents. The Egyptian position notes how few
ships have been affected by these practices, and that free
passage for vessels of other nations has not been impeded.
Moreover, the United Arab Republic can hardly be expected
to permit use of the canal to carry war materials to
Israel. The "aggressions" of 1956 and I967 are pointed
to in support of this basic right of self-defense.*^^
Egypt denies that the Armistice Agreement put an end to the
state of war and claims that an armistice only suspends
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hostilities; the war still continues
. If Egypt is to
respect Israel's claim to the internationality and
neutrality of the canal, Israel must respect the terri-
torial sovereignty of Egypt. Israel's right to invoke
free passage under Article I is not denied. Rather, it
does appear anomalous for Israel to deny Egypt's right to
invoke Article X while committing aggressions against it.
Finally, Great Britain provided the precedent of a de
facto closure of the canal to hostile shipping during
World War 11.^^
Controversy over passage into the Gulf of Aqaba
through the Straits of Tiran swirls around four fundamental
points of difference: (1) the status of the Gulf of Aqaba
in international law; (2) the status of Israel as a littoral
state to/on the Gulf of Aqaba; and (3) freedom of passage
through the Straits in addition to (i^.) the expected tension
over the state of war and rights of belligerency.'^^ Our
discussion of the Arab and Israeli cases will center upon
these points while certainly not excluding others. It is
appropriate to point out at this time that the Gulf of
Aqaba is about 100 miles long, 7 to 15 miles wide and
bounded on three sides by the State of the United Arab
Republic, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Before the
entrance lay the islands of Sanafir and Tiran validly
79
occupied by the United Arab Republic. Although the mouth
of the Gulf is nine miles wide, the only navigable channel
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by which Aqaba my be entered U the four mile wide Strait
of Tiran which lies between the island of Tiran and the
Sinai Peninsula.
The Arab position holds that Aqaba consists of in-
land, internal waters subject to absolute Arab sovereignty.
The Gulf is a mare clausum, not an international waterway
by its very geographical configuration. Even if the Gulf
were considered as part of the high seas, the narrowness of
the Gulf means that territorial areas of littoral states
overlap one another.®^ This has become even more obvious
since Arab states have extended their territorial limit
from six to twelve miles, thus making all of the maximum
fifteen-mile wide Gulf subject to the territorial juris-
diction of bordering Arab states. Finally, the Gulf has
been an exclusive and historic Arab route under Arab
sovereignty to the shrines of Islam.
The Arab position further holds that Elath and
Israel's five-mile long Aqaban frontage was seized in
violation of the Egyptian- Israel Armistice Agreement. On
March 9, 19i^-9, thirteen days after the signing of the
Armistice with Egypt and taking advantage of the one free
flank this afforded, Isi-t.eli military units set out for Om
Rashrash (now Elath) which they took on March 15. Since
this action occurred in violation of the already- signed
agreement, Israel's presence on the shores of Aqaba does not
confer on her the standing of a littoral state. Moreover,
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this coastal area was not within the temporary borders
established for Israel by the Security Council Resolution
of July 15, 191^.8. Israel's occupation in Arab eyes is,
therefore, an aggression and a belligerent occupation.®"^
Oppenheim tells us: "An occupant in no wise acquires
sovereignty over such territory through the mere fact of
82having occupied it." Israel is not a legitimate
littoral state and therefore possesses no rights to free
passage through these waters. The only entrance to the
Gulf of Aqaba is through the Straits of Tiran, an area
totally within the territorial waters of the United Arab
Republic and Saudi Arabia. Because Aqaba is not regarded
by Arabs as part of the high seas, because of the existent
state of war, because of Israel's illegitimate littoral
status, Israel is not deemed by the Arab case to be
entitled to free passage through the Straits of Tiran and
the Gulf of Aqaba.
The Israeli position holds that the Gulf of Aqaba is
an international bay shared by more than one state and
that the Straits of Tiran are, like other international
Straits connecting portions of the high seas and of an
international bay open to innocent passage by vessels of
all nations,®-^ As international waters, Egypt is legally
bound to permit innocent passages.®^ Otherwise, Israel
is justified in protecting its own rights and interests.
So-called Arab "immemorial possession" was interrupted by
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Ottoman Control lasting from 1517 to I918. After then,
Aqaba was bounded by the Mandate of Palestine from which
both Jordan and Israel emerged. Any claim flowing from
religious usage may be dismissed. Even were it considered
a mare clausum the waters of Aqaba could not be subjected
to a regime which excluded one of the littoral states. A
final point is that the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone of 1958 provides for innocent
passage through straits used for international navigation
between high seas and the territorial sea of a foreign
state in addition to parts of the high seas.^^
Israel's retort to Arab charges concerning a possible
invalid presence on the shores of Aqaba notes the point
that the 19ij.7 General Assembly Partition Plan Resolution
provided that Israel should reach and include a section of
the Aqaban coastline formally under the Mandate. The
Israeli position also notes that no armistice demaraction
line was drawn along the Gulf of Aqaba. The Israeli
position naturally bases itself on the 1914-7 Resolution.
The distinction then is drawn between control and deploy-
ment of forces. Control exists even if forces are not
present. The extension of Israeli military forces to
Aqaba following the Egyptian- Israeli Armistice Agreement
simply made congruent control and deployment of forces.
So the presence of Israel and its port, Elath, on the Gulf
of Aqaba is therefore legitimate and within the boundaries
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of the Jewish state. Israel is a legal littoral state
and Aqaba consists of international waters according to its
case.
While the Straits are undeniably located in Arab
territorial waters, Israel claims the right of free passage
there and through the waters of Aqaba. The Israel case
cites an Egyptian aide-memoire handed to the United States
in 1950 which allowed that the occupation of the islands
of Tiran and Sanafir was not intended to hinder innocent
passage through the Straits which would remain open.^^ A
proclaimed state of belligerency, enemy vessels or contra-
band cargoes do not come under this umbrella's protection,
however, for in a clear state of war a state may deny
passage to enemy vessels.
The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zones, as mentioned above, provides for
innocent passage through Straits used for international
navigation not only between parts of the high seas, but
also between high seas and the territorial sea of a foreign
state. Egypt, however, has not ratified this document.
Whether a state of war legally persists perhaps is
the single most significant legal factor which affects
passage through these waters and Straits. In a clear state
of war, a state may deny passage to enemy ships or ships
carrying contraband cargo. The Egyptian aide-memoire of
1950 and the 1958 Convention of the Territorial Sea would,
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for example, be inapplicable. Israel, therefore, cites
Security Council Resolution 95 (1951) as support for her
view, reflected in the language of the resolution, that
neither Is,rael nor Egypt can reasonably assert that it is
an active belligerent or can Justify the acts of visit,
search or seizure as a function of self-defense. Although
neither Aqaba nor Tiran are referred to in the operative
section of the resolution, this may be taken as a validly
political if not a legally correct view of Aqaba and Tiran
congruent with the position of Israel. As we are aware
from our previous discussion, in particular of the Suez
Cenal, Egypt continued to maintain the classical view
that only a peace treaty could terminate the state of war
and cited the 195^ and I967 wars as buttressing evidence.
Of all the problems which compose the Arab- Israeli
conflict, none is more critical to peace or so intractible
than that of the refugees. In 1967 the Report of the
Conanissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
estimated that there were a total of 1,11^4,390 refugees
living in Syria, 160,720 in Lebanon, 316,776 in the Gaza
8q
Strip and 722,687 living in Jordan. ' There were about
262,000 Palestinians who were cut off from their fields,
property or livelihood, but did not lose their home and,
therefore, though needful are not eligible for UNRVA
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assistance. There is a second group of intermediate
refugees-- 11,000 Arabs who were expelled from their
homes and villages in demilitarized zones by Israel after
the July 1, 1952 deadline for eligibility for UNRWA aid.*^^
Finally, there is the final category of refugees-- 120, 000
registered old-time refugees who fled for the second time
in the 1967 war from Israeli- occupied areas to Arab lands,
and approximately 232,000 previously unregistered in-
habitants of Jordan, Syria and the Sinai Peninsula who
became new refugees for the first time during the same
war.^"^
The Israeli case cites "abundant evidence" that Arab
orders and threats "first set the Arab masses on the move
92in 19i;8." Since the Arabs first caused the problem, so
it was up to the Arabs to solve it. Since "equality of
status" was necessary in possible negotiations dealing with
the refugee question, the parties to the conflict in the
Israeli view could not be "the Palestine Jews and Palestine
Arabs, but the Palestine Jews and the Arab States. "^-^
Israel would not negotiate with the original party, the
Palestinian refugees, but only with sovereign Arab Govern-
ments when the time came since "equality of status" between
the negotiating parties was requisite in Jerusalem's eyes,
Arab aggi^ession and Arab violation of Resolution I8I (II)
(i9i|7) released Israel., in its own eyes, from the Resolu-
Qh
tion's detailed provisions regarding minority protection.'^
Arab governments were accused of "Machiavellian" use of
their displaced kith or kinfolk and in their grasp of the
worth of the refugees as a political asset and means to
their own selfish political ends.^S Moreover, that the
pattern of pre- 19^8 Arab life "no longer exists and cannot
be restored"96
^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^
^
would be more humane to permit these refugees to settle
amidst their own culture and people in an Arab world large
enough in area and sufficiently rich in resources to meld
and absorb them. The refugees therefore should be settled
in the neighboring Arab countries and integrated into the
region's economic life.^'^' Israel is small; repatriation is
dlfficu:!t for this reason and especially because of the
serious social, political and security consequences
attendant upon such a reality, not to speak of the state of
war which the Arabs purport continues to exist. It is the
Arab states which have refused to face up to the reality of
the existence of the State of Israel and to resettle the
refugees in the countries to which they have journeyed.
There is no longer any home for Arabs to return to. Arabs
have "continued to cling" according to Israel's long-time
Director-General of the Foreign Service, Walter Eytan, to
the postulate found in I9k (III) (19l|8) which entitled
Palestinian refugees to "return to their homes" or to com-
pensation for property lost for those choosing not to re-
98
turn. The problem is extremely complex, stipulates the
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Israeli case. Israel has shown its willingness to meet the
problem by offering to accept 100,000 refugees in
by releasing t 2,790,000 of Palestinian refugees' bank
accounts by June 30, 1960,^^^ and by approving entrance
permits for 20,658 "new" refugees to return to Israel by
August 31, 1967.
"^^"^
The refugee problem is only part of the total political
problem which can be solved only by means of an overall
peace settlement, continues the Israeli case. Not only are
the aspirations of the refugees to be considered, but also
the vital interests of the relevant states. Israel is not
responsible for the origin of the refugee problem, nor is
she responsible for its continuance. The Arab states
cynically have used the refugees to suit their own purposes.
To repatriate Arab refugees to their previous homes in
Israel would be to ask Israel to place a "dagger" at her
own heart. Moreover, social and economic development has
unfolded along lines which simply preclude the return of
any but a token number of repatriates. The Palestinian
refugees must be resettled in societies and states which
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are Arab. No other solution is both fair and possible.
The Arab case begins by denying the Israeli charge
that Palestinian Arabs were urged by their leaders and via
radio broadcasts to fell the country. I. F, Stone commented
on this point in general in his famous article in the
August 3, 1967 issue of The New York Review of Books ;
Ik
The argument that the refugees ran away "voluntarily"
after ?hrfi^hif ''"^^^^ ^^^^^ '"^'^^ so untU^
hii; ?^<, ^
^^g^^i^g
--^as over not only rests on myth
retu^-^ H^vr'p'^'' ""V^
'"^^ ^^^^Sees no right to
^tl I ? ^ Germ-n Jews no right to recover theirproperty because th-y too fled?103
Stone himself ci^es the work of Erskine Childers, an
Irish broadcaster with a great interest in the Palestine
question, who sought tc test the Israel claim that "the
Arabs left because they were ordered to, and deliberately
incited into panic by their own leaders. "^^^ Childers
writes in a passage often referred to:
Examining every official Israeli statement about theArab exodus, I was struck by the fact that no primary
evidence of evacuation orders was ever produced. Thecharge, Israel clai-ed, was "documented," but where
were the documents? There had allegedly been Arab
radio broadcasts ordering the evacuation; but no dates
names of stations, cr texts of messages were ever
cited. In Israel i- 1958, as a hopeful of serious
assistance, I asked to be shown the proofs. I was
assured they existed, and was promised them. None hadbeen offered when I left, but I was again assured, I
asked to have the m^-terial sent on to me. I am still
waiting. lOp
The Arab case claims that the Palestinian refugees
left their homeland not of their own free will, but because
of fear of and threats by Zionist forces. Indeed, on
April 8, 19ii-8, more than one month prior to the declaration
of Israel's independence, members of the Stern gang and
Irgun Zvai Leumi, Zionis:; terrorist organizations, seized
the hitherto neutral Arab village of Deir Yasin and murdered
25I4. men, women and children. This crime, comparable only
to World War II' s massacre of the village of Lidice, was
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widely publicized and Arab mass flight, which had been
107going on since early 1914-8, accelerated. ' According to
Christopher Sykes:
It can be said with a high degree of certainty that
most of the time in the first half of 19i4-8 the mass-
exodus was the natural, thoughtlesness
,
pitiful
movement of ignorant people who had been badly led
and who in the day of trial found themselves forsaken
by their leaders. . . . But if the exodus was by and
large an accident of war in the first stage, in the
later stages it was consciously and mercilessly helped
on by Jewish threats and aggression towards the Arab
populations . ^^iB
George Kirk comments on this point:
At this stage of the fighting . . . [about April,
19i4.8]. . . , The Jewish attitude to the Arab flight
was ambiguous, since there is clear evidence that
the civil authorities at Haifa tried to tranquilize
the Arab population. . . . At a later stage, the
Israeli armed forces did not confine their pressure
on the Arab civilian population to playing upon
their fears. They forcibly expelled them: for
example, the population of Akka (including refugees
from Haifa) in May; the population of Lydda and
Ramla (including refugees from Jaffa) in July; and
the population of Beersheba and western Galilee in
October.
Nadav Safran, himself Jewish, born in Egypt and an
eminent student of the area's history and politics has
written succinctly:
On the basis of first-hand observation it can be said
that until about the end of May- early June 19i|8, the
refugees from areas under Jewish control left, and
left in the face of persistent Jewish efforxis to
persuade them to stay. From that time on, they were
expelled from almost all new territories that came
under Israeli control. HO
John Davis, an American and former Commissioner- General of
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refug
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(UNRWA) is very often cited in seeking to refute the
Israeli allegation that Palestinian refugees are being
held as idle hostages by insensitive, uncaring Arab govern-
ments which seek their own political than the refugees'
human ends. Davis writes that about 20 percent of the 191+8
Palestinian refugees were skilled and from urban areas—
consequently this group quickly became self-supporting and
have not been dependent upon doles from UIJHWA or similar
organizations. Approximately 70 percent of the total
number of 19i|8 refugees were surplus, illiterate farm
laborers in a part of the world already surfeited with
them. The problem is compounded, Davis writes, for
the refugee son:
... in the Middle East, as in all developing areas
of the world, well over 95^ of all youths learn work
habits and skills by working beside their fathers.
Because, in general, rural refugee fathers have been
unemployed, their sons have had but limited opportunity,
if any at all to learn even the self-discipline of work
or the skills of their fathers. Therefore, in com-
petition with other young people, particularly the
Indigenous rural boys, who are migrating from farms to
urban centers in vast numbers, the maturing refugee
boy has been and is at a serious disadvantage . 112
Davis points out that the refugee host countries of
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the United Arab Republic have
spent more than $100 million for direct refugee assistance
(education, health services, camp sites, housing, etc.)--
which Davis (who is sympathetic to the Arab case) calls
"generous and hospitable." Davis comments on host country
resistance to resettling Palestinian refugees on new land:
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We have devoted more space and dociimentation in
responding to specific Israeli charges to this point
than were given to the charges themselves. We expect
the American reader to be far more conversant with the
Israeli than Arab side. Therefore, we feel it incumbent
to present more space relating the Arab interpretation.
Finally, a scholar as deeply concerned for the
safety of Israel as Walter Z. Laqueur could, while
retaining the belief that Arab governments had main-
tained the refugees to serve their own political
ends,"^"''^ yet write:
A more imaginative approach might have had results,
it would not have worked a miracle. True, there
was the talk about using the refugees as a fifth
column--but how many refugees would have played
that role? Was not Israel strong enough to absorb
all the refugees who would have actually chosen to
return? An Israeli declaration to take back by
stages all refugees willing to return would have
been a risk, but not perhaps so great a risk as
most Isi-aeli leaders thought.
It is unlikely that most refugees would have
come back, and such a declaration would have
taken the wind out of the sails of the Arab
governments and compelled them to face their
The Arab case continues by citing Article VIII
cf the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
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of Man approved at Bogota in 1914-8 which reads: "Every
person has the right to fix his residence within the
territory of the state which he is a national, to move
about freely within such territory, and not to leave it
except by his own will."^-^^ Article I3 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights provides that everyone
possesses "the right to freedom of movement and residence"
within each state and the "right to leave any country,
including his own, and to re turn. ""'-' In addition, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
of 1966 provides for similar rights consistent however
with "national security, public order public health or
morals, or the rights or freedoms of o thers . ""^'^
The Arab position also holds that the refugees
were denied their basic right to self-determination as
provided for in Article V of President Wilson's Fourteen
119Points, the second and third principles of the
Atlantic Charter ^ and Article I, paragraph 2, and
Articles 55, 56, 73, 76 and 79 of the Charter which
provided in general for self-determination and self-
government in keeping with the freely expressed wishes
of the peoples concerned. -^^^ In addition. Article 2 of
the Mandate described the obligation of "safeguarding
the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants
of Palestine, irrespective of racft and religion. "-^^^
When partition was being considered, Arab members of
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the United Nations pointed out that no change in the
Mandate was legitimate until all the people of
Palestine had given their consent. An advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
compatibility of partition without consent was sought
under Article 80 of the Charter by the Arab states.
12This was rejected. ^
Even a general reading of the law of war requires
the belligerents to spare the noncombatant population
as much suffering and destruction of property as
possible and "refusal to allow repatriation or
compensation would violate the law."^^^ Count Folke
Bernadotte stated in a report to then-Secretary-General
Trygve Lie
:
The right of innocent people, uprooted from
their homes by the present terror and ravages
of war, to be returned to their homes should be
affirmed and made effective, with assurance of
adequate compensation for the property of those
who choose not to return.
The liability of the provisional government
of Israel to restore private property to its
private owners and to indemnify those owners
for property wantonly destroyed is clear. . . .
[There would occur] ... an offense against
the principles of elemental Justice if those
innocent victims of the conflict were denied
the right to return to their homes while Jewish
immigrants flow into Palestine and offer the
threat of permanent replacement of the Arab
refugees who have been rooted in the land for
centuries . -^^
^
To charge that Arab aggression and violation of
Resolution 181 (II) (I9I4.) alone is responsible for the
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hostilities, thereby releasing Israel from further
responsibility on the refugee question is to enter an
area of great controversy. Certainly it is clear that
outside the urban, compound- like areas where British
control continued, public order had broken down and the
hands of neither side were free of blood. For example,
Menachem Begin, the leader of the extremist Irgun,
described in his autobiography how his troops conquered
a near- totally-Arab Jaffa approximately three weeks
before the Arab armies opened hostilities.
On December 11, I9I4-8 the United Nations General
Assembly approved of Resolution 19k- (II) which resolved:
That the refugees wishing to return to their homes
and live at peace with their neighbors should be
permitted to do so at the earliest practicable
date, and that compensation should be paid for
the property of those choosing not to return or
for loss or damage to property which, under
principles of international law or in equity,
should be made good by the governments or
authorities responsible . -'-^
7
The Arab case emphasizes the right of the refugees
to choose themselves between repatriation or compensa-
tion. The resolution also created a Conciliation Com-
mission which struggled long and valiantly to solve
the problem. The United Nations Relief and V/orks
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
was created by General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV)
(I9I4.9). Each year the General Assembly has gone through
the motions of reaffirming the principles embodied in
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19k (III) {19ij.8) but makes no move toward implementation.
Pertinent resolutions are as follows: 1914. (Ill) of
December 11, 19i|.8; 302 (IV) of December 8, 1914.9;
393 (V) and 3914. (V) of December 2 and 11;, I95O;
512 (VI) and 513 (VI) of January 26, 1952; 6II+ (VII)
of November 6, 1952; 720 (VIII) of November 2?, I953;
818 (IX) of December 1^., I95I4-; 916 (X) of December 3,
1955; 1018 (XI) of February 28, 1957; 1191 (XII) of
December 12, 1957; 1315 (XIII) of December 12, 1958;
1I}.56 (XIV) of December 9, 1959; l60k (XV) of April 21,
1961; 1725 (XVI) of December 20, I96I; 1856 (XVII) of
December 20, 1962; 1912 (XVIII) of December 3, I963;
2002 (XIX) of February 10, 1965; 2052 (XX) of
December 15, 1965; and 215I4. (XXI) of November I7, 1966."^'
Whereas the Israelis point to the fact that over
l;5C, 000 Jewish refugees from Arab lands were willingly
absorbed by Israel between I9I4-8 and 1958,"'"^^ Arabs
point to the Jewish experience in Europe during and
after World War II. The Arab case notes that the
principle seems firmly established that a state (in this
case Israeli ) could seek inderinification from another
state in restitution for acts committed against persons
who were not their citizens at the time of the
injuries' commission. Accordingly, Arab states then
are entitled to seek redress for the Palestinian
refugees. However, while Germany paid over one and a
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half billion dollars in reparations to the Jewish state,
organizations and individuals, the Palestinian refugees
have not been so fortunate. United Nations support for
the refugees is evidence of its felt- sense of respon-
sibility in this matter. It is a moral contradiction
of the deepest nature for Israel to deny the Palestinians
their right to return to land within living memory and
for centuries theirs vrhile terming the ''law of Return"
for the world's Jewish population the "right that built
the state. "-^^^
Don Peretz cites estimates of the value of
abandoned lands at tP 100,383,781| movable absentee
property at iP 18,6C0,00C and abandoned Palestinian
non- Jewish immovable property at i,P 22
,
ICO, 000. "^^"^
Peretz was led to conclude: "Abandoned property was
one of the greatest contributions toward making Israel
1 32
a viable state." ^ The Arab position holds that Israel
seized and utilized the property by means of such
illegitimate laws as the abandoned Areas Ordinance
(19i^.8), Cultivation of Waste Lands Regulations (19^-8),
Absentee Property Regulations (19i4-8), Absentee Property
Law (1950) and Development Authority Law (1950)."^^^
Oppenheim states:
Immovable private enemy property may under no
circums tancos or conditions be appropriated
by an invading bellr.gerent . Should he con-
fiscate and sell private lands or buildings.
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propert^^lT'^ "'^^'''^ ^'^^^ ^^^^^^^^ to the
Oppenheim further- states that if a foreign state
enacts legislation which confiscates without compensa-
tion property of citizens of another state:
Such legislation may properly be treated as anullity and, with regard to rights of property,
as incapable of transferring title to the State
concerned either within its territory or outside
Resolution 181 (II) (igii?) prohibited the expro-
priation of Arab-owned lands in the Jewish State except
in the case of full payment prior to public use.
Resolution 19k (III) (I9I4.8) further stipulates the
refugees' right of return and of property compensation
for those who chose not to return. Neither resolution
has been respected let alone implemented.
Israel has always insisted that at least some
refugees would be allowed to return, given a final
peace settlement, but has asserted the hypocrisy of
Arabs living in what has always been envisioned as a
Jewish community. The New York Times on June 26, I967
reported: "According to unimpeachable sources, the
Israelis are driving Arabs out of occupied Soutn Syria,"
And on July 3, I967, Moshe Dayan was reported as saying
that he was happy to see the Arabs go and did not "want
them to come back.""^^^
Given the vastly larger number of refugees from
6k
the 1967 war the Israeli position emphasized resettle-
ment in Arab areas more than ever before, with pro-
visions even for a possibly autonomous West Bank state.
But severe problems and potential dangers remain.
Michael Howard and Robert Hunter recognized this in
stating that: "two and a half million Jews now control
territory containing nearly a million and a half Arabs,
and whatever settlement is made on the West Bank, Arabs
are likely in the future to make up at least a quarter
of Israel's population." Not only will Israel face
the usual problems of a multi-racial society, but in
addition one containing a hostile minority. Howard
and Hunter conclude: "on her ability to solve this
problem, Israel's future security will depend. "-'•^^
Demilitarized zones exist between Israel and
three of the four Arab states which are contiguous
with it: Jordan, Egypt, and Syria. Originally
created as a vehicle to prospectively dampen the con-
flict, and similarly envisaged in resolution 21^2, the
existence of demilitarized zones in the past has often
served the function of tinder for a flame. Jerusalem
was the scene of a number of neutral areas, no-man's
lands, and demilitarized zones between Jordan and
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Israel--residues al] of the 19i].8- 19ij.9 fighting.
The best known demilitarized zone is that of
Mount Scopus in northerly Jerusalem. Under
Article VIII of the Jordan- Israel Armistice Agreement,
joint special committees were to be set up to
"enlarge the scope" and "effect improvements in
. .
.
application" of the agreement . ^38 Qn July 7, 19i|.8,
the governments of Israel and Jordan agreed to divide
the Mount Scopus area into three sections: the first,
Israeli though with no contiguity with Israel contained
the Hadassah Hospital and Hebrew University; a second
sector contained the Arab village of Issawiya; and a
third sector contained the Arab Augusta Victoria
hospital. ^39 These areas were to be demilitarized;
Jewish and Arab civil policemen were to be limited in
numbers to their respective zones, and to be under the
control of the Chief of Staff, UKTSO. The United
Nations flag was to be overhead and the U.N. to inspect
both zones and the fortnightly resupply and replacement
convoys from Israel to the Israeli sector of Mount
Scopus
.
Culturally, the Mount Scopus area was of sig-
nificance because of the Hebrew University whose
".
. . National and University Library, vrith over a
million books
. . . [had] . . . not had a reader for
ten years. ""^^^ In a humanitarian sense, the Augusta
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Victoria and Hadassah Hospitals also wore of significance.
Tactically, Mount Scopus crucially and strategically
overlooked roads approaching Jerusalem, especially from
the Arab West Bank, and is vital to any party hoping
to control all of Jerusalem.
Article VIII of the Egyptian- Israel Armistice
Agreement read:
The area comprising the village of El Auja and
vicinity, as defined in paragraph 2 of this
Article shall be demilitarized, and both Egyptian
and Israeli armed forces shall be totally excluded
therefrom. The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice
Commission established in Article X of this Agree-
ment and the United Nations Observers attached to
the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring
the full implementation of this provi3ion.
.
The movement of armed forces of either party to*
this Agreement into any part of the area defined
in paragraph 2 of this Article, for any purpose,
or failure by either party to respect or fulfill
any of the other provisions of this Article, when
confirmed by the United Nations representatives,
shall constitute a flagrant violation of this
Agreement . I4I
El Auja (Hebrew: Nitzana), is the site of a
historically strategic crossroads which comprise one
of the chief invasion routes across the Sinai, linking
by road Beersheba in Israel with all the Sinai
Peninsula and Egypt. It follows that the party in
control of it enjoys a priceless military advantage.
In 19i|8, 1956 and I967, the decisive Israeli attacks
against Egypt were launched from this area.^^
Article V of the more complete Israel- Syrian
General Armistice Agreement of July 20, 19^9 stated:
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The Armistice Demarcation Line and the DemilitarizedZone have been defined with a view toward sepamtinSthe armed forces of the two Parties in such a manneras to minimize the possibility of friction andincident. While providing for the gradual restora-tion of normal civilian life in the area of theDemilitarized Zone, without prejudice to the
ultimate settlement.
Paragraph 5 of Article V continued:
(a) Where the Armistice Demarcation Line does not
correspond to the international boundary between
Syria and Palestine, the area between the Armistice
Demarcation Line and the boundary, pending final
territorial settlement between the Parties, shallbe established as a Demilitarized Zcne from which
the armed forces of both Parties shall be totally
excluded, and in which no activities by military
or paramilitary forces shall be perrtd.tted.
(e) The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission
shall be empowered to authorize the return of
civilians to villages and settlements in the
Demilitarized Zone and the employment of limited
niiiiibers of locally recruited civilian police in
this zone for internal security purposes.
. .
.^^3
Intervening subparagraphs described entrance by
armed forces, military or paramilitary, by either Party
Into the Demilitarized Zone as a "flagrant violation"
of the Armistice Agreement, gave to the Chairman of
the Mixed Armistice Commission, and Observers
responsibility for implementation and called for the
scheduled withdrawal of armed forces from the Demilitarized
Zones
.
Because of the particularly complex and difficult
nature of the armistice negotiations. Dr. Ralph Bunche,
acting mediator, wrote an "Explanatory Note to the
Governments of Israel and Syria" on June 26, 19l|9 in
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an effort to effect a compromise on disputed points.
In it Dr. Bunche stated:
The question of civil administration in villages
and settlements in the demilitarized zone isprovided for, within the framework of an
armistice agreement.
. . . Such civil administra-tion, including policing, will be on a localbasis, ^without raising general questions of admin-istration, jurisdiction, citizenship and sovereignty.Where Israeli civilians return to or remain in
an Israeli village or settlement, the civil admin-istration and policing of that village or settlement
will be by Israelis. Similarly, where Arab civilians
return to or remain in an Arab village, a local
Arab administration and police unit will be
authorized,
. . .
Questions of permanent boundaries, territorial*
sovereignty, customs, trade relations and the like
must be dealt with in the ultimate peace settlement
and not in the armistice agreement,
I call attention to the fact that in 'the
Israeli-Trans Jordan Armistice Agreement in
Article V, paragraph c, and in Article VI,
paragraph 2, the armistice demarcation lines agreed
upon involved changes in the existing truce lines,
and that this was dons in both cases without any
question being raised as to the sovereignty over
or the final disposition of the territory involved.
It was taken for granted by all concerned that this
was a matter for final peace settlement. The same
applies to the provision for thn al-'Auja zone in
the Egyptian- Israeli Agreement . Il44
This Demilitarized Zone between Israel and Syria
is divided into three noncontiguous, but constituent
sectors— the northern, central and southern sectors.
Together, they comprise about 66,5 square kilometers.
Though of strategic importance, to be sure, they are of
less significance than Mount Scopus, and certainly less
important than El Auja. Where part of their value does
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lie is in access to water and in their land. The
Banyas River ran through the northern demilitarized
sector; the central demilitarized sector touched upon
and/or incorporated Lake Hula, its marshes and the
Jordan River. 'The southern demilitarized sector
extended along about one-quarter of the shores of
Lake Tiberias (Hebrew: Kinneret). The rich farmland
of the central demilitarized sector, especially, was
a constant and bitter source of contention between
Arab and Israeli farmers.
Incidents between Arab states and Israel which
occurred in the Demilitarized Zones in Jerusalem, the
Sinai, and between Syria and Israel are, unfortunately,
too numerous to review thoroughly. But at least some
of the more intense incidents must be sketched to
convey at least a caricature of the conflict.
Tension occurred in the Mount Scopus area when
Israeli police, despite UNTSO protests, began patrolling
up to the fringes of Issawiya and, by 19Skt had set
up a roadblock on the road between the village and
Jerusalem, and claimed sovereignty up to Issawiya . ^^^
Jordanians also charged that the Israelis were
illegally smuggling into Mount Scopus armaments and
other prescribv3d materials . "^^^ Finally, Israel, calling
its area sovereign, only rarely permitted the movement
of U.N. observers in its sector to check on Jordanian
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charges of arms smuggling, or the construction of
fortifications
.
Tension from the Israeli point of view stemmed
from an adamant Jordanian stand which denied free
access to and the normal functioning of the cultural
and humanitarian institutions on Mount Scopus, and
denied also free access to places holy to Judaism,
but in the Jordanian- held Old City, such as the
Wailing Wall, and the cemetery on the Mount of
Olives.
There were other neutral areas, demilitarized
zones, and no-man's lands in Jerusalem. But none
except the area surrounding Government House, which
included UNTSO headquarters, was the subject of a
Security Council resolution. In the suioner of 1957,
Israel sent v/orkers into this area which it claimed
to plant trees. ^ Jordan, fearing a precedent which
later might help allow an Israeli claim to this land,
protested to the Chief of Staff, UNTSO, who ruled that
Israel should temporarily cease work until the merits
of the case could be decided. Israel refused, but
finally relented to Security Council Resolution 12?
(19i|.8). This resolution called for suspension of all
work until a determination could be made of whether
or not Arab land was involved. "^^^
In 1950 about 3,500 bedouin Azazme tribesmen
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were expelled from the El Auja Demilitarized Zone.
Despite Security Council Resolution 89 of November 1?,
1950 which called upon Israel to permit the Azazme to
return to the area, the resolution has not yet been
fully implemented. '"^^^
On September 28, 1953, Israel established an
experimental agricultural kibbutz in the El Auja
Demilitarized Zone called Ketsiot. Israel cited the
grounds that civil activity such as pioneer farming
did not violate the Armistice Agreement, since only
military restrictions had been placed upon the Zone.
Israel also claimed complete sovereignty over the
Zone in all but a military sense. On September 30,
195^4-* the Egyptian- Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission
found that Ketsiot was organized as and staffed by a
unit of the Israeli armed forces, in direct breach of
the Armistice Agreement. Inspections by U.N. Military
Observers and Lieutenant-General E. L. M. Burns himself,
then Chief of Staff, UNTSO, both commented upon the
apparent low ratio of agricultural work accomplished in
relation to the size of the kibbutz.
On September 21, 1955, following a problem over
the marking of the Zone's international frontier,
Israeli troops took sudden and complete military control
of the El Auja Demilitarized Zone, and constructed
fortifications and laid minefields, Israeli military
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forces installed themselves pormanently here and did
not withdraw, even after the 19S6 Sinai war.
Problems between Israel and Syria concerning the
Demilitarized Zone have been many and complex. Tliey
include attempts to divert Jordan River waters, disputes
over Lake Tiberias, problems concerning policing the
Zones, and conflicts over the right to plow and harvest
the rich farmland.
Shooting occurred in 1951 when Israel began the
attempt to drain Lake Hula and the surrounding marshes
in the central demilitarized sector. Not only v/ould
this have provided a good deal more land for cultiva-
tion, but the project would help substantially in
eliminating malaria from the area--a benefit to both
Israeli and Arab, About seven acres of Arab- owned land
was crucial to the Israeli project. The Israelis tried
to buy, the Arab owners refused to sell this land,
Israel charged, because of personal threats they had
received from Syria, The situation was complicated by
the fact that Israel, claiming sovereignty over the
area had not consulted with the Mixed Armistice Com-
mission before starting work, claimed a free hand in the
Zone, and put forward the Palestine Land Development
Company as a private concessionaire doing the work.
The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission rejected
the claim of sovereignty by Israel over this area, as
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well as the claim by Syria that this action would change
the military status quo of the Zone in violation of the
Armistice Agreement, and therefore that Syria's consent
was needed. Instead, he ruled that the project would
be acceptable if it did not affect the Arab lands with-
out their consent, or if it did not interfere with the
normal resumption of civilian life in the Zone--a stand
supported by Security Council resolution 93 of May 18,
A far more serious dispute over water rights con-
cerned the diversion of the Jordan River. On
September 2, 1953> Israel began to dig a canal to
divert Jordan River waters between Lake Hula and Lake
Tiberias. Because the Jordan River ran through her
territory at that point, Israel claimed to be free to
dispose of the waters since she said her plans would
not affect any Arabs then using waters. Syria denied
both Israeli points. UNTSO ordered Israel to stop
work; Israel refused. The Chief of Staff, UKTSC, told
the Security Council it was possible that Arab water
rights might be jeopardized, that the project could
upset the Zone's military status quo, and that, once
again, Israel did not consult with the Chairman of the
Mixed Armistice Commission befors starting work. Israel
ceased work only when the United States terminated
economic aid to Israel, subject to resumption only with
the UNTSO decision. ^ ^^^^^ resolution offered by
the United States, Britain, and France which directed
the Chief of Staff, UNTSO, to reconcile these conflicts
was vetoed by the Soviet Union. "^^^
During this period of time, Eric Johnston, a
personal representative of President Eisenhower,
attempted to derive agreement among the Arab states
and Israel concerning the development and use of the
Jordan's waters. The negotiations came extremely close
to technical and even, to a lesser degree, political
agreement on the division of the waters. However, the
negotiations foundered on the "obduracy of the Syrian
politicians. They simply would not agree to anything
that would benefit Israel, even if the Arab states
would thereby achieve greater benefits . "-^^^
In early 1956, then, following the failure of
the Johnston mission, Israel resumed work on the
project, but this time, proposing to draw water from
Lake Tiberias which Israel considered to be under her
own sovereignty, Israeli work on the project progressed
until Ai'ab summit conferences in January end September,
196[|., determined to divert the headwater rivers of the
Jordan-- the Hasbani and Baniyas. Incidents continued
to occur involving shots in both directions across the
armistice demarcation line until Israeli air action
against the diversion project on July llj., 1966 put an
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end to such efforts.
On January 19, 1956 the Security Council unan-
imously passed a resolution cosponsored by the United
Kingdom, France and the United States which condemned
Israel for a raid conducted against Syria north of
Lake Tiberias in which 56 Syrians were killed. The
resolution was notable in that Israel for the first
time, was threatened with more severe measures in the
future if Charter obligations were not complied with."''^^
Finally we come to the announced intention on
April 3, 1967 by the Israeli Government to plow certain
controversial lots in the Demilitarized Zone which
Syria claimed belonged to Arab farmers. Syrians started
shooting with the appearance of the Israeli armored
tractors and the fighting escalated until six Syrian
jet fighters were shot down over Damascus in an incident
which helped lay the groundwork for the June war."^^^
Many legal problems stemmed from the Demilitarized
Zone between Israel and Syria. The Israeli case claimed
that the General Armistice Agreement conferred sovereignty
over the entire Zone upon her. The Israeli Government
claimed this territory as an area that was only occupied
by Syrian troops who later withdrew, Abba Eban stated
before the Security Council:
The fact that parts of the demilitarized zone may at
one time have come under Syrian military occupation
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is of course quit© irrelevant, for military
occupation does not give rise to legal
sovereignty
.
Our view happens to be that since the
Armistice Agreement does not affect the previous
status of this area, except by demilitarizing it,
its Juridical status is the same as it was on the
day that the Mandate expired and Israel's in-
dependence was proclaimed. 158
Since the Demilitarized Zone was sovereign
Israeli territory, in Jerusalem's eyes, it followed
that Syria had no say in any matter concerning the
Zone. Neither, in Israeli eyes, did any other body
except to a small degree the MAC Chairman. Nor did
the General Armistice Agreement concern itself with
any matters except the purely military ones which
signified the only change in status which international
law recognizes in a Demilitarized Zone— demilitariza-
tion. So the civilian life, agriculture and police
would develop under Israeli control and guidance.
The Arab case disputed the Israeli claim to
sovereignty over the Zone and pointed out that the
General Armistice Agreement had left the "rights,
claims and positions of either Party hereto in the
ultimate peace settlement . ""^^^^ Since the final peace
settlement, and not the Armistice Agreement would here
govern, neither Israel nor Syria could legitimately
claim to solely control civilian activity. Israeli
activity might prejudice in Israel's favor claims to
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these lands Since title to them would be decided only
with a final peace agreement
.
The Arab or Syrian case disputed the Israeli
claim to sovereignty and pointed out that the General
Armistice Agreement, and even more explicitly, acting
mediator, Ralph Bunche who helped write it, said in
an Explanatory Note concerning the Agreement:
"Questions
of permanent boundaries, territorial sovereignty, customs
trade relations, and the like must be dealt with in the
settlement and not in the armistice agreement . "^^l
^.ere
fore, Israel had no right in claiming the right to act
alone in decisions concerning the various Zones. This
being so in Arab eyes, the Chairman of the Mixed
Armistice Commission was recognized as having more
power by the Syrians, both in terms of civilian life,
major changes in the Zone's status, and interpreting
the Armistice Agreement. Bunche 's interpretation of
the General Armistice Agreement was looked upon by the
U.N. as authoritative; therefore, there was a general
coalescence between the Arab and United Nations positions
on this point.
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CHAPTER III
THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HOSTILITIES
The Security Council convened in an emergency
session on June 5 following the notification first by the
representative of Israel, then by that of the United Arab
Republic that the other side had engaged in an aggression.
Ambassador Gideon Rafael of Israel charged in session that:
Fighting has erupted on Israel's frontiers and that
the Israel defense forces are now repelling the
Egyptian Army and Air Force.
The Egyptian forces met with the immediate
response of the Israel defense forces, acting in
self-defense ,^
Ambassador Mohammed Awad El-Kony of the United Arab
Republic countercharged that "reports indicate that the
dimensions of the Israel attack are so wide that no one can
doubt the premeditated nature of this aggression.''
Reminding the Council of the "black days of 1956" when
Israel 't)lanned and engineered" another aggression "in
defiance of all noiTis of law and decency and in flagrant
contravention of the United Nations Charter,"^ El-Kony
concluded by stating that his country had no choice but
self-defense under Article pi of the United Nations
Charter.^ According to Arthur Lall, privately Israeli
diplomats admitted at this time that they had launched
112
the massive military strike.^
Here, at the very beginning, the antithetical and
complex nature of the dispute was highlighted. Israel
claimed that the Arab closure of the Straits of Tiran was
illegal and a prior, precipitative act of aggression
against Israel; further, that Cairo's withdrawal of its
consent to UNEF's presence, and movement of forces toward
Israel were further manifestations of aggressive intent.
So in Jerusalem's view, these "aggressive" acts justified
defensive actions by Israel under Charter article 51, To
these Jerusalem added the persistent Arab and Egyptian
protestations of a state of war existing with Israel and
threats to Israel's independence and territorial integrity.
The Arab position and, in particular, that of the
U.A.R. looked upon its actions of blockading Tiran to
Israeli shipping and cargo, and requesting the withdrawal
of UNEF as within the realm of its domestic jurisdiction.
Cairo pointed out that Israel did not allow UNEF to cross
to its side of the cease-fire line despite U Thant's re-
quest, and that the U.A.R. moved troops into the Sinai,
and Gaza Strip, solely in response to Israeli troop con-
centrations against Syria. Cairo also made clear its
numerous reiterations that it would not be and i^as not the
first to launch a military attack. Sinularly to Jerusalem,
the Arab case claimed Israel to be the aggressor and its
own acts to be defensive actions under article ^1 of the
Charter.
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Since a cease-fire was finally established without
condemnation or the branding of one party or the other as
an aggressor under Charter provisions, no definitive legal
opinion may be expressed as to which, if indeed any party
had solely engaged in an aggression. Nor was the claim
to self-defense validated for either party. We do not
wish to fall into the miasmal pit of partisanly defining
what act was here "aggressive." But what is commonly re-
ferred to as the Six-Day War began with an Israeli in-
vasion "claimed to have been in self-defense, but which,
although by no means unprovoked, did amount to a first
use of force by Israel."'''
Finally, there is the strategic and moral case as
Israel perceived it. Before June i|, I967 no spot in
Israel was more than twenty- five miles from an Arab
neighbor. Both on land and in the air Jerusalem viewed
three fronts on which there was "no alternative" to
offensive operations which carried swiftly into enemy
territory; put simply, Israel possessed insufficient room
to retreat. Moreover, there was an inequality of dangers
in Israeli eyes; a defeated Israel probably could not rise
again to fight, as the Arab governments had, because of
its limitations in space and population. Therefore, in
the eyes, for example, of Yigal Allon:
Israel must regard any massive concentration of
offensive forces on her borders as an aggressive
111^
threat to which she was entitled to respond with forcebefore the enemy took the initiative against her.^
Allon's doctrine of "anticipatory counterattack,"
justified by a perceived threat to Israel's existence,
appears to help explain what happened in I967. There
were six contingencies under which Israel would be
entitled to go to war in Allon's estimation: (1) A
concentration of military forces sufficient to be dangerous
to Israel; (2) when a surprise enemy air attack is clearly
being planned; {3) when air attacks were conducted against
atomic and scientific installations; (i^j when guerrilla
raids reached an unacceptable level; (5) upon Jordan's
conclusion of a military pact with another Arab country;
and (6) if Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran. In Allon's
eyes, any one of these contingencies would constitute a
casus belli . Allen continues zo define the term
"anticipatory counter-attack" as an:
Israeli operational initiative taken against con-
centrations of enemy forces and the occupation on
enemy territory of targets having a vital security
significance, at a time when the enemy is mustering
his forces for an attack but before he has had time
actually to start his offensive.*^
An anticipatory counterattack would begin by
destroying enemy air forces on the ground. According to
Allon, Israeli's territorial vulnerability and Arab
hostility gave Israel the mora] right to utilize this
strategy. However, even Ben-Gurion thought it to be
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too similar to a preventi\'-e war.
However, the war did not spring. Medusa-like, into
existence on the morning of June 5, 196?. The precedent
factors are decades old; the immediately precipitative
factors herein perceived were outlined in Chapter I.
Damascus and especially Cairo certainly bear responsi-
bility in good measure for the provocation (witting or
unwitting) which we have reviewed as bringing about this
whole train of events. These Arab contributions to the
outbreak of hostilities are contradictory especially to
the purposes and principles of the Charter which include
members refraining not only from the "use," but also from
the "threat" of force in their international relations.
It is extremely difficult in light of our analysis
to label one or another party as the sole and singular
contributor to the crisis under the terms of the Charter.
While the partisans to each side would certainly enjoy
the benefits flowing from the designation of the other
side as the "aggressor," this may not have been organiza-
tionally advisable, politically possible, or legally
correct. It may appear that some reciprocity was necessary
in the downward spiral to hostilities, just as it will be
necessary in the far more arduous upward spiral to peaceful
settlement. In conclusion, however, one must recognize
that the Allonian doctrine of "anticipatory counterattack"
provides plenty of fodder for debate.
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Both parties possessed the will and believed they
possessed the capacity to carry out the conflict to a
conclusion favorable to themselves. It was this initial
intransigence of the parties to the conflict both holding
hopes of victory^^ initially buttressed by the Soviet
Union, for example, which tried to hold out for a with-
drawal of all forces to their June positions, which
paralyzed the Security Council at the start. "'•^
The will of the warring states and the flood of
events simply bowled over any attempts at changing the
course of what is now history. The recess of the session
for consultations proved fruitless and the stalemated
Council adjourned until the evening of June 6.
While consultations went on during the next day
(June 6), it became more and more apparent that neither
Egypt nor Jordan could halt the Israeli juggernaut. In
addition, emphasis on both withdrawal and disengagement
was dropped as the need to concentrate simply on a cease-
fire became essential. Forwarding the proposition that
Israel could not have launched its attack without U.S.
foreknowledge and consent, Moscow accused the United States
of hypocritically procrastinating in the Security Council
in the hope that additional time would permit further
Israeli advances, especially upon Sharm el- Sheikh and the
Sinai. ^3
On the evening of June 6, resolution 233 was
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unanimously passed by the Security Council. In the
language of the resolution, the Security Council called
upon the various Governments to "take forthwith all
measures for an immediate cease-fire" and cessation of
military activities, and requested the Secretary General
keep it "promptly and currently informed on the situa-
tion."^^
Thereafter, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg of the United
States stated his country's consistent support of a cease-
fire over the preceding thirty- six hours while expressing
his fervent hope that compliance would be complete and
immediate. Lord Caradon, representative of the United
Kingdom, joined Mr. Goldberg in denying the involvement
of their aircraft in the hostilities."^^ Lord Caradon
also welcomed the resolution. In a very characteristic
discourse he noted his Government's unchanging position
on the major is3ues--a personal constancy as well which
we shall describe and which was to be a wellspring of
great strength for him later on through the time when
resolution 2)42 was actually passed. He also commented
on the current crisis in international authority which,
if not met, could "betray" world hopes for progress and
peace. Surprisingly enough too, in the midst of war and
confusion, Caradon still spoke with foresight of the
Council's inescapable "responsibility to go forward, to
take the other steps now so urgently required." It was
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also characteristic of him to recognize and remind Council
members that failure would result in more bloodshed and
suffering by innocents
:
We need not look farther than the Near East to see
evidence that when conflict comes it is always the
innocent who suffer most, and suffer worst. Id
Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics who followed Caradon condemned Israeli
aggression, called for a cease-fire and the immediate
withdrawal of aggressive forces "behind the truce line,"
reminded the United Nations of its "primary duty
. . .
[to] condemn the actions of Israel and take urgent
measures to restore peace in the Middle East.""^*^ Joining
with Ambassador Milko Tarabanov of Bulgaria, the U.S.S.R.
stated that resolution 233 (196?) should be considered
only a minimum first step. I-nmediate and unconditional
withdrawal by Israel behind the armistice lines should be
considered and adopted by the Council in light of this
flagrant violation of international law. The Russian
position had eroded after reports were received of Israeli
18battlefield successes.
Notable also was an early willingness to see the
Middle East problem through to a different solution which
was expressed by a number of representatives. Ambassador
Lij Endalkachew Makonnen of Ethiopia called for "following
up our decision of today with concerted action which can
lead to the creation of fair and equitable conditions for
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a just and lasting settlement . "^9 Ambassador Jose Maria
Ruda of Argentina stated that the cease-fire "should be
immediately followed by the most intensive efforts in the
Middle East."^^ Mr. George Ignatieff of Canada concurred
in that "We cannot and we must not wait for another ten
years, for another crisis which will
. . . bring us all
once more to the edge of catastrophe."^-^ Even Ambassador
Moussa Leon Keita of Mali called for a "searching study"
of this question so that action will amount to more than
putting" a few more lines on another sheet of paper under
the illusion of having solved a problem that will soon
be confronting us again at the next crossroads . "^^
To these appeals by these representatives to commence
the search for a more profound solution, three other
members— China, Japan and the United States
—
joined in
also urging that the next step be a concerted effort to
delineate a basic settlement to this profound problem--
one which had evoked three area wars in two decades. If
we add to this group the remark of Ambassador Roger
Seydoux of Gaullist France that once peace had returned
"we shall have to embark upon a lengthy process," the
breadth of support for a fundamental settlement, after
the cease-fire can be appreciated.
These calls, just as the conflict itself, marked a
new turn in the course of events. Prior to June p, some
representatives, especially the American and British, had
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appealed for caution and restraint in their effort to
forestall actual hostilities as war clouds gathered. A
chance always existed that the parties would not resort
to the grave alternative of war, that the situational
relationship was still sufficiently viable to enable the
parties themselves to work out their grievances. With the
advent of hostilities, the need for restraint to avoid
hostilities collapsed in face of the necessity to grapple
with the problems of hostilities themselves. India, for
example, made a strong stand for a cease-fire coupled to
withdrawals to positions held on June l\. "based upon the
sound principle that the aggressor should not be permitted
by the international community to enjoy the fruits of
aggression . . . [as] . . . the only basis on which a
lasting peace can be built, Meanwhile, the Iraqi
delegate termed the cease-fire resolution previously
adopted "a complete surrender to Israel," and the
Syrian representative, Georges Tomeh, called for the
condemnation of Israel as an aggressor and for sanctions
under the Charter. To the calls for a withdrawal and
a cease-fire, the Soviet Union added the condition of a
condemnation of Israel. The United States upheld Israel's
point that any cease-fire must be unconditional. This
opened the United States position to Soviet and Arab
charges that by refusing to link the cease-fire to
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withdrawal as the Indian position advocated, the U.S. was
hypocritically abetting its client, Israel, to enjoy the
added fruits of its aggression in direct violation of
international law. The rush of events stripped away the
luxury of discussing how or in what manner a cease-fire
resolution should be passed by the Security Council. Un-
questionably the early pre- June Soviet attitude changed
once an assessment of the incredibly successful Israeli
first strike against Arab military airports was available.
Further delay could only mean further losses in men,
territory and equipment. This may be illustrated by a
consideration of the contrasting, hurried adjectives that
Ambassador Fedorenko used at this point "the first urgent
step . . • stop immediately . • . take urgent measures"
in the Security Council late on June 6 when stating it:
... to be the bounden duty of the Security Council
to adopt without any further delay a decision con-
cerning the immediate and unconditional withdrawal
of the forces of the aggressor behind the Armistice
lines.27
Now, even the Soviet Union was forgetting its prior
specific demands for condemnation of Israel by the Security
Council in the interests of the nub of the matter- -a
cease- fire
.
It was in this sort of a setting that this wide-
spread, though not yet total international groundswell
for a more profound treatment and solution to this problem
surfaced. But it remained the immediate problem of
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halting hostilities which transfixed the energies of the
Security Council.
The American remarks could only have been directed
at the prior positions of both Prussia and the United
Arab Republic in order to contrast Washington's official
constancy with Moscow and Cairo's erraticism on the record,
as well as to point out to the Security Council members
how important it was for them to act promptly and appro-
priately in matters such as these <> It is worthy to note
here that just as the Security Council on one level was
unable to act on the crisis in the period between
U Thant's return from Cairo on May 25 and the June 6
fighting, so too it was stymied in adopting a draft
cease-fire resolution from the early morning of June 5
until the passage of 233 (I967) late on June 6 because,
in Ambassador Goldberg's words, that "draft resolution
28
was not supported by other powers."
But fighting did not cease. No state accepted the
call for a cease-fire in 233 {I967), so Resolution 2}^.
(1967) was adopted unanimously by the Security Council
on June 7 at its 1350th meeting. There are a number of
differences between Resolution 233 of June 6 and Resolution
2314. of June 7. Resolution 23I4. was a much stronger resolu-
tion than 233. The June 6 resolution noted the ''oral
report of the Secretary- General" on the situation, v/hile
the June 7 resolution noted that "in spite of its appeal"
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to the Governments to prepare immediately "for an imme-
diate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military
activities
. . .
military activities are continuing."
Resolution 233 spoke of concern "at the outbreak of the
fighting and with the menacing situation" while 23!; was
concerned that the continuation of fighting "may create
an even more menacing situation in the area." (Emphasis
mine
.
)
The 1,314.9th meeting of the Security Council opened
on June 7 in response to the urgent request of the repre-
sentative of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union had come a
long way since the month of May when it maintained that
to call the Security Council into session was pointless
since no grounds for convening it existed. After stating
that Resolution 233 had had no effect and that the
aggressor was continuing in his aggression^ the Soviet
representative introduced a draft resolution which re-
affirmed the Council's call for a cease-fire. Ambassador
20Pedorenko then pressed for an immediate vote.^ Certainly
this reflected the intense pressure which both the Soviets
and the Arabs felt themselves to be under. One indication
of this from an Arab state traditionally pro-Western was
the Secretary-General's announcement that Jordan had
accepted the Council's cease-fire Resolution 233 that
30
morning at 6:00 A.M. Upon a request by Brazil for a
very short recess so that we can at least become acquainted
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with the wording of the text before us, "31 the President
of the Council, Hans Tabor of Denmark, recognized
Ambassador Goldberg. The American Ambassador, in con-
tradiction to the sudden Soviet turnabout concerning a
cease-fire pointed out:
My delegation has been conscious of the gravity of
this situation not since last night, but for three
weeks ... if certain powers had not objected andhad not deprecated our statements about the gravity
of the situation, a resolution would have been in
the hands of the council for effective action to
avert the outbreak of hostilities in the Near East. 32
V/hile the earlier resolution (233) called for "an imme-
diate cease-fire and for a cessation of military activities,"
the latter one {22k) "demanded " (emphasis mine) a cease-
fire "as a first step" and set a brief deadline for the
discontinuance of military activities. But once again,
no mention was made of steps which would be taken if
compliance were not forthcoming . 33
Following the vote Ambassador El-Kony repeated
charges which he and other Arab delegates had made about
British and American collusion with the Israeli attack
and commented upon the United States "policy of hypocrisy
and antagonism towards Arab nations which, while guaranteeing
the independence and territorial integrity of the States
in the Middle East, have tolerated one expansion of Israel
after another." El-Kony then asked a pointed question:
"Is the United States assei'ting today, by deed or action,
that it will not allow Israel to annex an inch of Arab
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territory?"^^ It was significant that while the represen-
tative from Egypt repeated the request for Council con-
demnation of Israel, this was no longer echoed by the
Soviet Union. Still on June 7, Foreign Minister Abba
Eban of Israel possessed of flawless Arabic and perhaps
the most eloquent living command of the English language
rebutted. After dismissing the allegations of collusion
with the United States and United Kingdom as "absurd,"
Eban clearly stated the pith of the Israeli response to
the Arab charges of aggression:
The central theme of the Arab Israel conflict is
clear and simple. There are Member States that
desire to destroy another Member State. There are
those
. . .
v;ho both proclaim and at times carry
out, measures for the destruction of its indepen-
dence and its integrity. There is neither any
historic basis nor moral justification nor juridical
foundation for that assertion. 35
Eban then turned to the question of attitudes toward
the cease-fire. In contrast to the U.A.R., Syria and Iraq
which had rejected the cease-fire resolution and Jordan
whose acceptance was clouded for Israel by her common
defense pact with the United Arab Republic, Eban proclaimed
of his Government: "We welcome, we favour, we support,
we accept the resolution calling for immediate measures
to institute a "cease- fire . "^^
To this view on one level came a response on another
level. The Bulgarian Ambassador Tarabanov pointed out that
while Foreign Minister Eban appeared to have agreed to
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abide by Resolution 23]+ (I967), "We have neither heard nor
seen anything to indicate that this is the case."^'^
Tarabanov was shortly answered by action, as Israel
announced her acceptance of the cease-fire, provided that
38her Arab foes also agreed. Following contributions by
other states, the Council adjourned for nearly one full
day.
Certainly in any case of diplomatic negotiations
between parties, the fundamental and mutual exclusion by
each of the other's starting premises almost forecloses
chances for the success of the effort. In such a situa-
tion only greater powers which exert their own good offices
and influence can bring hope. The non- policy of drift,
hesitancy and half-heartedness of the U.S. was consistent,
being in evidence both during the upswing toward hostilities
and during much of the fighting as Israel demonstrated its
ability to take care of itself. -^^ The Indian position
actually was quite close to the final United States
position of 195>o« A rereading of General Assembly resolu-
tions during the fighting of that crisis indicated there
too a U.S. emphasis upon stopping the fighting, but coupled
with the call for withdrawal. The U.S. stand thus had
departed from the form of its 1956 behavior in insisting
in 1967 that the most basic of the norms affecting conduct
between nations be dealt with first--a cease- fire--before
questions affecting either condemnation or withdrawal be
12 7
dealt with. It is inescapable, moreover, to note the
Soviet contention that the American position, by refusing
to link a cease-fire with withdrawal, permitted more
latitude for the Israelis to retain the fruits of their
conquest than the Soviet position which linked a cease-fire
to withdrawal. Such talks without Israel's withdrawal
from occupied territory did best suit Israel. This is
inescapable for it is precisely what happened. The fact
that this norm of international law-
-withdrawal from
territory occupied by force of arms--wa3 not injected at
this point, as it was in 1956, had an influence upon
events as they unfolded. Of course, it was not the norm,
or its passage or nonpassage, but the U.S. choice to abide
by the norm in 1956 coupled to the will to see it through
which in part accounted for the difference. Another
important consideration is that the war in 196 7 moved much
faster than the one in 1956. Consequently, in 196? a
necessarily higher premium was placed on sinply halting
the fighting.
On June 8, the Council convened for the 1351st
meeting after notification by both Israel^^ and again
Jordan^"^ of their acceptance of the call for cease-fire
in Resolution 23k (I967). Beth the U.S. and the Q.S.S.R.
had requested thi? aeasion, Ainbassador Fedcrenko of
the U.S.3.R. stated that "'the extremist circles in
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Tel-Aviv obviously are drunk with their temporary successes
on Arab soil" and have "maliciously" laid down conditions
for their acceptance of the Council cease-fire Resolution
22k (1967) as have aggressors through history.^ The
Arabs are forced into defensive action. The Soviet
Ambassador Fedorenko went on to state the necessity that
the Council safeguard the rights of the victims of such
aggression by approving a new draft resolution. In it,
the Soviet Union stated that Israel had not only ignored
Resolutions 233 and 2314. (1%7), but seized more territory
in the interim and that such defiance of the United Nations
continued. The draft also asked that the Council "vigorously
condemns" Israel's violations of U.N. resolutions and prin-
ciples while demanding an immediate halt to Israeli
military activity and their withdrawal "behind the
armistice lines. "^^ The Russian draft resolution may
have been on weaker grounds in its condemnatory mention
only of Israel concerning irdlitary activity, but on the
point of the continuing Israeli territorial advance was
on stronger grounds. Yet, despite the undeniable validity
of this latter point, it is not altogether clear if
(1) the Soviet draft was not too partisan to attract the
wide consensus sought at this time, and (2) whether or
not condemnation is a legitimate Charter approach to peace
inducement
.
The United States which also had requested the
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session submitted its own proposal whose approach basically
diverged from that of the Russians. After noting the
various resolutions and indications to accept a cease-
fire, the United States draft resolution registered its
"deep concern" that no agreement to a cease-fire had yet
been reached. In addition, it called for: (1) "scrupulous
compliance" by Israel and Jordan with the cease-fire
;
(2) immediate compliance with the "Council's repeated
demands for a cease-fire and cessation of all military
activity" as a first step toward peace in the area;
(3) called for
. . .
discussions promptly thereafter among the
parties concerned, using such third party or
United Nations assistance, as they may wish,
looking toward the establishment of viable
arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and
disengagement of armed personnel, the renun-
ciation of force regardless of its nature, the
maintenance of vital international rights and
the establishment of a stable and durable peace
in the Middle East;
(I4.) requested steps by the President of the Security Council
and Secretary- General to secure compliance within twenty-
four hours ; and (5) requested the Secretary-General to
"provide such assistance as may be requested in facilita-
ting the discussions called for" in (3) above.^ Emphasis
upon the "essential" first step of a cease-fire is clearly
evidenced in operative paragraphs one, two and four.
Jordan, Israel, and immediately after Goldberg concluded
speaking, the United Arab Republic announced acceptances
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of the cease-fire call as in 233 and 22>li (I967) on the
condition that the other party/parties reciprocate.
No mention was made in the American draft of the
lines to which withdrawal should be made— those of
June I|. or the Armistice lines. The matter was left
ambiguous. Moreover, operative paragraph (3) of the
American draft, though admirable in intent and certainly
less blatantly one-sided than the Russian proposal,
remained perhaps just as incapable of adoption. While
communication in some form should occur, at this moment
the war was still on, blood was still being spilled; this
was hardly the time to expend energy upon the basic
elements which would make for a "stable and durable
peace," admirable as that may have been, whose very
definition and clearer focus envisaged prompt discussions.
The full extent of the victory/defeat were not yet known,
indeed were still in process. No matter how valid the
content of the U.S. draft resolution would have been over
the long run, tactically it suffered because it advocated
far too much far too soon. Both draft resolutions, then,
each in its own way was dissonant to the tasks at hand.
Into the breach of these widely disparate proposals
conciliatorily stepped Lord Caradon who spilled calming
oils upon the raging waters. First he reminded the
Council members of his and his Government's "connected
and continuous" actions since early Monday morning-- leaving
131
unsaid the erratic and discontinuous actions of other
members. Next, he spoke of the delay; not only that
of the prewar period (".
. , had there not been delay
last month ... we might even have been able to avert
and prevent the war altogether"), but of delay once v;ar
broke out ("we remain of the strong opinion that the
Council should have acted twenty- four hours earlier
. . .
as we urgently advocated on Monday morning").^''' While
he quietly criticised the early Soviet attitude that the
dangers of the situation were "overdramatized and the
urgency artificial,"^® he levelled an accusing finger
not at one party to the conflict, as did the Soviet
proposal, but at both in saying that they "have fallen
far short of readiness to respect and employ inter-
national authority" without distinction between them,^^
Similarly, Caradon ignored the sweeping U.S. proposals
and spoke instead more narrowly that the "next urgent
step must be to provide for the implementation of the
. . . cease-fire . . . call," while speaking of the
coming work" which will urgently occupy us for a long
time to come"^" and concluded with the view that the
immediate United Nations' task should be more limited and
humanitarian while the more distant should be so vague
and ambiguous that no party could object to them:
... to stop the fighting"- and w© pray that the
fighting may very soon be stopped; to ensure and
secure disengaganen t ; to bring relief and succour
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to the wounded and the homeless; and to move on to
J ?^
conciliation and the establish-ment of order and justice. These practical tasks
to%oSey?2''^ * ^ ^°^S ^i^^
Finally, Caradon appealed to the Members' creative
vision and to the United Nations' role in the crisis by
seeking "new means of establishing an effective United
Nations presence "beyond the rear- guard of UNEF while
setting the organization back on the "hard uphill road to
international authority." After observing that there
still existed an opportunity to demonstrate that there
was nothing wrong with the U.N. or its Charter "but
with those who refuse to use it," Caradon "earnestly and
sincerely" appealed to Council members
... to approach these tasks with a will to work
together to abandon old prejudices, to realize that
the world looks to us not to perpetuate animosities,
but to heal wounds and repair the damagre , and give
to all the peoples of the Near East the security
they need and the security they long for, to make
their lives tolerable and their future not a future
of fear, but a future of hope.
In all these purposes we, round this table, have
an inescapable obligation. I trust that we shall
show that we are determined to rise to it.3'3
Here, by means of an appeal to fulfill the general
norms for which the U.N. stands, here, by means of a general
appeal to the core of morality and concern for life which
is the basis both for international organization and inter-
national law—here Lord Caradon exhibited that presence
of mind and embodiment of principles by which men con-
sistently influence events.
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At 1:00 A.M., June 9, the President of the Security
Council wa3 informed by the Secretary-General of Syria's
acceptance of the Council's cease-fire appeals contained
in the Council's resolutions of June 6 and 7 "provided
that the other party agrees upon the cease-fire . "^^
At 5:30 A.M. the Israel representative reported heavy
Syrian shelling of 16 Israeli villages and at 6:00 A.M.
the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, George
Tomeh, requested an urgent meeting of the Security
Council. The war on the Syrian front was on in earnest.
At 1:05 P.M., June 9, Resolution 235 (196?) was
adopted by the Security Council. This marked the third
cease-fire resolution passed unanimously since June 6.
Briefly, 235 (196?) (1) cited resolutions 233 and 23I4.
(1967) concerning an immediate cease-fire and cessation
of military activity; (2) demanded the forthwith cessation
of hostilities; (3) requested the Secretary-General to
immediately contact the Governments of Israel and Syria
to arrange immediate compliance and to report back to the
Security Council within two hours; and iU.) noted that the
Governments of both Syria and Israel had announced their
acceptance of a cease-fire.^''
It is worthy to note here that in Resolution 235 th-©
duty of the Secret a ry-General went beyond mere reporting
on the situation to the arrangement of coripliance . In
addition, not only was a time limit placed cn compliance,
but a time limit only of two hours.
Ambassador Goldberg's remarks after this vote may
have reflected the restraining of Lord Caradon. Goldberg
spoke of a "lack of ability to concert our actions"^^ as
a consistent failing point for the Council and then went
on in a less than oblique fashion to state:
I say this very plainly and very categorically. My
Government is willing to concert its actions with
every member of this Council so that we can bring
the fighting to an end, so that we can start
consideration of all that we need to consider
. . .
we are ready at any time to do this, we are ready
under any circumstances.
. .
.57
Clearly, the United States was prepared to offer
more flexibility than it had previously demonstrated.
When Ambassador Fedorenko spoke after this, his
remarks continued in the same vein as before with little
change in policy; again he insisted that Israel be punished
by an active Security Council, that it cease military
activities and withdraw its troops from Arab territories.
There was no question but that the Soviet Union intensely
desired withdrawal:
... by what right does Israel refuse to withdraw
its troops from the territories which it has seized.
. , . Or is it that Israel has decided to give birth
to new principles all by itsslf . . . that it is
possible and permissible to seize foreign territories
by armed force. . . . This situation brooks of no
delay. 58
The l,353i'*cl meeting of the Security Council opened
later on June 9 to a barrage of charges, denials end counter-
charges by the representatives of Syria, Israel, and Egypt.
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Each state claimed to have accepted the cease-fire vhUe
accusing the other state of violating it anew. The in-
creasing level or righting between Israel and Syria evoked
a new and stronger response rrom ^^^b.ssador Fedorenko.
Accusing the United States or complicity and Israel or
"unbounded" arrogance and hypocrisy, in a broadside
accusation or violating international law. treading
underroot the Charter and sabotaging Security Council
resolutions, the Soviet delegate by his vituperative
words indicated the increasing urgency with which his
government viewed this latest or a long-series or armed
clashes all or which resulted in marked Israeli successes.
The rirst avenue was through the Security Council. It
"... should immediately take resolute end errective
measures" to guarantee Israel's abidance or Council
decisions; Vapt condemn" Israel's disregard or its
resolutions; "must demand" that Israel cease military
action at once and:
.
. .
should warn Tel Aviv that non-compliance by
Israel
. . .
will have the gravest conseauencesfor the Israeli State, and that the Security
Council will be compelled to use the powers which
are invested in it by the Charter or the United
Nations to deal with such situations .59
V/hatever their chance or passage in the world body,
these were certainly strong measures to advocate. To ensure
full impact or its attitude, the Soviet delegate drew the
attention or the Council merabers to e communique issued che
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same day by the States of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany,
Poland, the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The
communique reviewed Israeli aggression and noncompliance,
imperialist collusion, illegal occupation of Arab territory
and, after declaring their full and complete "common
cause" with the Arab people "to repeal the aggression and
defend their national independence and territorial in-
tegrity," and asking for the condemnation of Israel, con-
eluded
:
If the Security Council does not take the proper
measures, great responsibility will rest on those
States which fail to fulfill their duty as members
of the Security Council. 61
In other words, ''while the Western powers voted
in the Security Council for the cease-fire resolution, they
were not exerting the influence on Israel that the
62
Western powers called for."
A number of points need to be made here. Perhaps
the paramount one is the mixed nature of Fedorenko's state-
ment and the communiquS. While increasing their backing
of the Arabs from support to "assistance" in repelling
aggression and defending Arab national independence and
territorial integrity, thereby raising the stakes in the
game, at the same time, there was no talk threatening
Israel's national independence or territorial integrity.
This was significant. It was also significant that though
the threat to widen the conflict was certainly there, both
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Pedorenko's statements and the East European communiqu6
will support the interpretation that this was only a last
resort measure, that first every U.N. channel would be
explored and exhausted. So a mixed bag of bellicosity,
reason, immoderation and caution resulted. In any event,
the Middle Eastern nations were at loggerheads and Russia
obviously was floundering toward extremism against her
will due to the nature of the situation's evolution and
the U.N.'s inability to affect the same evolution.
Into this situation stepped Ambassador Goldberg of
the United States with a statement on the "full authority"
of his Government: hewing close to the consistent prin-
ciple "that the Security Council's resolutions shall be
complied with in letter and spirit by Israel and the Arab
countries involved, "^^ he went on to remind the Council
of the continuing U.S. commitment to halt hostilities and
bloodletting in the area and to get on to a final settle-
ment of the outstanding questions between the parties. He
reviewed official U.S. policy which we might excerpt to
be: (1) a firm commitment to "the political independence
and territorial integrity of all the nations of the area";
(2) "the United States strongly opposes aggression by anyone
in the area, in any form, overt or clandestine"; (3) "the
United States has consistently sought to have good relations
with all the States of the Near East"; and while this
has not always been so, U.S. differences with and between
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area States "must be worked out peacefully and in accordance
with accepted international practice. "^^ Going on to appeal
to "every fair minded person"^^ Ambassador Goldberg pro-
posed an impartial investigation by the Secretary-General
of all allegations of cease-fire violations as well as
the creation of adequate machinery to implement the cease-
fire resolutions adopted by the Security Council. This
was done in order to ascertain exactly what the situation
was so that the appropriate steps can be taken.
Following this, Ambassador El-Parra of Jordan
called his state the victim of a war crime-aggression by
Israel--and expressed his regret that the United States
chose to ignore this aggression and the need, in Jordan's
eyes to condemn it and all for an Israeli withdrawal.
Ambassador Tarabanov of Bulgaria attempted to whiplash
the U.S. on its stands concerning respect for area state
territorial integrity and political independence now that
Israel military units were advancing on Arab soil. In
addition, Tarabanov called it time for the Security Council
to find out just what the situation was in the Middle East
so that the Council could act.
Now that representatives of both blocs had requested
it, Ambassador Tomeh of the Syrian Arab Republic "cate-
gorically" declared his Government's readiness to facilitate
such a U.N. investigation. Ambassador Rafael of Israel
found himself ". . .in singular agreement with the
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representative of Syria" on this matter.^''' Then, both
Tomeh and Rafael were urging and seconding motions to
contact U.N. observers on the spot to assess real develop-
ments in the area. Certainly the logjam was beginning to
move. There followed a report by the Secretary-General
concerning just what facilities would be helpful and how
area states could be cooperative with U.N. observers.
Following the U.S.S.P.'s support of both the
Secretary-General ' s requests and the Syrian suggestion.
Lord Caradon suggested that since the Council was dealing
with rumor and hearsay, it made sense to adjourn and permit
the Secretary-General time to gather information from U.N.
observers on the spot. Following a further refinement by
the French representative, Caradon pushed snd led the
Council (not against its will) to find q way out of the
miasma of charge and counter-charge.^^
Shortly thereafter Security Council President Tabor
was able to present a formula acceptable to all camps--
that cooperation be extended, Government House in Jerusalem
be restored and freedom of movement be facilitated for
United Nations observers in the area. Thereafter, the
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Council adjourned.
Lord Caradon' s feat was no mean one. According to
Arthur Lall, it was he who was the prime mover behind the
entire successful process. Developments both in the area
and in the Council moved with such rapidity that obviously
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he could not have received any instructions from his
Government. Caradon's contribution, acting on his own,
enabled him to find that "slender piece of middle ground"
which permitted movement toward resolution.*'''^
The Security Council next convened at a pre-dawn
emergency special session on June 10 called at the request
of the Syrian Government in response to the deterioration
along her Israeli front. The representative of the Syrian
Arab Republic stated that Israeli forces had occupied the
town of Kuneitra and were proceeding toward Damascus, An
oral report by the Secretary-General was not able to
validate the Syrian charges due to the fragmentary nature
of U.N. observer assessments in the area whose freedom of
movement was still restricted. Ambassador Tcmeh told the
Council that the Israeli representative was deliberately
misleading the Council in stating his country's acceptance
of the cease-fire and requested that this body apply
sanctions to Israel in view of its disregard for unanimous
Council resolutions.
Representative Fedorenko continued along this line
in stating that the Ambassador from Israel had attempted to
"mislead and deceive the Council by using casuistical
subterfuges and ambiguous reservations, the real purpose of
which was to conceal the attack by the Israeli aggressors
against the Syrian Arab Republic ."^"^ "The U.S.3.R. continued
to request the condemnation of Israel for its criminal
bandit activity against Syria. ""^^ The representative from
India joined in with the denunciations of Israel's defiance
of the U.N.
The Soviet representative charged that it was
absolutely plain that Israel was continuing to advance on
Syria and that condemnation was called for. This was
buttressed by similar statements from the representatives
of Bulgaria, Mali and India calling for immediate measures
to halt this aggression.
The representative of Israel denied these charges
and stated that Israeli forces were in Syria only to silence
Syrian gun emplacements which had continued to bombard
Israel in direct violation of the Security Council cease-
fire resolutions.
Ambassador Goldberg insisted on awaiting the report
of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Super-
vision Organization (UNTSO), General Odd Bull, on whether
or not Kuneitra was in the hands of the Syrians or the
Israelis. "When we get that information the Council will
know what to do." Goldberg stated that his Government
believed that both sides had an obligation to comply with
the cease-fire. But it was not appropriate to pass
judgment merely on en allegation by one of the aggrieved
parties
.
Then a communication from the U.N. machinery in the
area reported air attacks on Damascus. ^ Despite taunts
Ik2
from the Soviet and Bulgarian representatives, Ambassador
Goldberg insisted this was not a "comprehensive report on
what is going on the whole area."^^
Later, contradictory reports of both Israeli and
Syrian action from General Bull stated: "there have been
and are Israeli aircraft in the vicinity of Damascus; they
are there as protective cover for the Israeli forces in
the area" as well as indications of the Syrian shelling of
76Israel which Gideon Rafael had complained.
Certainly this meeting pointed up the vital role of
U.N. machinery in an area of conflict and the near-total
dependence of the U.N. upon such machinery if they are to
deal promptly and appropriately with dangerous cases of
conflict.
Reconvening shortly after eight that same morning
(June 10), the meeting began with another oral report by
U Thant on developments in the area. The message read
that air attacks were reported to the north of Damascus
and in the area of its airport. Fedorenko Jumped to the
attack exclaiming:
The perpetration of the crime is proved. Never-
theless, in spite of this we are compelled to note
the inexplicable position adopted by certain members
of the Security Council, especially the represeni^ative
of the United States. We have heard his explanation.
We are forced to reject the attempt of the represen-
tative of the United States to confuse a clear
situation. We cannot attribute objectively to
him. , , J'^
^^ain Caradon moved the Council off a stalemated
dead-center by speaking very deliberately, succinctly and
incisively to the crisis of the day. Reminding both Syria
and the Soviet Union of their not-hours-old commitment to
U.N. machinery and authentic, verified information, Caradon
went on to meld their criticism and get the Council back
on ttie track it belonged:
We should condemn in the strongest terms any breach
of our call for a cease-fire. We should condemn
in the strongest terms every breach of our call for
a cease-fire. I vould like to repeat that. . . .
We should condemn any and every breach of the cease-
fire, without exception.'''"
Certainly no nation which subscribed to the Charter
could help but agree to this. The stand was irreproach-
able. Moreover, Caradon had the knack of lifting the
scales from members' eyes:
We must not at this time lose sight ... of our first
and overriding purpose, the purpose on which we have
all agreed and on which we have three times voted
unanimously. Our first and overriding purpose is to
stop the fighting and stop it at once. That is the
purpose we have had from the start, and I believe
that we shall concentrate, without diversion and
without delay, all our effort on that main purpose.
Immediately after this, Thant reported that General
Odd Bull had been asked to meet Israeli Defense Minister
General Moshe Dayan to discuss an effective cease-fire.
Tomeh of Syria described additional Israeli aggressions,
Keita of Mali called for the condemnation of Israel and
Fedorenko of Russia threatened, with other peace-loving
states to apply sanctions bo Israel unless the aggressions
ceased. The Ambassador of Canada, George Ignatieff, pro-
posed the strengthening of UNTSO (already suggested
officially by both the U.S. and India) and the sending of a
special representative of the Secretary
-General to the area
(first suggested by India). The Council adjourned on the
news from the Secretary-General that real progress was
being made toward implementing a cease-fire between Israel
and Syria. Nonetheless, the U.S. was suspect in many eyes
of hypocritically and quietly favoring its client-victor
at this point.
At 9:00 P.M. that same evening (June 10) the Security
Council met again at the request of the Soviet Union whose
representative charged that Damascus was under air attack
and that ground fighting had resumed. Again the problem
was fragmentary reporting from the area from U.N. machinery
due to limitations of size and less-than-complete freedom
of movement. Again the same paradox presented itself: how
to act on this basis? Kuneitra had changed hands. Military
activity was continuing long after both states ostensibly
had accepted the cease-fire. Should the Council consider
condemnation, should it strengthen the U.N. presence, should
it await further information, or pass another resolution?
Ambassador Goldberg countered the Soviet demands for
condemnation and withdrawal with a draft resolution con-
demning "any and all violations of the cease-fire" and
requesting that the Secretary-General order full investigati
1U5
of all reports cf cease-fire violations and report to the
Security Council. It also called upon the Governments con-
cerned to issue "categoric instructions" to cease fire and
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military activities. Lord Caradon's presence may be
felt. Fedorenko then accused Goldberg of "some discomfort
as he was facing the obvious fact of the flagrant violation
81by Tel Aviv of the cease-fire." He went on to ask the
U.S. representative: "Does he condemn the bombing of
Damascus? Does he condemn the fact that the representative
of Israel has been cynically misleading the Security
Op
Council" before offering to yield the floor for a
response. Ambassador Goldberg responded by citing his
draft resolution which condemned all cease-fire resolutions
and with a question of his own for Fedorenko: "Is he pre-
.
pared to condemn all the violations of the cease-fire con-
firmed by the Security Council in his report? "^^ While
Fedorenko offered to answer Goldberg's query, in fact, he
never did for there had been earlier breaches by Syria.
Later, there arrived a report from General Bull: "No
Arab breaches of the cease-fire."®^ The Council adjourned
just before 3:00 A.M. the next morning.
Late Sunday evening the Council gathered for its
1» 357th meeting in response to a Syrian charge of Israeli
advances aimed at the Yarmuk River, a large tributary of
the Jordan. General Odd Bull reported movement of Israeli
tanks south of Rafid, While the Syrian representative
11+6
claimed Israeli military operations after the cease-fire
had gone into effect, the Israeli representative retorted
that there had been movement by military vehicles within
the new truce lines, but no advance beyond them and that
there was no fighting anywhere along the front lines.
The Soviet representative accused Rafael of stalling
for time and "... trying by any means, with the support
of Washington and certain others, to enable the Israeli
army to take as much territory as possible. "^^ Pedorenko
again asked for quick and decisive Council action, for
the cessation of hostilities, the unconditional withdrawal
of troops ("the Security Council cannot permit Israel to
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enjoy the fruits of its aggression"), and condemnation
for Israel. Israel continues to defy the United Nations
and Security Council resolutions, stated Fedorenko. Its
aggressions and violations deserve condemnation as the
Soviet draft resolution recommends and upon which the
Soviets wanted a vote, he continued. The independence,
sovereignty and legitimate rights of a member State are at
stake. The Council should act energetically and without
delay, concluded Fedorenko.
Again Caradon threw himaelf into the breach, but with
typical discretion and accuity. Aftar stating his under-
standing of the importance of this matter to the Syrian
representative, Caradon said:
We have worked for a week for a cease-fire. We hopethat we have achieved it. Anything which jeopardizedthat cease-fire would be a matter of the utmost
gravity. ...
I suggest that what we can do, what we* should do'
and what we must do is to make absolutely clear,
tonight, now, that we insist that there should be nobreach whatsoever, of the cease-fire and
. . . that
we in the Security Council would take the most
serious and grave view of a breach of any kind.
• • •
Lord Caradon then suggested that since it would be
dawn soon in the Middle East, the Council take a short
recess to await fresh reports. Before the recess, the
representatives of Mali, Egypt, and Bulgaria again
demanded the condemnation of Israel and the immediate
withdrawal of its armed forces. The representative of
India repeated his earlier proposal for an immediate
withdrawal to the positions occupied on June i^. The United
States representative also voiced his support of the thrust
of Caradon 's argument.
After a brief recess, the Security Council at
3:00 A.M. unanimously adopted Resolution 236 (196?) of
June 12, 1967. Here again Ambassador Tabor, President of
the Security Council, was most instrumental, as usual, in
the unanimous vote. In addition, Tabor introduced the
draft resolution.
Briefly, the resolution: (1) condemned any and all
cease-fire violations in keeping with Lord Ceradon's
earlier formulation; (2) requested the Secretary-General
1U8
to continue and report his investigations to the Council
as rapidly as possible; (3) affirmed the demand for a
cease-fire and specifically a prohibition of any forward
military movements after the cease-fire; (I4.) called for
the prompt return to cease-fire positions of any troops
who may have moved forward subsequent to I630 GMT, June 10,
1967; and (5) called for full cooperation with the Chief
of Staff and observers of UNTSO specifically mentioning
freedom of movement and adequate communications.^'''
The resolution was narrowly tailored to fit the
broadest possible ground of the moment. No condemnation
and no withdrawal were included, but then, a firm and un-
violated cease-fire was essential before consideration of
any other steps. The Syrian front was, for the most part,
quiet thereafter.
The U.S.S.R. requested and was the first to speak at
the 1,358th session of the Security Council convening on
June 13. In a long position statement, Ambassador
Fedorenko wove together a fabric which included strands
of power politics, ideology, support for clients and the
invocation of international law. "The aggression by IsraeV'
said Fedorenko, "was aimed at changing the so-called
balance of power in the Near-East." Ideologically, its
purpose was to attempt to "undermine the national liberation
movements of the Arab people and to weaken th6 progressive
regimes in the United Arab Republic, Syria and other Arab
1I;9
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countries," The Israel aggression in Soviet eyes,
"was the result of a conspiracy of certain imperialistic
forces primarily the United States, against the Arab
89
states." Occupation of Arab soil by Israeli military
forces is "illegal, criminal, contrary to the United
Nations Charter and the elementary principles of con-
temporary international law." The position of the Soviet
Union, the Arab States, India, Mali and others "is based
upon the well-known principle of international law that
the aggressor should not be permitted to enjoy the fruits
90
of his aggression." The most elemental principle of
international law should be respected, Pedorenko con-
tinued, and Israel should be condemned; her military
forces should withdraw immediately and unconditionally
behind the General Armistice lines in accordance with a
draft resolution which Fedorenko presented. After quoting
statements by Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkcl and
General Moshe Dayan of Israel which hinted at "expansionist
plans," Fedorenko quoted a statement of Ambassador Goldberg
concerning the firm U.S. commitment "to the support of the
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political independence and territorial integrity"^ of all
nations in the area and then asked
... if that statement of the representative of the
United States is still valid, and if so, is the
United States prepared to affirm that it is against
the territorial claims of Tel Aviv?^^-
Ambassador Goldberg's response was lengthy in turn.
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He reviewed official United States efforts to solve the
various components which go to make up the Arab-Israeli
problem, reviewed the depth of U.S. commitment in 1956 and
the "even-handed" approach toward recent border problems
which included the Security Council call for the Government
of Syria to restrain raids launched from its territory and
the U.S. vote approving the unanimous Council censure of
Israel for the Es-Samu raid. He also reminded the Council
of the Soviet Union's foot-dragging and charged over-
dramatization in terms of the gravity of the early situa-
tion while the U.S. was calling "for urgent action by this
93
council." The inability of the Security Council to act
between May 21). and June 5 and the incapacity of the Council
to pass a simple cease-fire resolution during the first two
days of hostilities were laid at the feet of "Soviet obstruc
tion."^^ Goldberg then compared the Soviet proposal to
running a film "backwards through the machine to that point
in the early morning of June 5 when hostilities had broken
out," with troops back on either side of a border without
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the buffer or a U.N. presence. Rather, foundations for
a broad new peace must be created in the Middle East;
solutions must not be thought of as impossible, because
"for many years, they have not been tried really seriously."
The Council had a responsibility and a chance to get at the
deep-seatod ce.uses of 5ll the three wars in the Near E%3t:
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It is necessary to begin to move, not some day but
now, promptly while the memory of these tragic
events are still vivid in our minds, toward a full
settlement of all outstanding questions--'I again
repeat "all outstanding questions.
. .
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Goldberg's hope was all-encompassing:
There are legitimate grievances on all sides of this
bitter conflict, and a full settlement should deal
equitably with all legitimate grievances and all
outstanding questions from whatever side they are
raised. In short, a new foundation for peace must
be built in the Middle East. 93
Goldberg also foresaw a continuing role for the
Security Council:
. . . agreements between the parties on these
profoundly contentious matters will take a long
time, but the United Nations, speaking, through
this Council, has an urgent obligation to facilitate
them and to help build an atmosphere in which
fruitful discussions will be possible. 99
The United States proposal was comprehensive,
sweeping, dramatic and perhaps too quick for those reasons
as have been pointed out earlier. The Soviet resolution
was narrower and more open in its favoritism of one party.
Both apparently were difficult for the Council to accept.
The representative of Israel present at the meeting,
Reginald Kidron, rejected the anti-Zionist speeches of the
representatives of Jordan and Saudi Arabia and rejected
the Soviet draft resolution as "negative and one-sided.
"-'•^
The Ambassador from Morocco, Ahmed Taibi Benhima, provided
an insight into the depth of the Arab feeling towards
Zionism which is a part of the problem, and Mohammed
El-Kony, after castigating the U.S. for its alleged
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involvement in the attack, urged the Council to pass the
American draft. ^^"^ Shortly thereafter the Council adjourned
after rejecting a Soviet bid that its proposal be voted on
immediately.
At the convening of the l,360th Council session on
June ll^., Lord Caradon attempted to lend some balance to
members' thinking. While recognizing representatives'
responsibilities to express national policies and defend
national interests, Caradon reminded them that they also
"are charged with a much heavier obligation." People of
the world look to this august body to
. . . make an effort to understand, to find common
ground, to harmonize the actions of nations . . .
to seek just and honorable solutions, to establish
and keep a peace firmly based on international
authority. 102
Caradon asked for a "further supreme effort to work
together" and asked diplomatically that faces be turned
forward than backward: "In the hope that we can set out
on the second phase of our work in a better spirit, I shall
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not go back over the past three weeks." Then Caradon
characteristically began to outline the specific rather
than broad or condemnatory steps to be taken: (1) the
area U.N. machinery should be strengthened; (2) Govern-
ment House in Jerusalem with its records and communications
equipment should be returned to General Bull and his staff
by Israel; (3) the problem of civilian suffering and of new
and larger numbers of refugees should be alleviated
and a
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U.N. investigation should be undertaken concerning Arab
charges of Israeli pressure to coerce Arab civilians to
leave their homes; and that the Secretary-General
depute a personal representative to help in restoring
peaceful conditions, and that the Security Council should
appoint a mediator to
. . undertake discussions with
the Governments concerned so that an immediate start can
be made in setting the foundations for a just and lasting
peace, "^^^ Throughout his speech, Lord Caradon never
wavered in his own faith and constantly sought to re-
plenish the faith of those who might have wavered in the
ability of the United Nations to effectively discharge
its obligations in trust.
Caradon' s proposals were not acted upon. While
surely they could not have been accepted except after
deliberation and harmonization of views, there was little
in them by themselves which could have caused rejection.
Had they been accepted, possibly the unfolding process
which culminated in resolution 2l]2 (196?) might have
been concluded more quickly.
Despite Roger Seydoux's statement as representative
of France that "conquest by force of arms cannot confer
the right to occupy a territory," France later abstained
from voting on the Soviet draft on the basis that "we
should work together to facilitate talks when the time
comes which could lead to agreements acceptable to all
parties. "^^^ (Emphasis mine.)
But immediately thereafter, the Soviet Union draft
resolution postponed from the last session, was put to
the vote. Voting occurred by operative paragraphs. Con-
cerning the key points--condemnation and wi thdr8wal--only
four members out of the fifteen Council members--
Bulgaria, India, Mali and the U.S.S.R. voted for the first
point, while the original four states were joined only by
Ethiopia and Nigeria on the second point of withdrawal.
No negative votes were cast. Instead, all other members
abstained. This may be taken to indicate a variety of
interpretations: the Soviet resolution was too un-
yielding and too closed to compromise; Council members
had decided that Israel was not guilty of acts deserving
condemnation; or, that though Israel deserved condemna-
tion such an act was dissonant with the search for a just
and lasting peace in the Middle East--a search which de-
pended upon attitudes and the manner in which proposals
resonated as upon anything else. Against a crystal-clear
Soviet intention to . . oppose the United States draft
resolution and vote against it"^^^ because of its alleged
accommodation to Israeli violations of the Charter, Council
resolutions and international law, Ambassador Goldberg made
clear his nation's "desire to accommodate our views to that
of other members of the Council in the effort to find a
Tt 1 07
common approach to the solution of r.his grave problem."
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One can hardly be surprised that the effort was unsuccessful
since the U.S. refused to compromise on the points either
of condemnation or unconditional withdrawal behind General
Armistice lines--points on which Moscow would not compromise
either. No other resolutions were then put to the vote.
Hours later, the Council reconvened and quickly and
unanimously adopted Resolution 237 (196?) on June ll|.
Resolution 237 stressed the urgent need to spare the
civilian population and prisoners of war in the Middle East
from further suffering while considering that inalienable
human rights are to be respected even during war and that
the Geneva Convention relative to prisoners of war should
be respected: (1) to ensure the safety, welfare and
security of inhabitants of areas where hostilities occurred
and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had
fled since their outbreak; (2) recommended to all concerned
Governments scrupulous respect of prisoners of war and
civilians relative to the Geneva Convention of 1914-9; and
(3) requested the Secretary-General to effectively implement
1 03
the resolution and report back to the Security Council.
Mutual exclusivisity is an analytical term of haunting
appropriateness here on certain of the major Soviet and
United States points: unconditional versus conditional
withdrawal by Israel troops is an example. Perhaps this is
what led the representative of the Soviet Union to announce
"the Security Council has in fact concluded its examination
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of this problem at the present stage. "-^^^
The Council adjourned amidst wide rumors that the
Soviet Union was about to request an emergency session of
the General Assembly to continue the press for fulfillment
of its goals.
There should be no misunderstanding by this time of
our view concerning the Soviet Union's behavior during
this period; certainly it was erratic when one compares
the delaying behavior of May with the sense of urgency
depicted in June. But we have not commented in great
detail upon the behavior of the United States other
than to describe it. At this point it may be instruc-
tive to examine briefly U.S. behavior during the 1956
Suez crisis to see what points emerge.
During the actual fighting in 1956, the United States
submitted two draft resolutions, one to the Security
Council and one to the first emergency special session
of the General Assembly. U.N. Document S/3710,
October 30, 1956 noted "that the armed forces of Israel
have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in violation
of the General Armistice Agreement ..." and expressed its
grave concern at this, but, most importantly to our
examination, called upon "Israel immediately to withdraw
11
its armed forces behind the established armistice lines."
Similarly, on November 1 the United States submitted a
draft resolution to the first emergency special sossion of
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the General Assembly {A/3256) which subsequently was adopted
by the Assembly and became Resolution 997 (ES-I) on
November 2, 1956. After expressing grave concern over "the
disregard on many occasions by parties to the terms of the
Israel-Arab armistice agreements of 191+9," the French and
British military operations in Egypt, and the interruption
of the Suez Canal to traffic, urged "an immediate cease-
fire" and an end to the movement of military forces and
arms into the area. Again, most important to our purposes,
A/3256 and 997 (ES-I) identically continued: "urges the
parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw
all forces behind the armistice lines. ..."
In introducing A/3256 on November 1, United States
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, cited the many
"expressions of hostility" by the Egyptian Government
toward the Israel Government and reviewed the "somewhat
laggard, somewhat impotent" U.N. action toward "the many
injustices inherent in the Middle Eastern situation." But
then he went on:
If, however, we were to agree that the existence in
the world of injustices which this Organization has
so far been unable to cure means that the principle
of the renunciation of force should no longer be
respected, that whenever a nation feels that it has
been subjected to injustice it should have the right
to resort to force in an attempt to correct that
injustice, then I fear that we should be tearing this
Charter into shreds, that the world would again be a
world of anarchy.
We need only contrast these resolutions and words
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delivered during the U.N. proceedings in 1956 with the
documentation provided above to witness that U.S. formal,
official behavior in 196? was radically different from
that of 1956. Certainly we should note that the 1956
situation involved something of a betrayal of French, but
especially British word and confidence to Dulles and
especially President Dwight D. Eisenhower
. the
1967 war was "cleaner" in the sense of Israeli involvement
only and incredibly blundering Arab provocation including
the Syria-based commando activity, Nasser's request for
UNEF withdrawal (acted upon albeit too hastily by Thant )
,
and his closure of the Straits of Tiran which lent to the
Israeli claim of self-defense a sounder ring than the truly
shallow case of 1956. Whether because of fear of another
Viet Nam-type involvement, domestic pressures, previous
commitments, the nature of the Russian involvement and
consequent further polarization of the Middle East, or
other unknown factors--we can only speculate--President
Lyndon B. Johnson refused to direct U.S. policy to act
in conformance with norms of international law previously
espoused by the U.S. Government and applied to a similar
situation of invasion following provocation. The United
States had the chance to deviate from the legal norm con-
cerning withdrawal in 1956 and it did not. It had a similar
opportunity to deviate in 196? and it did. president
Johnson, unlike President Eisenhower, chose not to exert
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influence upon Israel while it swiftly and decisively
seized the territory of an Arab state.
Israel had gone this route once before in 1956 and,
in the conflict between abidance with the U.N, resolutions
or serving her perceived national interest chose, in 196?,
the latter route. No longer would it be possible to fire
shots into Israeli Jerusalem or possible to shell the
suburbs of Tel-Aviv, to place aircraft, or possibly
missiles in the Sinai closer to Jerusalem, more distant
from Cairo; no longer would Syrian army units look down
into Israel from the Golan Heights.
Israeli defense needs would be served as they had
not been fcr nineteen years. Resolution 233 passed on
June 6 was not acceptable to the Arabs because it did not
label Israel as the aggressor nor call for her withdrawal.
This, despite the Soviet Union's vote for the cease-fire
adoption. On June 7, cease-fire Resolution 22k was passed
unanimously.
Quickly, Jordan and Israel agreed to a cease-fire
113
"provided that the other parties accept" ^ in the case of
Israel and "except in self -def ense""^-^^*- in the case of
Jordan. Egypt accepted the cease-fire on June 8 Ggain with
the same proviso for reciprocity. Since June 7 Israel
troops had been rushing to the northeast front. Fears that
the Security Council might successfully attempt to stop the
attack and cause needless casualties and of Russian
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intervention restrained Moshe Dgyan from giving the final
go-ahead until:
.
. .
7:00 A.M. of June 9 ... the go-ahead thus came
nearly four hours after the representatives of Syria
and Israel in the Security Council had formally kccepted
a cease-fire injunction.
Syrian shelling of Israel had occurred in the prior
days of the war and was reported on June 9 also. However,
given the extent of the Israeli gains--the road to Damascus
beyond Kuneitra, the Golan Heights and the headwaters of
the Banyas and Dan Rivers^^^--it is difficult to resist
the conclusion that in this instance Israel deliberately
did not heed the cease-fire resolutions of the Security
Council
.
Adherence to international law is not deemed to imply
jeopardizing the existence of the state; in this delineated
instance Israel deemed this area to be one of vital interest
and proceeded to take it, especially in light of the
commando activities of 1966-67. On the other hand, Charter
Nations are not to employ the use of force in settling dis-
putes among nations, nor are they to decide themselves that
compliance with U.N. resolutions is to occur only after the
desired goals of war are achieved. The tension here concern-
ing the timing and taking of the Golan Heights between self-
interest and international law is an old and tragic one.
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ABSTRACT
The treatment of this topic is designed to show how
the United Nations was employed in a situation of crisis
and to trace the interactions of states, international law
and organization v/hich culminated in the passage of Resolution
2l\2, Our three foci of investigatory interest are political,
legal and organizational. We have sought to allow each
approach its position in accordance with their salient or
secondary natures at different junctures in the institutional
playing-out of this crisis.
A realistic study of the relationship between these
factors would begin with a review of the policies and
behavior of the area and superpower states which were
parties to the crisis. Our particular concentration here is
upon the upswing toward war. Our framed reference is chiefly
political. The Arab-Israeli conflict is one whose elements
are of long standing. The next section treats each issue
2of this conflict in its legal form and explores the case
which each of the direct parties makes, and whose conflicting
tension is reflected in the United Nations and its resolutions.
The third section traces the activities which occurred in the
United Nations from the period prior to the outbreak of war
through November 22, 196?. Here we are concerned with the
relationships between states, international law and organiza-
tion in the unfolding interplay which led up to the adoption
of Resolution 2[;2. The concluding section expectedly sum-
marizes and draws judgements upon the points presented
earlier.
Our central view is of the United Nations as a vehicle
or instrument of political conflict or its resolution. Al-
though the United Nations has been used as a vehicle or tool
of great power policy in the past to manage or contain
crises, this was one case in which the situation slipped
out from under great power control and posed an obstreperous
life of its own before the passage of Resolution 21^2 which
suggested the general outlines for a potential peace settle-
ment .
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CHAPTER IV
THE FIFTH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
A letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs for
the U.SS.R. to the Secretary
-General on June 13, 196?
requested the prompt convening of an emergency session
of the General Assembly. The grounds stated were that
Israel had seized additional Arab territory despite the
resolutions of the Security Council calling for a cease-
fire. Therefore, under Article 11 of the Charter, the
General Assembly should convene to consider the situation
and to act to liquidate the fruits of "aggression" and
to bring about the withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the
Armistice lines.
The fifth emergency special session of the General
Assembly convened on June 17, but actually did not get
down to business until June 19. Between then and July 5,
1967, 25 meetings were called and 7 draft resolutions were
put before the Assembly. Of these, two were adopted and
were concerned with humanitarian assistance and refugees,
and with unilateral Israeli changes in the status of
Jerusalem. All but one of the remaining five draft
resolutions were voted upon and rejected. Between July 5
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and July 12, the General Assembly recessed and the Security
Council met to hear mutual cross-charges by Israel and the
United Arab Republic concerning violations of the cease-fire
resolutions
.
When the General Assembly reconvened on July 12 fur-
ther discussion of the noncompliance of Israel with the
previous Assembly resolution was discussed and another,
stronger resolution relating to the status of Jerusalem
passed. Further discussions proved sterile and on July 21,
by Resolution 2256 (ES-V), the body decided to temporarily
adjourn the special session and to request the Secretary-
General to forward Assembly records to the Security Council
so as to facilitate resumption by the Council as an urgent
matter. The Assembly then adjourned until it reconvened
on September 18, 196? when it adopted Resolution 225?
(ES-V) expressing concern over the Middle East situation
and placing the matter on the agenda of the twenty-second
regular session as a matter of high priority.
As befits the superpower which sought the emergency
session attended by many Heads of Government and Ministers
for Foreign Affairs, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Soviet Union, Alexei Kosygin, on June 19 led off the
speakers. Chairman Kosygin began by explaining that the
Middle East could explode again so long as Israeli troops
occupied conquered Arab lands and urgent measures were not
taken to eliminate the cor^seouences of aggression. It is up
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to the Assembly to adopt those decisions which might open
the way to peace in that area. Speaking to the small
nations which comprise the bulk of the voting members of
the Assembly, Kosygin noted:
. . .
there are many regions of the world where there
are bound to be those eager to seize foreign terri-
tories, where the principles of territorial integrity
and respect for the sovereignty of States are far
from being honoured. If Israel's claims do not
receive a rebuff today, tomorrow a new aggressor, big
or small, may attempt to overrun the lands of other
peaceful countries
. . . whether the United Nations
will be able to give a due rebuff to the aggressor
. . .
gives rise to anxiety on the part of many
States from the point of view of their own
security .2
This smooth blending of law, self-interest, the role
of the United Nations and the age-old fear of the small,
born of their vulnerability certainly found resonances
with some smaller nations. Kosygin also tried to broaden
and polemicize the point by stating that Israel did not
act alone; that the aggression was aimed at toppling the
national independence regimes of the U.A.R. and Syria
which "evoke the hatred of the imperialists."-^
Chairman Kosygin repeated in a legal form the main
points of the Just-ended Security Council debates:
The Arab States, which fell victim to aggression,
are entitled to expect that their sovereignty,
territorial integrity, legitimate rights and in-
terests which have been violated by an armed
attack, will be reconstituted in full and without
del ay. ^
In keeping with its general line of Security Council
days, the draft resolution which the Soviet Union introduced-
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called for the (1) vigorous condemnation of "Israel's
aggressive activities" and continuing occupation of Arab
lands which constituted "an act of recognized aggression";
(2) demanded that Israel "should immediately and uncon-
ditionally withdraw ... its forces
. . . behind the
armistice demarcation lines ... and should respect the
status of the demilitarized zones, as prescribed in the
Armistice Agreements; (3) in a new point, demanded full
and rapid restitution by Israel for its aggression against
the aggrieved Arab States and their nationals and "should
return to them all seized property and other material
assets"; and {k) in a surprising point appealed for con-
tinued use of the Security Council to "take
. . . immediate
effective measures in order to eliminate all consequences
of the aggression committed by Israel."^
The last two points were novel and while (3) might
be dismissed as an upset over $2 billion loss of Soviet
military equipment in the Sinai alone, (I4.) merited atten-
tion as a hopeful indicator. The Soviet Union apparently
had not totally excluded the Security Council as an appro-
priate and useful channel for possible action in the future.
If we add to (k.) another statement of Kosygin's that should
the General Assembly:
. . .
find itself incapable of reaching a decision in
the iniierests of peace, this would deal a heavy blow
to the expectations of mankind regarding the possibility
of settling major international problems by peaceful
means, by diplomatic contacts and negotiations. No
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state which genuinely cares for the future of itspeople can fail to take this into consideration.
The peoples should rest assured that the United
?^ capable of achieving the aims proclaimedin Its Charter, the aims of safeguarding peace on©arth •
'
Coming at the very conclusion of Kosygin's speech before
the General Assembly, this was no mistake; Soviet com-
mitment to the United Nations was remaining in this affair.
This was a welcome sign. Another such sign was the
Soviet awareness of the dangers of civilizational con-
flagration:
The problem concerns war and peace period. In the
present tense international situation, hours or
minutes can settle the fate of the world. Unless
the dangerous developments in the Middle East
. . .
are curbed, if conflicts are permitted to spread,
the only possible outcome today or tomorrow would be
a big, world war. And no single State would be able
to remain on the sidelines.^
On top of this conscious restraint on the world-
wide level came a statement of restraint on the area level
concerning recognition and enunciation of Israel's right
to exist: "every people enjoys the right to establish
an independent national State of its own. This constitutes
one of the fundamental principles of the policy of the
Soviet Union. "9
A final positive note was sounded when Kosygin noted:
Much depends on the efforts of the big Powers. It
would be good if thoir delegations as well found a
common language in order to reach decisions meeting
the interests of peace in the Middle East and the
interests cf universal peace. ^0
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The Russian view here was based on the primacy of
Israeli aggression. Working off of this condemnation,
withdrawal and even restitution were requisite in Russian
eyes in terras of international law if only the "use of
force" according to Article 2 is accepted. The fact that
Kosygin did not rule out further use of the channel of the
United Nations and indicated a willingness to find a
"common language" with the U.S. was a hopeful sign. How-
ever, the case was not so clear, for the Charter also
rules out "threats" to use force. And the Arab states
themselves had ruled out their total exoneration on this
count by their many threats against Israel prior to the
actual outbreak of fighting. On June I4., for example, in
a live speech broadcast domestically, Nasser told the
Israelis: "we are facing you in the battle and are burning
with the desire for it to start, in order to get revenge
for the 1956 treachery. "-^-^
The Russian case here may be perceived on three
levels: (1) a selective appeal to the precepts of inter-
national law to eliminate the reward of aggression; (2) a
supportive commitment to the position of Arab states with
which, as we shall see, the Russian position was not
exactly consonant; and (3) a shielded indication of the
U.S.S.R.'s willingness to seek an accommodation of some
sort on a superpower level built upon a continued com-
mitment to the existence of the state of Isirael. What
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appears to emerge from this position is not so much a
commitment to international law as a desire to satisfy the
Arab states while avoiding the escalation into worldwide
holocaust which was so much evident in Kosygin's statement.
As the vote on it ultimately demonstrated, the Russian
draft resolution was too partisan to gather the required
two-thirds vote.
The Yugoslav draft resolution was delivered to the
Assembly by that country's Prime Minister, Mika Spiljak.
As a communist, albeit independent state and a firm friend
especially of the U.A.R.'s Gamal /ibdul Nasser, the Yugoslav
resolution called for Israel's immediate and unconditional
withdrawal on the basis that:
Any other approach would actually be tantamount to a
rewarding of the aggression and a sanctioning of
attempts aimed at solving disputes among States by
force . ^'^
This was justified on the grounds that:
One cannot tolerate the realization of territorial
and other pretensions through the use of force, nor
is it permissible to employ this expedient to impose
political solutions violating the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and independence of States.
. . . Solutions founded on coercion . . . are not
even durable. In this case, too, such solutions
would give rise to general indignation, hatred and
resistance, which inevitably leads to new and more
serious conflicts, and is fraught with dangers to
world peace. 13
Israeli indemnification too was called for, but
only in bhe speech, not the draft itself. This provides
an insight into the attitude of one of the drafters.
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Similarly to the Soviet position, and in contra-
distinction to that of the Arabs tha Vi,o.^ tou x o , line Yugoslav view recog-
nized the existence of Israel: "we had maintained, until
the recent events, normal relations with Israel, whose
existence we have never questioned."!^ But where it was
in conformity with the Soviet and Arab view of unilateral
Israeli recourse to aggression, in contrast to these views,
the Yugoslav draft at least mentioned negotiations:
There can be no negotiations prior to execution ofthe withdrawal, nor can there be any search for
arrangements that would otherwise be necesssry forthe long-term stabilization in the Near East and
securing of the independence and territorial in-tegrity of the countries of the region, as long asthe forces of the aggressor are not withdrawn fromthe occupied territory. 16
The original version of the draft resolution introduced
on June 28 was sponsored by Afghanistan, Guinea, India,
Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia, Tanzania
and Zambia in addition to Yugoslavia. Revised texts were
introduced on June 30, July 1 and July 3 with Senegal and
Cambodia having joined the list of sponsors.
In its final version, what came to be termed as the
17-Power or Nonsligned draft called for: (1) Israel's imme-
diate withdrawal of its forces to the positions they held
prior to June 5> 1967; (2) requested the Secretary-General
to ensure compliance with the resolution and to secure, with
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the aid of the Security Council-established UNTSO, the strict
observance by all parties with the General Armistice Agree-
ments; (3) further requested that the Secretary-General
designate a personal representative to assist him in com-
pliance with this resolution and to be in contact with the
concerned parties; (I;) called upon all States to assist the
Secretary-General in every way possible in implementing
this Resolution in accordance with the United Nations
Charter; (5) requested the Secretary-General to urgently
report on compliance with this resolution to the General
Assembly and Security Council; and (6) requested that the
Security Council consider all of the Middle East situation
and seek peaceful solutions of all the problems--legal
,
political and humanitarian--through appropriate channels
guided by those principles contained in Articles 2 and 33
of the Charter.-^'''
This appeared to have a better chance of passage
than the Soviet resolution. The sheer fact of sponsorship
alone was significant; the center of voting gravity had
shifted in the United Nations toward this bloc of third-
world States which were the principal sponsors. The resolu-
tion coupled immediate and unconditional withdrawal with
more openness toward a negotiated settlement of long-standing
grievances; it spoke of intermediately utilizing UNTSO and
a personal representative of the Secretary-General (in
accordance with the suggestion made earlier by India) to
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begin contact with the parties; condemnation was not re-
quired in the actual draft resolution itself. In this and
its other provisions, this was more proximate to the Arab
goals and case, though less partisan than the Soviet
proposal. Finally, the strong emphasis on immediate and
unconditional withdrawal assuaged and appealed to the
national interests of small and vulnerable new nations
while being in exact accordance with a strict definition
of international law and certainly the principles embodied
in the Charter.
The Arab position, like the Israeli one to be
examined below, was unto itself and though certainly
related to the Soviet position, was not an exact identity.
Condemnation and a call for the immediate and unconditional
withdrawal of Israeli troops were accompanied by an un-
compromising stand against negotiations with Israel of any
sort--direct or indirect--an element of inflexibility
missing at least in kind from the Soviet position which
spoke gradually of negotiations on a big power level and
the 17-Power draft which ruled out negotiations, but only
until withdrawal occurred. Jamil Baroody, Ambassador to
the United Nations from Saudi Arabia, in many points, one
of Washington's best Arab friends, underlined this in his
remark that;
The Arab world cannot accommodate Zionism in our
midst. It is not a question of thousands of official
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statements.
... If our leaders did not reflect the
mood of the Arab people, they would not remain leaders,ihls IS something which should be noted by all
countries, especially the Western countries which
were instrumental in creating Israel. They haveforgotten that this artificial State has destroyed
the indigenous people of Palestine. 18
Dr. Noureddin Atassi, Chief of State of the Syrian
Arab Republic dug this unrelenting position even deeper.
After noting that:
. . .
when Syria and Israel agreed to the cease-fire
ordered by the Security Council, the Israeli forces
of aggression had not yet occupied one iota of Syrian
territory. It was after we informed Secretary-General
U Thant that we had ceased fire as from I63O GMT,
10 June, that the Israeli invasion of our territory
began. i9
Atassi then sought to broaden his appeal both by
referring to the imperialists who wish "to seize the raw
material [oil] of our homeland" and by calling up images
of the "law of the jungle" to smaller nations. Atassi
pointed out that: "if we accept that logic, the result
would be that ive admit the right of the stronger to con-
pi
quer the lands of the weaker and retain them by force."
Atassi concluded with a blending of self-interest, the
compatible self-interest of others, and an appeal to inter-
national law, and organization:
The problem does not belong to the Arabs alone, but to
every individual in the international community whose
country may one day be the victim of an invasion. To
condemn, therefore, the aggression, to liquidate its
fruit and to punish the aggressors not only is a
victory for the Arab people, who are the direct
victims, but it is a victory for International
Organization, for the principles of the United
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Nations and for all great and noble human values.
Despite this attitude which shall be of major import
later, Dr. Atassi supported the Soviet draft resolution.
Moreover, there certainly was no recognition of Israel's
right to exist, as Kosygin had spoken of it.
This general stand was reiterated, though in more
cautious and moderate tones by the experienced and able
Mahmoud Fawzi, Deputy Premier of the United Arab Republic.
The Prime Minister of Sudan, M. A. Mahgoub, specifically
spoke to the Israeli claim to right of passage through
the Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba. He pointed out
that if Israel could calim the legitimate exercise of her
right to belligerency, in June, 1967, Egypt also had a
right to a belligerent act--to close the Straits of Tiran
to enemy ships and cargo. He too noted the Israeli
occupation of Elath about one month following the General
Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel. Mahgoub
went on to point out that Israel's massive attack was not
within the intent of the U.N. Charter's Article $1, since
Israel had not in point of fact been subjected to armed
attack. He too pressed for immediate Israeli withdrawal,
but appeared more to favor the Soviet leaning toward com-
promise than to the Syrian view, for example, of no com-
promise with Israel.
Thus the Arab position seemed to be comprised of full
and unconditional withdrawal, condemnation of Israel and
180
restitution— in full agreement with the Soviet Union. But
the Arabs diverged from the Soviet Union by taking a much
harder stand in general against negotiations stemming, one
expects, from their deep feelings of betrayal and injustice
of repeated and decades standing. Even Habib Bourguiba, Jr.
of Tunisia, a nation hardly noted for its inflexibility
toward this problem, clearly stated:
Although we continue to believe that war can offer no
solution for any problem, we likewise believe that it
is dangerous to drive a people to despair, to force
them to consider the problem of their survival and
their freedom only in terms of violence.
Some may consider that they have won the war.
They are mistaken. Violence is but a provocation to
violence, and the pernicious logic of war can be
demolished only by redress of the injustice.^ii-
If one reads these carefully, one can apply these
remarks to the Israeli as well as the Arab side, a tregic
commentary on the reciprocity of the situation, though this
may not have been intended. Bourguiba continued:
It is only a return to the status quo ante bellum that
will make possible an examination of tae chances for a
solution. That solution cannot possibly be a part of
the booty of war or the consequences of a diktat .
The evacuation of the occupied territories is a cgn-
dition sine qua non of any prospect for a peace.
Bourguiba, Jr., then went down the line on the points
of condemnation, and repatriation, but imnediately tempered
it by his hope that:
. . .
being equally responsible for both the origins
and the subsequent development of a situation that has
constantly deteriorated ... is it possible to hope
that the great powers may concert their efforts today
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P^^Pose of opening up new prospects for a
ril^ht nf"f;o*p^r''!.^^^®^ restoration of the
thfir dLSty!?^'"''^'"^ '° '^^^^ ^onel.n6. and
King Hussein of Jordan in the cadence of his prose
was perhaps more qualified to speak of the plight of the
Palestinian people than any other official national repre-
sentative permitted to speak before the Assembly. Hussein
not only ended, but began with the sense of injustice felt
by the Arabs and Palestinians:
Today's war is not a new war, but part of the old war,
which will go on for scores of years if the moral and
physical wrong done to the Arabs is not righted. 27
This brave monarch spoke not of legal niceties, or
national interests, but certainly from his own heart and
those of many of his people when he stated to the Assembly:
If there is one military lesson to be learned from the
recent battle, it is that victory goes to the one who
strikes first. This is a particularly ironic and
dangerous lesson to be established. But one way of
establishing it is to reward the aggressor with the
fruits of his aggression. The members of this Assembly
should ponder well this point, or they will surely risk
setting a precedent which will haunt these halls and
the world for decades to come. 28
Or again:
Should this aggression not be condemned and should the
return of all our lands be delayed any further . . .
Jordan will still survive. Ground down by sorrow for
the moment, we will rise again. And with us will arise
the Arab Nations. It is apparent that we have not yet
learned well enough how to use weapons of modern war-
fare. But we shall if we have to. The battle which
began on June 5th will then become only a battle in
what will be a long war. The political state of David
and Solomon lasted only 70 years. That of the crusaders
just under 100. It might be well for Israel to re-read
its history. 29
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The Arab position was similar to a montage in some
respects by the very division of the Arab world into dis-
parate, sovereign parts. From the unrelenting stand of
Syria to the more conciliatory one of Tunisia, variation
was in evidence. But if there were then unities to the
total position, they lay in the Arab demand for condemna-
tion and withdrawal of Israel and a unanimity on the neces-
sity to recognize the injustice committed and continually
perpetrated upon the Arab people of Palestine. The Yugoslav
resolution not only had a good chance of passage, but in-
corporated the key Arab demand: immediate and unconditional
withdrawal. This was necessary before any other aspect of
the issue could be examined. If, said Arab representatives,
the aggressor is permitted to keep these fruits of aggres-
sion, this would encourage other states to strike first,
to use force, to expand at will and endanger the terri-
torial integrity and political existence of neighboring
states--contrary to the very basis of international law.
The foundation not only of international law, but organiza-
tion would then be violated and endangered. There was a
legal and United Nations precedent for withdrawal, but this
was not being insisted upon in 196? as it was in 1956.
Sadly, while they railed against the illegality of
the Israeli use of force, there was no mention of the Arab
threats to use force--equally illegal under Charter
Article 2. Reciprocity is also fundamental to law. Whether
183
one believes that Nasser deviously meant to attack Israel
in league with a malicious Moscow, sought to use the
presence of force to gain a diplomatic victory but still
was confident to test Arab armed forces against those of
Israel if it came to that, or as a character in search of
a role, this time stumbled upon an improvisational , un-
written scenario whose major content was bluff than
actuality and whose outcome was hoped to be more peaceful
than warlike—whatever line one's attitude leads him to
selectively accept or reject, the reality of Arab threats--
by act and word--to force and to the peace cannot be
30denied. One can plead that they meant what one said or
that Arab rhetoric should be kept in context, but if one
is to apply a strict interpretation to use of force, the
same is only fair for threats.
Here politics truly intrudes upon the legal milieu.
Arabs saw the war as merely another in a long series of
immoral expansions by a state never welcomed into the area
whose creation to house refugees to right the immemorial
wrong of European anti-semitism, especially after World
War II, committed a wrong against the right of immemorial
inhabitants of Palestine by not permitting them to return
and thus creating new refugees; a state whose ideology was
exclusivist and alien to the Middle East; whose support b
the imperialist powers was proof of a desire to perpetuate
and extend imperialism by new means; and which now, by its
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actions threatened the territorial integrity of neighboring
states in a manner which violated international law and
flouted respect for the United Nations. The State of Israel
itself was a bitter fruit to the Arabs, a construction whose
essence and creation was a denial and derogation of the
rights of others.
In this context the threat and use of force was felt
Justified by Arabs in the effort to reestablish the
legitimate state in Palestine. But this does not help to
establish or reestablish the rule of law in this region
concerning this problem. Perhaps this is both the strength
and flaw of international law in this si tuation--that it
cannot, but is being used to legitimate two different out-
comes to a single problem. On the more specific point,
however, it was not the principle of withdrawal which was
at issue at this time, but whether it should be conditional
or unconditional and to which territorial point it should
occur.
The next position to be examined is that of the United
States. The American position essentially was based upon the
"five principles" of President Lyndon Johnson:
Our country is commit ted- -and we here reiterate that
commitment today--to a peace that is based on five
principles
:
First, the recognized right of national life.
Second, justice for the refugees.
Third, innocent maritime passage.
Fourth, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms
race.
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And fifth, political independence and territorialintegrity for all. 31
Like the Soviet representative, Ambassador Arthur
Goldberg basically recapitulated his Security Council
position. Recounting that the basic reason for the past
decades of crisis in the Middle East was the failure of
the parties to deal with the underlying causes of tension,
Goldberg asked that these causes finally be grappled with
and a permanent, not "band-aid" type solution be sought.
Recounting the United States view of how the current
crisis unfolded, Goldberg spoke of how the "major in-
sulator" for peace in the Middle East, UNE?, "was stripped
away";-^ how peace, then held by a thread as the Secretary-
General journeyed to Cairo and the Security Council vapidly
debated, was stymied. Concerning the start of the war,
Ambassador Goldberg said only: "Early on June 5 the thread
of peace was broken, "-^^ and then went on to deny charges
that the United States obstructed the activity of the
Security Council and countered by referring to his country's
willingness to accept a cease-fire without debate and with-
out delay right up through the fighting on the Syrian
front. Other states obstructed, bickered and falsely accused
the United States of military intervention on the side of
Israel. The previous day the Soviet Union had introduced
before the General Assembly a draft resolution which was
"essentially the same as that . . . which the overwhelming
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majority of the Council refused to accept. u3k The repre-
sentative of the United States then repeated his earlier
simile about how under the Soviet proposal: "the film is
to be run backwards through the projector" such that all
the tinder which had previously caused war shall be present
was not the way to get at the grievances which had caused
three wars in nineteen years. The United States proposed
its own draft resolution toward the striving for real
peace. Hopefully this would prove the basis for real peace
rather than just renewed hostilities.
The United States draft resolution bore in mind the
previous cease-fire resolutions and invoked regard for the
purpose of the United Nations--to harmonize the actions of
nations. Substantive paragraphs: (1) endorsed previous
cease-fire and called for their scnipulous respect; (2) set
the objective of the General Assembly as a "stable and
durable peace"; (3) considered that this should be achieved
by means of "negotiated arrangements with appropriate
third-party assistance" based on: (a) "mutual recognition
of the political independence and territorial integrity of
all area countries" to include those steps that will give
them security against terror, destruction and war
—
"disengagement and withdrawal of forces, (b) freedom of
innocent passage," (c) a "just and equitable solution of
in the same places again. 35 This, said Ambassador Goldberg,
18?
the refugee problem," (d) "reeigtr«i-^gistration and limitation" of
arms shipments to the Middle East «nH ^ m
^""^ ®) "recognition" of
the right of all sovereign nations "to ^xist iniL ^° e m peace and
security. "^°
The nnited states p.opo.al regained as long-te™ andb-ad ae ever and even „o.e so with the addition or area
a™s-li„itations. While inclusion was .ade or the alterna-
tive third-party assistance in negotiations, there was no
mention or specirio itci^o ^- _ jy i s eps to reduce tensions or to help
^.ring the concerned parties to that stage. „ost importantly,
while disengagement and withdrawal was c ailed ror, there
was no mention of the point to which the parties should
withdraw and no call for unconditional withdrawal: the
Israel Government would still be free unier the United
States formulation to link withdrawal to other conditions-
to use fruits of their conquest to extract peace terms
favorable to itself as the Arab states.
It is worth quoting the operative paragraph 3(a) of
the draft resolution itself:
i :pL^nrdfs-g^i:i;n? ^^-^ :r?^f:that will give them security against
-lerror?
^
destruction and war.jJ? *
We should note that this is quite a- expansion upon
President Johnson's original statement of June 19 which
simply read "... fifth, political indep-ndence and
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territorial integrity for all."
Finally, it appeared that the formula for negotiations
called for in the U.S. draft resolution placed too much
implicit stress upon potential face-to-face negotiations
to be acceptable to the Arabs. Moreover, it was premature
to call for them at this early stage. The United States
formulation remained as broad in its long-term orientation
as the Soviet proposal remained narrow in its short-term
orientation.
While full of long-term goals which were worthy of
ultimate realization, the United States position was devoid
of those shorter-stepped, nearer goals which help get to
the more distant ones. In addition, this administration,
unlike a previous one, more highly respected Israel's
perception of her vital interests in that complex inter-
play of legal principle, national interests and pragmatic
reality termed decision-making.
Abba Eban, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel,
pleaded the Israeli case with his usual eloquence. His
case began with the de facto and de .jure existence of the
State of Israel— a fundamental point of denial by the
Arab Governments. Foreign Minister Eban found the single
and "true origin of the tension which torments the Middle
East "to lie in the fact that:
Israel's right to peace, to security, to sovereignty,
to economic development, to maritime freedom— indeed,
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its very right to exist—hag been forcibly deniedand aggressively attacked. 38 ^ a a
After a long outline of Arab-Israel relations since
191|8, Eban reviewed the chronology of events in May-June,
1967 denying the charge of troop concentrations,^"^
severely criticizing U Thanfs accession to Cairo's request
for the withdrawal of UNEF and citing numerous instances
of the verbalized Arab intent to destroy Israel. Of UNEF
itself and similar international peace-keeping forces,
Eban said:
Israel's attitude to the peace-keeping functions of
the United Nations has been traumatically affected by
this experience. What is the use of a fire brigade
which vanishes from the scene as soon as the first
smoke and flames appear? Is it surprising that we
are resolved never again to allow a vital security to
rest on such a fragile foundation?^0
Turning to the question of the Straits of Tiran, Eban
stated:
The blockade is by definition an act of war
. . .
never in history have blockade and peace existed
side by side. From May 21; onward, the question of
who started the war or who fired the first shot
became momentously irrelevant. There is no dif-
ference in civil law between murdering a man by
slow strangulation or killing him by a shot in the
head. From the moment the blockade was imposed,
active hostilities had commenced and Israel owed
Egypt nothing of her Charter rights. ^i
This certainly was a rejection of the three-power draft
which called for the parties' compliance with the General
Armistice Agreements and of Kosygin's charge of aggression.
Eban noted:
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rL^o fateful morning of 5 June, when Egyptianforces moved by air and land against Israel
• 3 western
coast and southern territory, our country's choice
was plain
. . . our nation rose in self
-defense . 1+2
Forcefully accusing the U.A.R., Syria and Jordan
of aggression, Abba Eban then turned to the Soviet Union.
After detailing the Soviet's contribution to the area arms
race and charging Russia with an alarmist, then obstructive
role in the latest crisis, Eban reviewed the Security
Council use of the Soviet veto in the interest of the
Arab states and concluded that:
The Council has become a one-way street.
. . . The
consequences of the Soviet policy have been to deny
Israel the possibility of just and equitable treat-
ment in the Security Council, and very largely to
nullify the Council as the constructive factor that
it should be in the affairs of the Middle East. 4-3
After accusing the Arab states of shattering the
whole "fabric and texture" of post-1958 interstate relations,
including Armistice Agreements, UNTSO and the MAC's, and
the old demarcation lines, Eban urged that the concerned
states look not backward, but forward. He urged that they
withdraw from acts of belligerency and a state of war, and
advance toward a negotiated peace of recognition, agreed
frontiers and security arrangements. He called for a final
peace, and promised "durable and just solutions , "^^ but
then returned to the terms always unacceptable to the
Arabs of face-to-face negotiations, Arab recognition of
Israel and a broad hint that the Old City of Jerusalem
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would not be returned to Jordan, given a peace settlement>^
Further, Eban asked the Great Powers to "remove our tomented
region from the scope of global rivalries," advised other
small nation-members of the Assembly that "experience
.
teaches us that small communities can best secure their
interests by maximal self-reliance"^^ and asked even the
United Nations "to respect our independent quest for the
peace and security which are the Charter's higher ends."^"^
In apposition to the Arab's denial of recognition,
Eban asserted Israel's right to exist. As a member of the
United Nations and of the community of nations, Israel had
a right, asserted Foreign Minister Eban, to exist and to act
to ensure the lives and security of its citizens, especially
in this Charter age. Certainly this is a basic right
accorded recognized States in international law. The
blockade was set in a legal context and termed not another
aspect of belligerency, but a provocatory act of war aimed
at a vital interest which Justified a military operation of
self-defense. Israeli distrust of international peace-keeping
forces and of the Security Council core of the United
Nations' peace-keeping was described. As students of this
crises we note that these bodies, because they possess no
will or strength of their own, except insofar as others
allow them, had not served the interests either of peace
or equity exactly for either side. Eban rejected the
Soviet draft resolution, and instead proposed direct
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negotiation, recognition of Israel and a bright dream of
progress, cooperation and growth for the entire area once
a settlement was reached in accordance with Israel's out-
lines. However, direct negotiations, as important as they
will be, for clarity of understanding between the parties
when and if a settlement is ever reached, was anathema
especially at this early juncture to the Arabs and probably
sensed as so by the Assembly membership. Arab stubborn-
ness on these issues matched that of Israel on withdrawal.
In point of fact, the Israeli position said nothing to the
issue of withdrawal. And as one astute observer of the
United Nations points out:
In light of the Charter of the United Nations, to
which Israel is a party, a matter such as withdrawal
falls within the clear directions of the law of the
United Nations. It is not one that can be left to
negotiation unless those negotiations are circum-
scribed within the framework of the accepted legal
position, which, of course, would take care also of
Israel's legitimate rights and interests. Would it
not have been wiser for Israel at this juncture to
make specific its adherence to the principles and
injunctions of the Charter and to pledge itself to
act accordingly? A plea for negotiations within
this framework would have had much more impact on the
General Assembly. M-O
Israel rejected the 17 -Power proposal which called
for unconditional withdrawal. Israel had withdrawn in
19^7 on the basis of an "understanding" with Washington.
This was a grave error in the Israeli view as the with-
drawal of UNEF and closure of the Straits proved. If
Israel evacuates the occupied territories before the
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Arabs agree to make peace, a similar situation could easily
spring up again, as Israel saw it. Since the U.N. had not
demonstrated a competence to protect Israel's vital in-
terests, Israel felt justified in holding out for a con-
ditional withdrawal-conditional upon a peace agreement
in line with Eban's outline. This matter, said Eban, was
not one which can be settled under U.N. or even great
power auspices as well as it can be settled by direct
negotiations between the parties themselves, independent
of all other States or organizations. This is a stand
of hard state self-interest so typical of that prime
characteristic of Israeli foreign relations— the very
intensity of its conduct and policy.
Throughout the early Assembly proceedings, very little
was heard from the Latin American States. Distant from
the scene of conflict, but interested in its outcome for
reasons of world peace, the Latin American delegation in
their speeches and in the draft resolution they introduced
injected a strong emphasis on juridical and especially
Charter principles into the proceedings. Moreover, this
reliance on principles was leavened with a strong dose of
pragmatism and specific, practical steps which were possible
and homologous with international law. Not only legal
theory, but practical action was stressed. We wish to
extract the flavor of some of the many speeches delivered,
for to this single resolution can be attributed a great
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deal that was vital to the passage of 21^2 (196?).
Nicamor Coste Mendez, Foreign Minister of Argentina,
set the tone by referring to both the Arab and Jewish
cotnmunities peacefully resident in Argentina and to "the
need for a scrupulous respect for the legal principles
that govern relations among States. "^^ He spoke of his
faith in the Security Council as having both "sufficient
authority and ability to handle the issue," and to pro-
vide adequate machinery to lastingly solve the problem.
Four times, one after another, he repeated in almost
identical language his hope:
. . .
that this Assembly will not take a purely
political stand. We do expect and hope . . . that
its objective will not be vitiated and it will
not be diverted from its true mission: to bring
peace to the Middle East as soon as possible. 5l
Pointing out that his Government would no more vote
for a condemnation of Israel than for the Arab States, he
went on to speak of the individuality of the state of
belligerency
:
, . . the state of belligerency could not be invoked
only in order to accept part of the logical consequences
flowing from the principles governing such a state.
If it be invoked in order to give legal justification
to certain circumstantial and specific limitations of
some general principles, then all its other conse-
quences must also be admitted. 52
Finally, Costa Mendez powerfully called for a return
to the Charter principles found in Articles 1 and 2.
Ambassador Julio Caesar Turbay Ayala of Columbia
perhaps best verbalized the basis upon which the Latin
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American States sought to make their contributions:
Our strength emanates from our unauestionedimpartiality concerning this problem. Columbia, as
well as other American States, is not committed to
any of the parties to the military confrontation.
Our only commitments are those born of respect forthe rule of law, for our international obligations,
and our duty as a Member of the United Nations and
of the American regional system. 53
With great understanding and insight into the psycho-
logical dynamics of the problem, Turbay Ayala continued:
One of the many distortions that war produces is that
each belligerent believes himself to be the sole
possessor of trust and Justice. We know of no case
in which those who have gone to the extreme of a
military confrontation have ever recognized in their
opponents the slightest degree of reason. When
situations become critical belligerents do not dis-
play toward neutral parties the understanding and
tolerance that they so fervently clairc for their own
cause. Because of these special considerations, we
venture to presume that neither Arabs nor Jews will
be satisfied with our statement, since combatants
consider only their allies as friends. And we, in all
truth, are not their allies, but are certainly their
friends.SM-
Positing the unoriginal, but welcome view that "the
paths of understanding do not lie at the extremes, that
they lie rather along the middle of law, reason and
justice, "^^ Turbay Ayala, along with the other Latin
American representatives injected that note of juridicality,
responsibility and ominouaness perhaps most eloquently
expressed by Ambassador Don Leopold Benito of Ecuador when
he asked the Assembly:
. , , to bear in mind the cri-?is of the League of
Nations which led to the most ghastly holocaust of
history, and that it was born of the abandonment of
196
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of S?f?es
ment nr'^r' 't^^'^ ^ '^'^^^ o/peace?ul se^t?;.
r«^^ ^hi""''^''^^"^ disputes. On this principle
muni?v «nd
existence of the international com-ty a , therefore, of the United Nations. 56
In keeping with this approach. Foreign Minister
Nicanor Costa Mendez of Argentina said:
.
.
.in the present circumstances the simple with-drawal of forces would not bring with it a returnto peace. We believe that withdrawal must be a con-dition concomitant with a cessation of the state ofbelligerency if it is to have a truly logical meaning
and juricical basis. Thus, once free from compulsion,the parties themselves could seek solutions and
voluntarily abide by the commitments assumed. 57
In keeping with the above, the first operative
paragraph of A/L. 523, June 30, 196?, the Latin American
draft resolution, urgently requested the withdrawal by
Israel from occupied territories conditional with the
ending of the state of belligerency by the parties in
conflict, to establish "conditions of coexistence based on
good neighborliness" and to have recourse to Charter
channels for a peaceful settlement in all cases.
Turbay Ayala of Columbia stated:
. . . conquest through the use of force, whatever
its background cannot be legitimized. Therefore,
Columbia could not endorse a recommendation by
an international organization which would impose
a modification of the territorial boundaries of
Member States v.'ithcut the voluntary consent of
those States. 58
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In conformity, the second operative paragraph of the
Latin American draft resolution reaffirmed its conviction
that "no stable international order can be based on the
threat or use of force" while denying recognition to the
valid occupation or acquisition of territories brought
about by such means.
The beginning of the third operative paragraph of
A/L. 523 (1967) requested the Security Council to continue
examination of the Middle East situation. As Foreign
Minister Costa Mendez, led up to it:
. . .
the Security Council should then, with strict
and wise determination, undertake the analysis of thepresent situation and its immediate and remote origins,
which we consider indispensable as a foundation for
peace .59
Operative paragraph 3(a) of the Latin American draft
called for the Security Council to carry out operative
paragraphs (a) and (b) which provided for Israeli withdrawal
and a termination of the state of belligerency. Just as
Ambassador Enrique Garcia Sayan of Peru unequivocally
called for:
. . .
affirmation and recognition of the right of
Israel to free transit of its ships through the
Suez Canal, the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of
Aqaba.°0
So, operative paragraph 3(c) called for the
"guarantee [of] . . . freedom of transit on the inter-
national waterways in the region."
Foreign Minister Jos6 de Magalhaes Pinto of Brazil
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spoke on the need of
.
.a fomal guarantee on the part
of the Government of Israel to settle the problem of the
refugees on equitable and permanent bases" in addition to:
;r»;Ki\'^®^°!'^^?^?'?^ ^'''^ settlement of all pending?problems, including, on the basis of mutual consen?
l^l ^""t^'^T^
establishment of demilitarized zones b^
Charter . Sr^'"^''^
solution envisaged in ?he
^
Accordingly, operative paragraph 3(c) of A/L. 523,
June 30, 196? coupled an appropriate and complete solution
to the refugees' problem with guarantees of territorial
inviolability, and political independence and the estab-
lishment of demilitarized zones.
Similarly, de Magalhaes Pinto spoke of his hope for:
.
. .
the placing of Jerusalem under perm.anent inter-
national administration, with special guarantees for
the protection of the Holy Places with a " corpun
separatum " in accordance with the spirit of the United
Nations General Assembly resolution of 29 November
19i;7.°2
So, operative paragraph I4. of the Latin American
resolution reaffirmed the desirability of an international
regime for Jerusalem to be considered at the twenty-second
session of the General Assembly.
It is not easy to try to assess the significance of
the Latin American resolution. There were reports that
because it coupled withdrawal with the termination of
belligerency, the United States supported this resolution
in an effort to defeat the draft resolution originally
put forward by Belgrade. ^-^ Had there been only one
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resolution favoring withdrawal and given the Assembly
sentiment in its favor, a two-thirds majority for the
Yugoslav resolution might have been within closer reach.
But two such resolutions split the vote too broadly. While
Israel predictably rejected the Yugoslav resolution which
she perceived as only slightly less partisan than the
Soviet Union's, Jerusalem was only lukewarm about the Latin
American proposal. While it provided a quid pro quo on
the question of withdrawal (even allowing for its emphasis
on territorial changes without the voluntary consent of the
involved states), it did not provide for direct negotiations
while a larger role for the United Nations was provided
than Israel desired in her independent quest for peace.
The Arab states in the full realization of the slim
chances for passage by the Soviet draft resolution fell
back on the draft of the 17-powers, for it provided for the
unconditional, immediate withdrawal by Israel which the
Arabs saw as a sine qua non before movement was possible.
A diktat by Israel was intolerable and another war was
likely unless Israel withdrew. Expectedly, the Latin
American resolution did not arouse enthusiasm among the
Arab states due to the conditional nature of the envisaged
withdrawal
.
It was the constancy, conviction and concert with
which the Latin American states--Argentina
,
Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El-Salvador,
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Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela-
presented their views both formally and behind the scenes
which may have comprised their greatest impact. And, of
course, that impact was wrapped around the Latins' reliance
upon the juridical approach and the institutions of the
United Nations and its Charter principles. Throughout,
their speeches, reasoning and proposals were filled with
reliance upon and citation of sound legal principles.
Not seeking to favor one party over another, aware of the
political, psychological, historical and legal complications
in the matter and seeking the broadest sort of consensus,
the Latin American efforts and draft resolution, while
not totally dissimilar to all preceding resolutions, was
sufficiently distinguishable in its constant thrust to
impress a distinctive and necessary juridical awareness
upon the milieu which had not been present, unfortunately,
in the same manner before their concerted activity.
Outside of the actual combatants, member support and
criticism of the various draft resolutions was varied.
Ambassador Goldberg objected to the Yugoslav text on a
number of grounds. The very first criticism was very
important
:
Operative paragraph 1 concerning withdrawal, could net
be more clear and definite. Operative paragraph 6,
concerning "all aspects of the situation," is vague
in the extreme.
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There was, then, no connection between withdrawal and
the claims of belligerency— "claims which are among the
leading causes of all the troubles in the past."^^ on the
other hand, the Latin American texc--"recognizes that we
face a situation the two aspects of which are interdepen-
dent--that neither aspect can be solved in isolation from
66the other." The American Ambassador went on to praise
the "concrete guidelines" and recognition of "just
grievances on both sides" found in the Latin American
text; "unfortunately neither of these claims can be made
for the Yugoslav text."^''' The representative of the United
States cited the refugee problem, international maritime
passage and the status of Jerusalem as three such areas.
It is interesting to note the divorce between the U.S.
and Israel on the questions of refugees and the status of
Jerusalem herein recorded. Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister
of the Soviet Union, responded. Playing to the non-aligned
sponsors of the 17-Power draft resolution "the majority of
which have recently become free from imperialist oppression
and know full well what aggression and what foreign occupa-
tion is," Gromyko then went on to state:
This draft resolution qui^e correctly puts into the
first place the question of the withdrawal of Israeli
troops from the territories they now occupy. Only
this decision can bring about the normalization of
the situation in the Middle East. The aggressor
cannot be allowed to wait for a prize. This is a
question of principle. ^'^
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Similarly to the U.S., the Soviet Union too demon-
strated the space between its stand and that of the Arabs
when Gromyko continued:
sentativ^^
discussions and conversations between repre-es of various countries, a wish was very fre-quently expressed to try even now to bridge th7gap
th^ M?H^ ^'^^^ questions delating toe iddle East. The draft resolution presented bythe non-aligned countries also meets this wishthe troops must be withdrawn immediately, and theA
*
there will be a much more peaceful atmosphere than
now in order to achieve progress in all the otherquestions--I emphasize the word "all" questions--
which have accumulated on the sidelines. Then there
would be revealed those possibilities which havebeen provided for in the draft resolution of the non-aligned countries. '0
Clearly the positions of the great powers were less
frozen in than those of the actual combatants who felt
their vital existence to be more threatened, and were
deeply committed to psychological orientations, one
toward the other, which precluded the trust so essential
to endeavors such as these. Britain and Prance, with minor
modifications of the relevant texts, lined up behind the
Latin American and Non-aligned draft resolutions, re-
spectively.'^'^
Abba Eban of Israel described the Yugoslav proposal
as "one sided, backward-looking and totally indulgent to
the continuation of belligerency."'^^ Eban saw only a return
to the dangers of the past with the Sinai "a springboard
for renewed aggression," the Golan Heights where "Syrian
guns would again threaten," Tiran where "blockades would
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be reinstated. ""73 Certainly, all of these were security
considerations par excellence. Eban went on to describe
the veto-bound discussion of the Security Council prior to
the outbreak of war when:
.
. .
not only that the Security Council could not act,but that it could not even speak, could not even utter
a single word in a resolution against the growing
.threat to Israel's existence
. . . the deadly design
of politicide--the murder of a State. 714-
Describing "how slender, how fragile" is the present
mood and structure of great power relationships on which
Israel is being asked to rely, Foreign Minister Eban cited
the present Arab refusal to recognize Israel "as a state
within the terms of the Charter
. . . with which it is
their will and intention to live together in peace as
7^good neighbors." -"^
Eban rejected the Yugoslav resolution. Turning to
the Latin American draft, Eban stated Israel's principles:
(1) a linkage of withdrawal with "the establishment of
peace"; (2) that in a peace settlement, "vital security
interests" must be taken account of; (3) "total and
permanent elimination of the Aqaban and Suez Canal
blockade; (i;) that "sovereign States have the right and
duty to fix their permanent frontiers by mutual agreement
amongst themselves"; and (5) to provide and preserve the
complete unity and peace of Jerusalem and access to all its
Holy Places" consonant with Israel's unchanging views on
201;
tectorial intem.tionali.ation. ^6
ciea.ly. Israel was
unsatisfiod with the Latin American d.aft
.esclution. We
also Should note the gap with the American position.
The representative of India. Ambassador Parthasarathi
,
probably gave the clearest and most succinct formulation of
the core of both the Arab and non-aligned positions:
dr;fi fanrshorrof^he'.o ^^^ftl^e . latin Americanj. xj.a aaort oi the accepted Drini-i-nio oi-,^primary objective which I men^ioned e-rUer itcouples withdrawals with l-h« ^^ -^-^-^e^-
issues, and thus it leToJs a rl^^^^^^from a position of strength by l^ael
^^^g^^ning
is that it would lead to\ deLlocTb;c;u;e\rLir"not give primacy to the central issue of iLil- J
withdrawal. No State Member of the Un?fpH r?-^^®particularly no small stat^^ could ever ^^reeio"''negotiate so long as alien armed forces rfmain on if,soil and it is subjected to duress???
A more lucid exposition of the clash between the
parties and between the right both sides claimed can be
imagined. Here too the tragedy is as if isolated for our
examination of its components: divergent rights claimed
and Justified to the same issue and land at once, both
sets isolated, with no points of connection or mutuality,
both stands intense and adamant. Here too, the super-
powers presented stands divergent from those of the
conflicting parties, but were unable or unwilling to exert
the influence necessary to resolve the situation to which
both had contributed so mightily for so loog.
Foreign Minister Sharfuddin Pirzada insightfully ex-
pressed perhaps the key factor in the Arab stand:
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It
^^^^ Israel's aggression hasinflicted the deepest physical and psychological
wounds. How can it be expected that after such
a traumatic shock, the two sides will begin to
negotiate the terms of a just and lasting peace,
unless withdrawal of Israeli forces are first
carried out . '
^
On July 1;, votes were taken on the non-aligned,
Soviet and Latin American draft resolutions unfortunately
before the former and latter groups had had more time to
work toward a possible compromise
.
'''^ The vote on the
non-aligned draft resolution was 53-i;6-20--( affirmative-
negative-abstention)
--a majority, but not the two-thirds
required. The Soviet proposal was voted upon by separate
operative paragraphs: (1) relative to condemnation failed
57-36-23; (2) which urged immediate and unconditional with-
drawal was rejected i|8-i;5-22; (3) concerning restitution
by Israel was turned down by a vote of 5l|--3ll.-28 ; and
operative paragraph (Ii.) which appealed for continued
use of the Security Council to eliminate the "conse-
quences" of Israeli "aggression" was voted down by
5i4--36-26. No vote was taken on the draft in its entirety.
The Latin American draft resolution also failed to get the
necessary two-thirds majority by a margin of 57-^4-3-20.
We must note that an Albanian draft resolution which
was more severe than the Soviet draft in its insistence on
81
condemning Israel failed by a vote of 22-71-27. We
should also note that a Cuban amendment to the Non-aligned
draft which called for the condemnation of Israeli
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aggression and its "principal instigator the imperialist
Government of the United States of America" against the
Arab States and the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces
went down to defeat by a roll-call vote of 20-78-22.
Finally, an Albanian amendment to the draft introduced
by Yugoslavia which urged the strong condemnation of
Israeli aggression was defeated by a margin of 32-66-20.®^
It would be instructive to briefly review the com-
position of the various voting blocs. The Non-aligned
draft resolution attracted the votes, of course, of every
Arab and Communist state, most Asian and African countries
and even the assent of France, Greece, Spain and Turkey in
addition to the U.S.S.R. Negative votes were cast by the
Latin American group, the remaining NATO and West European
states, the white Commonwealth countries, some African
countries, China, Ireland, Israel, Phillipines, United
Kingdom and the United States. Naturally, positions were
reversed in the case of the Latin American draft, except
for the abstentions of both France and Israel.
A few conclusions can be drawn from this. First, the
Assembly obviously was not in favor of condemning any party
to the conflict for aggression. Not only was the Assembly
unwilling to assay guilt, but a move such as this, whatever
the situation, would not be conducive to encouraging the
two parties to draw together in a mutually agreeable, just
and lasting peace settlement within a United Nations
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framework. The Assembly was not as interested in con-
demning past actions as in its responsibility toward the
future. Next, there obviously was extremely strong
sentiment for Israeli withdrawal. Both the Non-aligned
and the Latin American draft resolutions drew 53-57
affirmations. This may be interpreted many ways, but
whether it be the political interpretation of assisting
the Arabs toward negotiating in an honorable fashion;
the self-interested fear by the smaller, newer states of
their own future occupation of territory; the simple fact
of standing by old friends-the U.A.R. and Syria especially;
or the adherence to the basic norms of international law
in the Charter age-that the fruits of aggression should
not be retained, that the use of force and violation of
territorial integrity and threats to political sovereignty
shall not be tolerated—whatever the motivations, support
was broad and deep on this point of withdrawal.
As is always to be expected, beyond the mere stating
of the principle, divergences occur. The Arabs and their
friends sought an unconditional withdrawal by Israel for
reasons of cultural psychology, to avert the situation
whereby territorial blackmail could distort the voluntary
and lasting nature of any eventual settlement and, finally,
because the land was theirs by right in an age when the
Charter outlaws the seizure and acquisition of land by
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force. To an Arab and certainly to a Palestinian it
might appear that he had suffered too
.uch at the hands of
so-called international organization and international law.
The former had created and the latter perpetuated an alien,
expansionist, repulsive state in their rnidst which had torn
from them their most elemental rights-their homes and lands
To have the most elemental precept of international law
violated and unenforceable in the halls of the United
Nations must have seemed the crowning hypocrisy indeed.
The Latin Americans, the United States and Israel
sought a conditional withdrawal. it is irrefutable that
while the Government of Israel actually used force, the
Government of the United Arab Republic, and especially the
Syrian Arab Republic, threatened the use of force and acted
in a most provocative manner, whatever their real intention
was. The Charter prescribes both the threat and use of
force. It also calls for "friendly relations" and recog-
nition of the "sovereign equality" of nations. Within this
context, this call for an Israeli withdrawal linked to
the ending of belligerency, encouragement of coexistence
and good-neighborliness, and recourse to the provisions for
peaceful settlement contained in the draft was firmly based
upon Charter and other legal principles. (Unfortunately,
it also would have had the political side-effect of per-
mitting Israeli troops to remain while any negotiations
were going on, thus to prejudice the free and voluntary
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nature of the negotiations.) The Latin American draft
resolution tried to balance within itself the issues
outstanding and to appeal for their discussion and resolu-
tion based upon juridical principles. The Latin American
draft resolution was the only one voted upon which did not
have the backing of at least one of the direct parties to
the conflict. Israel voted against the Yugoslav-introduced
draft and abstained on the Latin American proposal. To
see why, we need merely review certain key principles
enumerated by Israel's Abba Eban: two of them were that
any peace settlement must take account of Israel's vital
security interests and then, that sovereign states alone
(no international organization) need become involved in
the fixing of mutual borders. Clearly, views of this nature
which only lifted the after-phase of war from the hands
of the U.N. had little in common with any of the draft
resolutions proposed. Any settlement arrived at under
such conditions could only be influenced by the use of
force which the Charter outlaws. This is why Israel sup-
ported neither of the drafts.
But for Israel too international law and international
organization were cause for suspicion, not settlement. Inter-
national law could take away from Isrsel the territory which
was felt to be the only reliable guarantee of state and
citizen security. The withdrawal in 1957 from the Sinai
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was not as of ten years ago in the Israeli mind, but as of
yesterday. What sort of law was it the Israeli Government
might ask which deprived a state of fruits it had taken
only in consequence of another's aggression? And the U.N.
which had not protected Israel in 19i;8
, which had been the
instrument of Israel's withdrawal in 1957 and which had
stood by, mute and impotent during the ominous upswing
toward war in 196? had thrice proven that its actions were
not in conformity with Israel's perceived security interests
While this sense of gentile "standing aside" as Jews faced
their peril, while this betrayal was nothing new in Jewish
history, unfortunately, the two senses of betrayal, Arab
and Israeli did tend to balance off each other, but in a
monstrously symmetrical emotionally taut and distrust-laden
relationship
.
International law here conflicted with an interest
Israel deemed vital; her existence's right to strong peace
terms favorable to Israel before withdrawal to positions
deemed in Israel's security. There would be no return to
1956.
We hold that it was this intense interplay of interest
and laws, either uninfluenced or underinfluenced by big
powers which caused the deadlock at this level. If peace
ia ever to come and be lasting, it must flow from the
parties' mutual willingness to approach peace. It is the
big powers, as arms suppliers if nothing else, which must
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exercise mediatory roles and responsibilities here.
At least one attempt in this direction was made by
the superpowers. After the July k voting, the emergency
session was extended until July 21 for a number of reasons.
First, Resolution 2251; (ES-V) was passed on July li| by a
roll-call vote of 99-0-18. This resolution regretted the
"non-compliance" by Israel with Resolution 2253 (ES-V),
which had been passed earlier by a margin of 99-0-20.
Resolution 2253 (ES-V) considered the changes by Israel
concerning the status of Jerusalem as invalid, called for
Israel to rescind them and to desist from any such actions
in the future. Resolution 2251; (ES-V) "deplores" Israel's
"failure ... to implement" 2253 (ES-V), "reiterates"
its call to Israel "to rescind" such measures already taken
and "to desist forthwith" from future actions altering the
status of Jerusalem and requested the Secretary-General to
report to the Security Council and General Assembly regard-
ing the resolution's implementation. The United States
abstained on both measures while Israel announced that it
chose not to participate in the vote on the grounds that
to return to a divided Jerusalem would result in a return
to religious discrimination. Debate and consideration of
this measure served to help extend the duration of the
emergency session.
During this time negotiations were being conducted
between the Non-aligned and Latin American blocs in the
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hopes of a possible compromise resolution, a compromise
did come, but neither from the parties nor direction
expected. On July 18 and 19, Anatoly Dobrynin and Andrei
Gromyko, U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the United States and
Foreign Minister, respectively, visited with Arthur
Goldberg at the United States' United Nations Mission in
New York. The result, reportedly, was a draft resolution
which both superpowers felt was acceptable. Consisting
only of two operative paragraphs, the first was concerned
with the issues of withdrawal and the second paragraph with
the termination of belligerency, i^ile the exact text
has never been released, Ambassador Goldberg did describe
the content in a speech:
It provided that the withdrswal of Israel's troops
would be linked with the acknowledgement by every
member of the U.N. in the area that each enjoys the
right to maintain an independent national state of
Its own and to live in renunciation of all claims
and acts inconsistent therewith.
. .
.8^
Certainly while not spelled out as such, a claim to
belligerency was inconsistent with this second proposal.
This reworking, narrowing and possible rewording of the
Latin American draft, returned their land to the Arabs,
and so, salved the psychological wound while it provided,
by U.N. resolution, support for the Arab states against
an expansionist Israel together with support for Israel
against an irredentist Arab cause. While we have no word
on the Israeli reaction, we do know that the Arab caucus
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rejected the draft on July 21 led by Syria and Algeria.
Whether the compromise draft was born of Soviet weakness
in the attempt to gain a withdrawal for the Arab states,
or whether it died of Arab intransigence-the compromise
came about so rapidly that there was little time to convey
the new Soviet initiative and attitude in a persuasive
85
sense.
In any event, an opening toward movement, as fine as
it was unexpected, slipped by. Certainly this was deeply
regrettable and a major point which we should note. But
since our objective here is not polemicism, praise or
condemnation, but understanding, let us pass on as we have
before, quietly, but not forgetting the basic issues.
On July 21, also, the Assembly, its patience at an
end after repeated extensions approved the temporary
adjournment of the emergency session, authorized the
President of General Assembly to reconvene it as and when
necessary and requested the Secretary-General to forward
the records of the emergency Special Session to the Security
Council in order to facilitate the resumption by the
Council, as a matter of urgency of its consideration of
the tense situation in the Middle East. The fifth Emergency
Special Session of the General Assembly having no further
substantial achievements to its credit, met and voted
itself out of existence on September 18, 1967.
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CHAPTER V
THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE DRIVE TO
RESOLUTION 2i|2
On the first of July fighting broke out in the Suez
Canal sector and escalated to include tanks, artillery and
aircraft. On July 8, the representatives of both Israel
and the United Arab Republic requested an urgent Security
Council session to deal with the fighting each charged the
other had started. The only immediately notable contribu-
tion which resulted from the July 8 session was U Thant's
announcement of his initiative in broaching with the repre-
sentatives of both Israel and Egypt the possibility of
stationing observers on both sides of the Canal. Operative
paragraphs two of both Resolutions 233 and 23i^ had requested
the Secretary-General "to keep the Council promptly and
currently informed on the situation." Certainly Thant could
not accomplish this without machinery, especially since
Israel had withdrawn recognition from UNTSO and the various
Mixed Armistice Commissions. ^
While Lord Caradon and Ambassador Goldberg supported
this concrete step at the next meeting, on July 9, Ambassador
Fedorenko threatened to invoke sanctions against the
aggressor in Russian eyes, Israel, as Chapter VII of the
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Charter provides. Fortunately, the nonper^a.ent
„e„bers of
the security Council were able to arrange a compromise.
Although not a formal resolution, the following
statement by the President was accepted by Council members
as a "consensus" of their views without dissent or a fomal
vote
:
^ITlli""^
Security Council resolutions 233 23ii P^crand 236 and emphasizing the need for all pirtie: to
Chief nf qfoTf ^f-\-u tt "^^-^^ request the
nltli^ J ^ °^ United Nations Truce Supervisionorganization in Palestine, General Odd Bull, to work
j\l Governments of the United Arab Republicand Israel, as speedily as possible, the necessaryarrangements to station United Nations mi?i?a?y^
Sta^rUN^SO?!'""'
^'""^^ ^"^^^ C^i^^
Cease-fire observers were in place by July 1? and the
fighting soon subsided.
During the Summer and before the Security Council
resumed meetings in the Fall a number of developments
occurred which should be reported. First, there was the
slow hardening of Israeli claims to occupied territory.
After the original Israel disclaimers of territory, it came
to pass that Jerusalem especially, the Gaza Strip, Golan
Heights and certain areas of the West Bank could be
Justifiably retained in Israeli eyes. Gradually, as the
Summer passed, high Israeli officials began to talk of the
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most "natural" of frontiers for Israel-the Jordan River
and Suez Canal.
^ Second, there was an important Arab
Summit Conference at Khartoum in late August. At Khartoum
the serious Egyptian and Jordanian financial plight was
alleviated by pledges totaling $378 million annually from
Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia.^ In addition, a compromise
agreement was reached, at least on the Heads of State
level, concerning the Yemeni war between the U.A.R.'s
Nasser and Saudi Arabia's monarch, Peisal. Finally,
while popular sentiment was appeased by the reiteration
of such slogans as the "three no's"--no recognition,
no negotiation, no peace--there were growing signs of
private moderation among attending states, especially
Egypt.
^
By October, there was even a more pronounced private
willingness to accommodation and flexibility by the Arabs
provided that an acceptable channel were provided whereby
the problems could be dealt with without a loss of face.^
The United Nations Security Council was, of course, ideal
for such a function. Among the many factors which affected
this, unquestionably the facts of the relative strategic
positions helped mold policy stands here. Nevertheless,
King Hussein's swing through V/estern Europe and Washington
in early November served as a platform to underline the
new Arab willingness to consider compromise and to move
fron the intransigent rejection of any sort of erosion of
principle. 6 Next, there were intense behind-the-scenes
negotiations which were conducted by both permanent and
nonpermanent members of the Security Council. The irre-
placeable Lord Garadon spoke to this when he stated on
October 21;:
We all know that members of this Council have beenworking with increasing urgency, particularly in the
SSf.V J! establish and declare the principlewhich should govern a settlement, and to take thefirst practical steps on the hard road to peace,
we know that they have set themselves the task ofpreparing a fair and balanced draft resolution
that IS the over-riding purpose; that is the prize.'
a durable peace. It cannot be won without justice
and equal recognition of equal obligations on both
sides. It cannot be won without a real sense of the
utmost urgency.
'
This was buttressed by the revelation by a non-
permanent Council member, Ambassador S. 0. Adebo of
Nigeria who, on October 25, stated: "Action began to be
taken by members of the Security Council as long as two o
three weeks ago."^ Or again, when he revealed that:
The permanent members of the Security Council
. . .
about a week ago
. , . let it be known to the
President that they would welcome any initiative
which the non-permanent members of the Council
might take to help to resolve the whole of the
Middle East situation.
9
Clearly, the drive for a resolution was intense.
Finally, the events which provided the "urgency" Caradon
apoke of also helped provide the impetus for the Council
to reach a final agreement. On October 21, the Israeli
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destroyer Eilat was sun. by ndssiles n.ed r.c. Egyptian
naval vessels. On October 21,, Israeli artillery and air-
craft attacked the Egyptian city of Suez, drove out
hundreds of thousands of civilian residents and destroyed
much of Egypt's oil refining capacity.lO
^he Security
Council convened on that same day in response to a request
from both Israel and the United Arab Republic. if nothing
more, these events were a reminder to the Security Council
of how explosive the situation remained.
Despite the fact that the representative of the
U.S.S.R. joined those representatives who had spoken before
him, from the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark and Ethiopia,
in the realization "that it is necessary to bring about a
political settlement in the Near East,"^l Ambassador
Fedorenko proceeded to introduce a draft resolution which:
(1) strongly condemned Israel for its act of aggression
committed in the area of the city of Suez; (2) demanded
compensation by Israel to the United Arab Hepublic for the
damage caused by this act of aggression; and (3) urgently
called upon Israel to strictly observe the cease-fire and
cessations of military activity called for in Security
Council Resolutions 233 and 231^.^^
Ambassador Goldberg prefaced the United States draft
resolution by emphasizing how this latest flare-up merely
emphasized the need to move toward a just settlement of all
the questions outstanding between the parties to the conflict
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He then introduced a draft resolution which: (1) condemned
"any and all violations" of the cease-fire; (2) insisted
that the united Nations member states concerned
"scrupulously
respect the cease-fire" contained in Council Resolutions
233, 23I+, 235, and 236 in addition to the consensus of
July 10 and cooperate fully with area U.N. machinery
including the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and other military
observers in the discharge of their duties and (3) called
upon the concerned Governments to "issue categoric instruc-
tions to all military forces to refrain from all firing,"
as these resolutions required. Following a general appeal
by members of the Council for more information on the in-
cidents before passing judgment on the responsibilities,
the session was adjourned until the next day, October 25.
It is notable that especially beneath the Soviet rhetoric
an underlying theme to the statements of non-Middle Eastern
or Superpower states was the felt-need for a fair and
balanced resolution based on fundamental principles.
After consultations the next day, Resolution 2k0 (196?)
was unanimously adopted. This resolution was in keeping with
the sentiment expressed above in that it did not indict
either party, but tended more toward an insistence that all
parties concerned meet the norms of law and the principles
expressed in previous Security Council resolutions. In so
doing it reflected more the United States than Soviet draft.
Briefly, the operative paragraphs of Resolution 214.0:
2214.
(1) condemned the cease-fire violations; (2) regretted
the resultant casualties and loss of property; (3) re-
affirmed the necessity that the cease-fire resolutions
be strictly observed; (i;) and demanded the immediate
ceaseing of all prohibited military activities in the
area and the full and prompt cooperation with UNTSO by
area Member States."'"^ The representatives of both the
Soviet Union and the United States both stated that there
was no need to put their drafts to a vote; Fedorenko
cited the interest of Council members in unanimity, and
Goldberg the refusal by the Security Council to deal with
the situation in a one-sided manner and the balanced nature
of Resolution 2I4.O. After reiterating the eld, vital point
that: "as long as the Israeli forces of aggression con-
tinue to occupy the territory of Arab States there can be
no peace in the Middle East," Fedorenko went on to say
that
:
The Security Council is in duty bound . . . seriously
to ponder the need for an immediate political settle-
ment of the situation in the Near East, ... At the
same time, it has to be noted that the majority of
Council members indicated in their statements that the
situation in the Near East was extremely tense and
that it was high time to bend every effort to restore
peace and a normal state of affairs. It flows there-
from that there is an almost unanimous feeling that
consultations must be speeded up to work out a decision
leading to a political settlement in The Near East. 15
The representative of the other superpower. Ambassador
Goldberg, immediately joined with these remarks in voicing
225
the attitude that: "... what the Near East needs is net
Just a cease-fire, essential though it is, but new steps
towards a durable, permanent and Just peace
. . . thus
Council must begin promptly to help move towards a Just
settlement of all the outstanding questions between the
parties. And we believe that
. . . there is the framework
by which such a settlement can be concluded."
During the remainder of the Security Council sessions,
the chronology of major events was as follows: November 7,
the U.A.R. requested the convening of the Security Council--
the three-Power, and the American draft resolutions also
were submitted on that day; on November 16, The United
Kingdom delegate, Lord Caradon, submitted the draft reso-
lution which was later adopted as Resolution 2[(.2; on
November 20, the Soviet Union submitted a surprise draft
of its own; and on November 22, the final vote occurred.
Intense consultations continued through the beginning
of November, especially among the nonpermanent members of
the Council. Slowed by the desirability and difficulty of
reaching a broad agreement, but spurred on by the U.A.R. 's
increasing flexibility given her need to cope with 300,000
new civilian refugees from the Suez area, progress was
frustratingly slow. On November 7, the United Arab Republic
in a letter to the President requested the convening of an
urgent session of The Security Council:
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Ar.\^^ Z-A^'^^'^i^'^ dangerous situation prevailingin The Middle East as a result of the persistence
of Israel not to withdraw its armed forces from allthe territories it occupied as a result of theIsrael aggression committed on 5 June 196? againstthe United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria. 17
Concurrently, when the Council convened on November 9,
Ambassador Parthasarathi of India orally presented to the
Council a three-Power draft resolution sponsored by India,
Mali and Nigeria. Although Parthasarathi viewed the fifth
emergency special session of the General Assembly as in-
conclusive, nevertheless he felt that the session "revealed
certain fundamental areas of agreement which could pave the
way towards finding definitive solutions . "^^ The repre-
sentative of India isolated these as--withdrawal by Israel
of occupied territory, settlement of the refugee problem
and freedom of navigation through international waterways.
None of these was surprising. What was surprising was the
addition of such points as a termination to the state of
belligerency, the right of all states to live in peace and
security free from threats or acts of war, and the respect
by all states for all states' political independence and
territorial integrity. In addition, words such as "con-
demnation" did not appear in the text while phrases
descriptive of the draft itself such as "to ensure equality
of obligations" and "fair and balanced formulation" were
noteworthy for their presence . -^^^ Parthasarathi described
how over the past month the Afro-Asian's and Latin American'
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delegates to the Security Council "have been engaged in in-
tensive and extensive consultations in regard to the most
appropriate course to be followed by the Security Council. "^^
After examining the totality of varied proposals, the three-
Power draft used "the Latin American draft as the basic
document of reference "^-^ and went so far in certain areas
as to use "language identical, word for word, to the . . .
22Latin American draft."
2^What exactly did this draft resolution propose?
Within the first operative paragraph it affirmed the neces-
sity to reach peace within the Charter's framework. In
subparagraph (1) a basic point of the Latin American text
was rephrased in the three-Power text to state: "Occupation
or acquisition of territory by military conquest is in-
admissable" under the Charter and that the armed forces of
Israel "should withdraw from all territories occupied as a
result of the recent conflict. "^^ Linked with this in
subparagraph (11) there was the crucial statement in the
three-Power draft that:
. . .
every state has the right to live in peace and
complete security free from threats or acts of war
and consequently all states in the area should
terminate the state or claim of belligerency and
settle their international disputes by peaceful
means
.
Here the three-Pcwer draft went further and was more
comprehensive than the Latin American text upon which it
was based. Moreover, if subparagraph (1) had been
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offensive previously to Israel, subparagraph (1) had been
objectionable to the Arab Governments. It was an admission
of the Arabs' difficulties and of their recent willingness
to be flexible that their friends should link these prin-
ciples together and submit them.
Subparagraph (111) of operative paragraph 1 clearly
stated
:
. . .
every state of the area has the right to be secure
within its borders and it is obligatory on all Member
States of the area to respect the sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity and political independence of one
another.
There was a more comprehensive formulation than the
Latin American draft. While it provided a legal solution
to the raids by Palestinians which have plagued Israel, the
phrase "within its borders" provided consolation for Arabs
fearful of an expansionist Israel.
The second operative paragraph was divided into two
subparagraphs. The first affirmed a "just settlement of the
question of Palestine refugees." The second subparagraph
affimed a "guarantee of freedom of navigation in accordance
with international law through international waterways in
the area." Pathasarathi noted his realization that the
reference "in accordance with international law" might
obfuscate the issue and prolong potential litigation.
The Indian representative recognized this and stated his
delegation's readiness "to examine very carefully any
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arguments that might be advanced in the Council in respect
of the words 'in accordance with International Law.'"^^
Operative paragraph three was as old chronologically
as the call for withdrawal. Indeed, India had been the
first state to suggest that the Secretary
-General dispatch
a special representative to the area "who would contact the
states concerned in order to coordinate efforts to achieve
the purposes of this resolution" as the three-Power text
put it. Indeed, Lord Caradon, who later made this point one
of the foremost in his own proposal, followed India's lead
on this.
The submission of the three-Power draft was a hopeful
sign of the momentum building up for the adoption of a
resolution by the Security Council. The fact that friends
of the Arab states had submitted this text which called for
an end to belligerency and freedom of navigation in addition
to recognition of Israel's statehood could only be taken as
a sign of tacit acceptance by the Arabs of these and the
rest of its provisions. We should note, however, that this
was tacitly accepted only in return for the withdrawal of
Israeli forces to positions occupied on June i^.. The
American resolution, to be discussed next was fairly close
to the three-Power formulation in most areas except the
point of clarity on withdrawal. It was certainly a land-
mark, for India, Mali and Nigeria--all states which had
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voted in favor of and even, in the case of the first two
nations, vehemently supported the Yugoslav draft--had now
submitted a new draft which, by their own admission, drew
most heavily upon the Latin American text. There was
little that was homologous in the three-Power draft with
either the original Israeli or Arab position3--and in-
tentionally so. The Israelis sought no withdrawal except
as a result of bilateral negotiations while the Arabs
sought no negotiations until after unconditional with-
drawal. To the heavy juridical influence of the Latin
Americans had been added the utilitarian short step of
the personal representative of the Secretary-General--all
under Chapter VI of the Charter--Pacific Settlement of
Disputes. This was a deliberate attempt by Council
members to give effective meaning to a potential resolution
by seeking unanimous rather than merely sufficient Council
support.
An American draft resolution was submitted to the
Security Council on the same day as the three-Power draft.
As Ambassador Goldberg stated before the Council, the
presentation of the American draft was somewhat more
hurried than had been anticipated:
The process of consultations we had initiated had
not run its course when the request for the con-
vening of the Council made it necessary to circulate
the product of our efforts on 7 November ... we
would have preferred to hold back our draft resolution
until the final results of our consultations were in.'^^
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Ambassador Goldberg affirmed that the draft resolution
was "guided by certain axioms of negotiation"^? which flowed
from the view that the Council should act under Chapter VI
of the Charter. First, that "only the parties themselves,
through mutual accommodation, compromise end peaceful means
of their own choice, can make peace and impose peace."
Peace, said the United States representative, cannot be
imposed by one side or the other or imposed on both by an
outside authority, for such a peace "cannot endure."
Second, that Council members individually, combined and
"by virtue of the Council's responsibility under the
Charter, can and must assist the process of accommodation."
Third, consonant with the preceding, any formula cannot
"prejudice the known positions of the parties
. . . [or]
. . .
preclude the acceptance by either side of the
assistance, encouragement, help and guidance the United
Nations can properly offer." Fourth and last, consultations
to achieve this formulation will be invaluable with both
the parties involved and Council members. In keeping
with these axioms. Chapter VI of the Charter and President
Lyndon Johnson's five principles of June 19, 1967, Ambassador
29Goldberg offered the following draft.
The draft began by reminding member states of their
commitment to Article 2 of the United Nations Charter,
Operative paragraph (1) of the American draft was expansive
and cumbersome. In fulfillment of Charter Article 2, it
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called for:
.
.
.withdrawal of armed forces from occupiedterritories, termination of claims of belligerence
or state of belligerence,
. . . mutual recognition
and respect for the right of every state in the
area to sovereign existence, territorial integrity,political maependence, secure and recognizedboundaries and freedom from the threat or use offorce.
. . .
Operative paragraph (2) further affirmed the necessity
of "guaranteeing freedom of navigation" through area inter-
national waterways, "achieving a limitation" to the area
arms race and "guaranteeing the territorial inviolability
and political independence" of every area state through
measures including demilitarized zones. Operative
paragraphs (3) and (ij.) requested that the Secretary-General
designate a Special Representative who would maintain con-
tacts with the concerned states "with a view to assisting
them in the working out of solutions in accordance with
the purposes of this resolution" while requesting a progress
report to the Security Council as soon as possible.
To this U.S. draft resolution, the Soviet Deputy
Foreign Minister, V. V. Kuznetsov, focused upon what he
termed "the most important aspect
. . how the draft
attempts to solve the problem of the withdrnwal of troops. "-^^
Kuznetsov continued his frontal assault:
We must say quite frankly that in the American draft
this key provision is formulated in a very ambiguous
diluted manner. It is lost somewhere in the midst of
other questions. . . .^^
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... in the United States draft Israel is not
mentioned at all. There is no mention of the
withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the
territories occupied as a result of the recent
conflict, whose troops, where should they be
withdrawn from--these are fundamental questions
to which the United States draft contains no
clear-cut answer. 32
There was no mention, as in the three-Power Security
Council draft that "Israel's armed forces should withdraw
from all the territories occupied as a result of the recent
conflict."^-' Nor was this an advance over the Latin
American text which called for "Israel to withdraw imme-
diately all its forces to the positions they held prior to
5 June 1967." While the American formulation may not
have "prejudiced" the known position of Israel, it certainly
retreated from the chief issue which seemed to grip the
majority of the U.N. membership both in the General Assembly
and Security Council as well. It was this single issue of
withdrawal which was perceived by them to "be the greatest
single threat to international law, the United Nations and
to their own survival as well.
Ambassador Goldberg met this objection by stating that
the United States saw the draft as:
... an effort to do what can be done now, to set in
motion a diplomatic effort within the United Nations
and within the framework of the Gh^irter and to estab-
lish guidelines and objectives for such a peace-
keeping effort. ... In all candour, we do not
conceive that such a mandate could be stated in terms
entirely satisfactory either to the Arab states or to
231;
J»™:';>,J'^!!!^°r!: have attempted to state it in
eg
on, takes
iiimpnasis mine.)
It should be noted that, in comparison with the
American draft submitted to the emergency session of the
General Assembly, the new resolution "required" with-
drawal. However, the intent of the United States to lay
down general "guidelines and objectives" toward and within
which negotiations could occur is orthodox diplomatic
technique. And the American concern to phrase the draft
in such a manner as to avoid prejudicing "the positions or
the vital interests of the states involved'' makes good
sense if the voluntary consent of the concerned states to
work out and abide by a mutually acceptable agreement is
sought. But the plain and simple fact of the matter is
that on this precise point the U.S. was insensitive and out
of step with the thinking of the overwhelming majority of
the United Nations membership. The proof lies in the Non-
aligned and Latin American drafts voted upon in the General
Assembly in which withdrawal was a primary point and in
Resolution 21^.2 itself, adopted scant days later by a
unanimous vote of the Council. Operative paragraph 1,
subparagraph (ii) of the United Kingdom draft resolution
both cited "Israel" and required withdrawal "from terri-
tories occupied in the recent conf lict . "-^^ This was a
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vital point of law deemed paramount by the membership.
The three-Power and American text were close together
on the point of a special representative and just settlement
of the Palestine refugee problem-one as old as the State of
Israel itself. There was a point of difference on the
question of area international waterways since the U.S.
text contained no complicating phrase such as "in accordance
with international law" as did that of India, Mali and
Nigeria. The proof that there was agreement here stems not
only from textual analysis of the drafts themselves, but
once again, a comparative analysis with Resolution 2i;2
itself. It is intriguing, but in November the three
Non-aligned states which had supported the Yugoslav draft
were urging a principle on withdrawal forwarded by the
Latin Americans in the General Assembly while the United
States which had voted for the Latin American draft in
July moved away from its basic point on withdrawal in early
November. Certainly there was room for movement and com-
promise for the parties to come to an agreement on this
vital point at issue.
Beyond his Government's commitment to a stage-by-
stage approach--first , on principles, and then, on applica-
tion--the representative of the U.S. repeated his Govern-
ment's policy that what the Middle East needs is a "non-
prejudicial mandate embracing the essential elements of a
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Just, dignified and durable peace-that has been the very
cornerstone of the United States policy during the entire
consideration of this grave matter by the United Nations. "^"^
In the drive toward adoption of a resolution,
Ambassador Goldberg asked for a truce on old charges and
recrimination:
Let there be no more attempts to pervert the Council,this instrument of peace, into a centre of defamation
and incendiary charges. For such abuse of the UnitedNations instrumentalities simply compounds thedifficulties of the peace-making process which are
already formidable enough. 3o
The only state Goldberg named in this respect, and
in his defense of United States consistency in behavior
and adherence to international law was Syria.
Israel's final position prior to the vote on
November 22 was roughly as follows as Abba Sban gave it:
Our policy is that we shall maintain and respect the
cease-fire situation until it is replaced by peace
treaties ending the state of war, determining the
agreed national frontiers of states, and ensuring
a stable and mutually guaranteed security. We cannot
return to the shattered armistice regisie or to the
fragile demarcation lines, or to any system of
relations other than permanent, contractually-binding
peace.
. . agreement on secure and recognized
boundaries is absolutely essential to a just and
lasting peace; and we believe that any constructive
resolution should emphasize the duties of the states
themselves--the states of the Middle East--to work
out the conditions of their own peace in direct
negotiations
.
39
Eban led up to this position with a spirited effort
which admirably wove together two constant, but paradoxical
strands in the behavior of every state in its relationship
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with international law: that while "Israel is not in a
position of juridical defense, her "vital interests
should not be--cannot be--detertnined outside her
consent . "'^^
To attempt to depict the tension more clearly, while
Israel would determine her own interests without resort to
Juridical defensiveness--what Israel was proposing was con-
sistent with international law. The representative of
Israel characterized the relationship between the Arabs
and Israel as a war not of six days', but nineteen years'
duration. A withdrawal without bilateral negotiations
leading to a contractually binding treaty of peace which
would end the state of war and recognize national
boundaries, therefore, was unthinkable. Security compelled
this. Law led to this.
Two abstract pairings unify and grant insight into
the Israeli position. The first might be termed that of
continuation-termination; Israel did not wish this to be
merely an interval before the next round in this already
endless struggle. A conclusive, permanent and contractually
binding peace treaty was therefore sought to put an end to
the state of war. At the same time, a second pairing, that
of ambiguity-clarity was operative. All of this was related
to land. Land was the answer to the early Zionist
pioneer-dream, the felt-vulnerability since then, and
serves as that basic element of any state. Land and its
238
clear division was the answer here too as Abba Eban made
clear:
Now this is really the very heart of the Arab-Israel
problem. The central issue to be negotiated in a peace
settlement is the establishment of permanent boundaries .^^
Armistice demarcation lines had been "ambiguous,
provisional, precarious, unresolved," while territorial
boundaries would be "secure, recognized, respected and
acknowledged.
For nineteen years there have been demarcation lines
based, according to the 1914-9 agreements, "on military
considerations alone." Nothing has been regarded as
permanent. Everything has been unresolved. 55
A demarcation line means vulnerability. A negotiated
boundary means stability. A demarcation line means the
maintenance of reciprocal territorial claims. A boundary
implies their mutual and final renunc iat ion.U^^
Negotiation was the key to solve this and other prob-
lems in Israeli eyes. Eban was clear on thiis: "I have
never heard of any substantive agreement on any subject
ever having been achieved by Governments that do not set
eyes on each other." Eban also reviewed statements
concerning the India-Pakistan dispute in which the repre-
sentative of India stressed the need for direct negotiations
between the parties directly involved free of external
pressure. Eban continued:
No delegation has allowed this fetal concept to appear
in any text that we have been shown. The idea of
negotiation has been converted from a Charter prin-
ciple into an Israeli eccentricity . - . [if] . . .
it would be "unrealistic" to have negotiations
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without withdrawal. I only invite the Council to
believe that it is unrealistic to believe that there
can be withdrawal without negotiation.
Foreign Minister Eban certainly was not on weak
grounds in the basis for his charges. At some point, if
the solution to this conflict is to be peaceful, negotia-
tions will have to occur. But to insist on this while
occupying territory was not consistent with international
law. Arabs claimed it was more consistent with blackmail,
while Israelis considered impossible the probability of the
victor negotiating with the vanquished in a territorial
situation precisely similar to the one prior to the outbreak
of hostilities. So do international politics and law
commingle
.
Eban injected a strong juridical tone into his
speech. He pointed out that by the Egyptian interpreta-
tion the I9I4.9 General Armistice Agreement did not end the
state of war between Israel and the U.A.R., a state con-
sistent with "non-recognition of sovereignty" and "un-
resolved territorial claims." Eban continued:
We are tired of contesting the United Arab Republic's
interpretations. We accept them; we accept that the
1914.9 agreement signifies what the United Arab Republic
has always interpreted it to mean: the absence of peace,
maritime blockade, and a prelude to ultimate total war
. . .
that is why that agreement exploded long ago
... we can, accordingly, have nothing to do with it
or with any of its apparatus or with any similar
situation of juridical anarchy. The only judicial
possibility now available is full, formal peace.
. . .
Everything else has been tried. 4-9
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Finally, in commenting upon the draft texts before
the Council, Abba Eban stated: "our standard of Judgement
is whether or not they prejudice our negotiating position
in advance. On this overriding basis, Israel rejected
the three-Power draft "unreservedly" on the primary grounds
that
:
The suggestion that Israel should move from the cease-fire lines without a peace-treaty defining permanent
and secure frontiers is unacceptable. 51
Criticism was also levelled at the maritime freedom
passage of the three-Power draft. Eban termed the Soviet
draft (which we discuss below) "a backward-looking resolu-
tion. It seeks to restore the Judicial ambiguity and the
territorial vulnerability of the shattered armistice
regime." Eban did not convincingly elaborate on this.
Moreover, if one reviews the Soviet draft, and especially
operative paragraphs 2(b), and 3(a) and (b) (see page 251;
below). Foreign Minister Eban's statement appears too
strong. A studied silence, by and large, met the United
Kingdom draft after it was introduced. Israel preferred
more to reiterate its own position.
Eban argued on a Judicial basis with telling effect.
By accepting the Arab stance that a state of war continued
between them, he laid the groundwork for his Government's
call for a contractual peace settlement. But while in
one sense, this could be considered a reversal of policy,
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to accept the Arab case, in another, it evidences the
continuity of the Israeli effort to legally end the state
of war. A similar remark is applicable to the Israeli
concern for territory. A state of war is more consistent
with nonrecognition of sovereignty, unresolved territorial
claims and unrecognized boundaries than that which would
flow from a state of peace. Eban too, stood on ultimately
firm ground in his insistence on negotiation. Negotiations
are necessary to the peaceful conclusion of the many, many,
disputes which go to make up this conflict. The U.N. agreed
to this. But to shoulder out the U.N. while perched atop
Arab territory and demanding bilateral negotiations
apparently struck an unresponsive chord among the U.N.
membership. The fruit of vie tory--territory--clouded the
issue. And the high stakes of world peace, coupled to the
immense complexities of the problem and the political, if
not physical, suicide for an Arab leader to do this pre-
cluded such an ultimate step at this time. To defuse the
crisis, to get the parties talking, if only through a third
party, it appears, was envisioned as the first step. Not
only international law, but diplomacy, negotiations and
sheer practicality intruded here.
The Arab position at this time, and especially that
of the Syrian Arab Republic, demonstrated the tragic
clich^ in this situation; that for the Arabs and Israelis
it has not been so much a case of talking to as talking
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past each other when it is a case of talking at all. Just
as Eban ignored the refugees, and spoke of a peace treaty
and recognized boundaries, so the Syrians ignored treaties
and boundaries to talk of the refugees.
The words of Ambassador Adib Daoudy convey perhaps
the most economical insight into the Syrian view of the
Palestinian refugees:
The right of the Arab people of Palestine are not
• and can never become the subject of bargaining.
Those Arab rights are inalienable. . . . Those who
continuously pressure the Arabs to recognize what
they call the rights of Israel are in the wrong when
they ignore the rights of the Arabs and the obliga-
tions of Israel toward those rights.
Ambassador George Tomeh continued in this vein when
he observed just prior to the vote on the United
Kingdom
draft resolution that as he looked around the
Council table:
The party directly concerned, the Arab people
of
Palestine, who should themselves be the f^^st
sneakers to be heard, since they have never
ceded
the?r Inalienable rights to anybody nor
fo^^eited
them, are totally absent from the
picture.^'^
No reference, except "belatedly" is
made of the
refugees as constituting the refugee problem,
Tomeh pointed
out. The Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human
Rights, and eighteen General Assembly
resolutions since
191V (III) (m8) were not meant, stated
Ambassador Tomeh,
to "deprive people of their
inalienable rights to self-
determination in their own lands and
their right to their
homeland in which they had lived
for over two thousand
years. "^^
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Tomeh accused Israel of nineteen years of aggression,
topped by the invasion of Syria after the acceptance by
Damascus of the cease-fire was conveyed to the Security
Council: "the momentum of
. . . [Israeli]
. . . pre-
meditation was so strong that the fact that the Security
Council was just at that time considering the very problem
involved did not deflect it from its course. "^^ The U.K.
draft was criticized by Tomeh because it contained no time
limit or specified modus operandi for ensuring Israeli
withdrawal, because it was silent on the General Assembly
resolutions concerning the status of Jerusalem and post-
June 5 refugees and for other reasons:
It is inconceivable to Syria that this draft resolutionbe accepted because it ignores the roots of the problem,the various resolutions adopted by the United Nations
on the Palestine Question and the right of the
Palestinian people to self-determination it
crowns all those failures by offering to the aggressors
solid recognition of the illegitimate truths of their
wanton aggression when it speaks of "secure and recog-
nized boundaries . I
Rather than withdrawing, Israel is consolidating its
grip on the occupied territories, said Tomeh.
Israel is the actual aggressor, the real belligerent--
it is not an Arab state, but Israel which has annexed land
and displaced people, turning them into refugees, the
Syrian representative stated. Tomeh recalled Security
Council Resolution 228 (1966) in which Israel was censured
for the Es-Samu raid. Ambassador Tomeh concluded that his
Government's "non-acceptance" was based upon a "real, true
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and legal context" and finished:
Peace and security, while being the cherished coal ofevery society, would only mean^ew oppression frlhelwere to be emptied of their basic tenet, which isjustice. History has taught us all thai tSe seeds of
force"'"! '"""^ "^J^^^ imposed by. A lasting peace cannot be imposed by forceOne does not open the way for it by seizing another
'
s
property and demanding certain concessions\e?ore
<^hnn?r^?;
given back to its legal, lawful owner.Should the principle of putting on an equal footing
^^Sotf^'T^?; ^""^ ^^'^^"^ approved, thus offeringrewards to the aggressor, no safeguard would remain inthe world to prevent one power from overwhelming another
and extracting concessions therefrom. 58
While some certainly would call this uncompromising,
the legal principles herein espoused are so basic that to
permit their violation is to erode the very foundation of
international order. Foreign Minister Mon'im El-Rifa'i of
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan focused on the single
question he too felt was one of principle and lies at the
very roots of the United Nations and international law:
. . .
is occupation or acquisition of territory by
military conquest admissible under the Charter of the
United Nations and international order. If the
answer is negative, then the basic foundations of
peace will be established and the United Nations will
emerge as the centre for harmonizing the actions of
nations in the attainment of the principles and pur-
poses of its Charter. But, if the answer is in the
affirmative, then I must ask in all fairness what good
purpose this organization serves. . . .^^
We need but recall the downward spiral for the League
of Nations which began with the military conquests of
Manchuria and Ethiopia to witness what can occur when
international organization cannot or does not answer a
similar question negatively. Rifa'i, as Tomeh, made
r
special reference to the threat posed to small and weake
states. He told the Council that if the U.N. could not
effect Israel withdrawal:
We shall have to return to our people and explainto them that they have no other course but to
mobilize their own efforts, to use their own
resources and to organize themselves in order toliquidate the Israeli aggression, no matter what
the price and sacrifice might be.oO
The initial statements of Mahmoud Riad, Foreign
Minipter of the United Arab Republic on November 9 appear
correlative in content with the introduction of the three-
Power draft by the representative of India. This was high-
lighted in his words describing the decision taken at
Khartoum as :
... a decision for peace, but not surrender. It was
a decision for a political solution to the crisis, and
not a decision for national suicide in the name of a
political solution.
Riad went further in stating:
The peoples of our part of the world can in no way
benefit from a state of war, belligerency
. . .
the Palestine question . . . can be adjusted only
by peaceful and appropriate application of the
Charter. "2
There is little chance of mistaking the desire for a
settlement sought by the United Arab Republic. Perhaps
this is why the U.A.R. contributed so little in the verbal
or formal sense to the proceedings. However, this is not
to say that Riad was diluting his Government's stand on
withdrawal
:
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cS^;ro:i3e'oT?^^rp:?nt"Lr^? ""^^^"^ Republic
the_ Security Council? a^^res,?""" J"<^eemeat: shouldagainst the Charter, and thffefore°?he°'that aggression have to be -uli^fi* ? consequences ofance with the Charter. 63 ^ ^ eliminated in accord-
The U... H. delegate also called Tor self-determination
ror the people of Palestine and condemned IsraeLs policy
Of expansionism and afft?res«?ion q ^ggression. Sober in the views he pre-
aented and seeding to do so on a legal plane. Hiad exposed
the Plight of the Arab position and the need in the Arab
view to act promptly. He as.ed for Charter enforcement
measures if Israel did not comply „ith the minimum measure
Which the council should advocate, in Egypfa eyes-immediate
withdrawal to the positions of June 1;.
The legal and moral case of the refugees, and the
legal proposition
-no fz^its of conquest" and the grave
threat its passive acceptance would pose to the orders of
both law, nations and international organization were
emphasized by the Arab representatives. But here, as if
in relief, was highlighted the legal problem in grappling
with this problem. Israel began with the premise of its
existence and constructed both a legal defense and Justifica-
tion thereupon. The Arab states began with the premise that
the existence of the Israeli state itself was illegal and
immoral as was the birth and continuance of the refugee
status for the Palestinian people. Some basis of common-
ality, some slight sharing of norms or accepted standards
is requisite for parties to a conflict to accept the jus-
tifiability and applicability of law to their quarrel. And
because of the nature in which they have played their
political hands, those perennial enforcers of common
standards--or at best, inducements, at worst penalties-
the big powers, had been unable and/or unwilling to
actualize this role. So law in the framework in which
it had operated had provided no final settlement thus far.
The concatenation of norms, diplomacy and fine negotiating
skills, personified by Lord Caradon, was able to provide a
formally agreed-upon framework for discussions, but this
was all. This was a great deal, of course, but after
nineteen years--in domestic law there is a final degree
of coerciveness such that even the most obstinate parties
must accept a decision, once it is handed down from the
highest level. But in international law, there is no
final degree of coerciveness, no enforcement of decision
and no "highest" level. But if some problems do not get
solved, perhaps they can be ameliorated.
Into this breach stepped the esteemed and ameliorative
Lord Caradon. Upon hearing both the three-Power and American
drafts he wisely avoided specific comments on the drafts and
bided for time. The representatives of both the United
States and India had indicated their willingness to pass a
resolution. Once again, Caradon early put the situation
into perspective, and lent balance to the proceedings:
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It IS not my purpose to deal at this stage with thedetail of draft resolutions which have been circulated.Nor is it a question of seeking victories in the vote.We want not victories in the vote. We want not
victories but a success. It is a question of what
resolution we can adopt with the prospect of early
effective action.
Consequently I would earnestly put to the Councilthe suggestion that when we have heard, the opening
statements in this debate, we should allow a short
period for further urgent consultations among ourselves.
There is, I am sure, such a measure of agreement and
common ground among us that I cannot believe that such
consultations will fail.oM-
On November 15, Caradon evolved that "common ground."
After reminding the delegates that time was of the essence
and that the obligation for the Council was not to partisan-
ship, but to the discharge of responsibility which will set
the peoples of the Middle East either "on a road of hope or
a road of despair, "^^ Caradon outlined that area in terms
of the direct participants toward which the resolutions were
directed
:
The Arab countries insist that we must direct our
special attention to the recovery and restoration of
their territory. The issue of withdrawal is to them
of top priority. The Arabs want not charity but
Justice. They seek a just settlement to end the long
and bitter suffering of the refugees. There is a
recognition on all sides that a new, comprehensive,
imaginative plan, as we have advocated, to deal with
this desperately urgent problem is vitsl.
The Israelis tell us that withdrawal must never
be to the old precarious truce; that it must be to a
permanent peace, to secure boundaries, to a new era
of freedom from the use or the threat or the fear of
hostility and force.
Both are right. The aims of the two sides do not
conflict. They converge. They supplement and they
support each other. To imagine that one can be secured
without the other is a delusion. They are of equal
validity and equal necessity. The recent consultations
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that have been going forward so energetically and
continuously reinforce strongly my conviction that
we in tnis Council now have a supreme opportunity
to serve the interests of all those concerned.
. . .Justice and peace are not in conflict; they are
as inseparable as they are indispensable, and one
must go hand in hand with the other. 66
Lord Caradon requested another period of consultations during
which:
We should make a final and supreme and successful
effort to set aside all differences, many of which
are in wording and not in substance, and concentrate
on the common ground of agreed purpose and principle.
Then Caradon envisaged the members taking "...
perhaps the most important decision which the United Nations
68has ever taken." Caradon again stressed the goal he saw:
We must pass a resolution. I hope we can do so
unanimously. That will be the best way to discharge
our responsibility and to do so in such a way that
action is effective in the interests of all the people
concerned. 69
Caradon had not criticized either the three-Power or
American resolutions. He did not advocate the satisfaction
of one party over the other. Rather, he appealed to the
members to exercise their responsibility according to the
highest norms of both international law and organization.
His was a search both for common ground and action on
which a start toward settlement could be made. As he
said on November 20, his draft "... was prepared with the
greatest care after listening long and patiently to the
views put to us by those directly concerned ... we know
and respect their intense feelings . ""^^ In so keeping, he
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wanted "to work with others to devise a resolution which
would take full account of the essential interests of both
sides as they have stated them. ""^^ The aim always was agree-
ment to permit forward progress in the Middle East on the
issues themselves. In consciously seeking this, he sought
out not just the direct parties, or the Council membership,
he heeded not Just the resolutions of the Security Council
or General Assembly, but sought that:
This resolution which stands in our name is the work of
us all. It draws on the ideas and formulations of
others. It seeks to bring them all together in a
balanced whole. It represents, above all, an endeavor
to be fair, to be just and to be impartial. 72
What was the nature of this draft resolution? After
expressing continuing concern with the grave situation in
the Middle East, the opening paragraphs of what ultimately
became Resolution 2l|.2 emphasized "the inadmissibility of
the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work
for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the
area can live in security." This was coupled with the
statement in the resolution that the establishment of a
"just and lasting peace" in the Middle East should include
application of the principle of:
Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories
occupied in the recent conflict.
This was a denial of the validity of the Israeli claim
to withdraw only after bilateral negotiations with the Arab
states
.
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The Latin American resolution submitted to the General
Assembly had urgently requested in operative paragraph 1(a):
Israel to withdraw all its forces from all the
territories occupied by it as a result of the
recent conflict. '3
The Latin American draft also had reaffirmed its con-
viction in operative paragraph 2:
. . .
that no stable international order can be based
on the threat or use of force and declares that the
validity of the occupation or acquisition of territories
brought about by such means should not be recognized.Tij.
The three-Power draft had linked, reversed and re-
phrased this to read in operative paragraph 1(1):
Occupation of acquisition of territory by military
conquest is inadmissible under the Charter of the
United Nations and consequently Israel's armed forces
should withdraw from all the territories occupied as a
result of the recent conflict. 75
The three-Power draft certainly was closer to Caradon's
than to the U.S. draft which had merely affirmed "withdrawal
of anned forces from occupied territory" in operative
paragraph 1. While the United Kingdom, three-Power and
Latin American drafts specifically mentioned and linked
Israel and its armed forces to withdrawal, the United
States resolution did not. In addition, such withdrawal was
identically called for "from all the territories occupied"
76in the Latin American and three-Power drafts,' while the
United Kingdom compromise called instead for withdrawal
"from territories occupied." Conceivably application of
the United Kingdom formulation could permit border
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modifications as a result of negotiations of the sort Israel
envisioned for secure borders. The translated French version
of the U.K. text reads, however, withdrawal "des territoires
occup^s," a phrasing with somewhat more specificity and
import. Naturally, the Arab governments claimed the French
version as paramount. Consequently, after its approval,
Abba Eban stated before the Security Council:
I am communicating to my Government for its considera-
tion nothing except the original English text of the
. . .
[United Kingdom] . . . draft resolution as pre-
sented by the original sponsor on 16 November. 77
Operative paragraph 1(11) of the United Kingdom draft
affirmed application of the principles:
Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and
respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of
every state in the area and their right to live in
peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from
threats or acts of force.
Once again, an early formulation belongs to the Latin
American text which, in operative paragraph 1(b) requested:
The parties in conflict to end the state of
belligerency, to endeavor to establish conditions of
coexistence based on good neighborliness and to have
recourse in all cases to the procedures for peaceful
settlement indicated in the Charter of the United
Nations. 2^
As noted above, operative paragraph 2 of the Latin
American draft also stated "no stable international order
can be based on the threat or use of force. ..."
The United States draft resolution presented to, but
never voted upon by the emergency session of the General
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Assembly in operative paragraph 3(A) had called for:
t«r^^to^;f^°^^^^^°''-2^ political independence ande ritorial integrity of all countries in the area,
encompassing recognized boundaries and other arrange-
ments
.
. .
that will give them security againstterror, destruction and war. 79 *
Since the Latin American draft was not introduced
until ten days after that of the United States, ten days
in which the Latin American delegates sat and listened,
it is entirely possible that the American draft was an
antecedent here.
The three-Power text contained much of this though
more a progeny of the Latin American text. Operative
paragraph 1(11) and (III) of the three-Power draft stated:
Likewise, every state has the right to live in peace
and complete security free from threats or acts of
war and consequently all states in the area should
terminate the state or claim of belligerency and
settle their international disputes by peaceful
means
;
Likewise, every state of the area has the right to
be secure within its borders and it is obligatory on
all Member States of the area to respect the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of one
another. . . ,oO
But certainly the November U.S. draft to the Security
Council came very nearly closest in words and phraseology to
the United Kingdom draft. The November 7 United States
draft affirmed in operative paragraph 1:
. . . termination of claims or states of belligerency,
and mutual recognition and respect for the right of
every State in the area to sovereign existence, terri-
torial integrity, political independence, secure and
recognized boundaries and freedom from the threat or
use of force. 8l
2Sk
The remainder of the United Kingdom draft replicated
exactly the United States draft of just nine days earlier.
Operative paragraph 2 of both the U.S. and U.K. drafts read:
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation
through international waterways in the
area
;
(b) for achieving a just settlement of the
refugee problem;
(c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviola-
bility and political independence of every
state in the area, through measures including
the establishment of demilitarized zones.
. . .
The three-Power draft had carried clauses very similar
to these in operative paragraphs l(III), and 2(1) and (II)--
with the additional phrase "in accordance with international
Op
law" concerning freedom of navigation. In the United
States emergency session draft, both freedom of navigation
and a just solution of the refugee problem were included. ^-^
But it was the Latin American draft, once again, which more
than embryonically stated in operative paragraph 3(c) the
precedent text closest to both the U.S. and U.K. drafts.
. . .
guarantee the territorial inviolability and
political independence of the states of the region,
through measures including the establishment of
demilitarized zones.
Operative paragraph 3 of the United Kingdom draft
read as follows:
Requests the Secretary-General to designate
a special representative to proceed to the
Middle E?3t to establish and maintain contacts
with the states concerned in order to promote
agreement and assist efforts to achieve a
peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance
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with the provisions and principles in this
resolution.
The fourth and last operative paragraph requested a
progress report to the Security Council by the Secretary-
General as soon as possible.
On November 20, eleven days after the three-Power and
United States draft resolutions had been submitted to the
Security Council and four days following Lord Caradon's sub-
mission of the ultimately successful United Kingdom text,
the Soviet Union put forward a draft resolution of its
own. Although it was entered too late to be of any con-
sequence in the finely balanced and negotiated consulta-
tions which resulted in ultimate formal success, it is
worth reviewing this draft for the view it provides us of
the evolving Soviet position just before the crucial vote.
There were four operative paragraphs to this surprising
85
resolution. ^ Operative paragraph 1 declared that the
Charter of the United Nations provided the framework to
achieving peace and a final solution to this problem. The
second operative paragraph was divided into two subparagraphs
:
(a) urged withdrawal of armed forces by "parties to the
conflict" to positions "held prior to June 5" in keeping
with the principle "that the seizure of territory by means
of war is inadmissible"; (b) urged that area member states
. . .
immediately recognize that each has the right to
exist as an independent national State and to live in
peace and security and should immediately renounce all
claims and desist from all acts inconsistent with the
foregoing
.
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Operative paragraph 3 deemed it "necessary" to con-
tinue Council consideration of the Middle East situation
by "working directly with the parties concerned and making
use of the presence of the United Nations "with a view toward
achieving" an appropriate and just solution of all aspects
of the problem" on the basis of four principles: (a) "the
use or threat of force in relations between States is in-
compatible" with the United Nations Charter; (b) every
area State "must respect the political independence and
territorial integrity of all other
. . . area
. . . States;
(c) "there must be a just settlement of the question of the
Palestine refugees." (d) 'Innocent passage through inter-
national waterways in the area in accordance with inter-
national agreements." Oierative paragraph i; considered
that the area states "should put an end to the state of
belligerency, attempt to limit the arms race, and discharge
their Charter and other international agreements.
Of course, the key Soviet motive was to seek an Israeli
withdrawal "to the positions of 5 June" so that the "fruits
of aggression" would not be enjoyed. The linkage of 2(b),
withdrawal, had a precedent in the July 19 agreement between
the United States and the Soviet Union. The fact that the
key Arab demand for withdrawal was linked to the principles
of 2(b) and that Kuznetsov himself early in his statement
said "on the part of the Arab states there has been a
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clear-cut manifestation of interest in a political settlement
and of readiness to seek ways and means for the establishment
of a lasting peace in the Middle Eas t"^^-meant that compromise
by the Arabs had already occurred. The key point still was
formulated by the Russians as "the aggressor has come into
foreign lands: the aggressor must leave those lands."®'''
This was not quite the formulation the Security Council
sought. While this point certainly would be considered
prejudicial by Israel, there were two key aspects of the
earlier Soviet General ^issembly position which had been
dropped: the calls for condemnation and compensation. It
is noteworthy that the Soviet draft now linked withdrawal
to a "principle." It is noteworthy also that as late as
November 9, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov was describing
these points as the "essence" of Soviet policy before con-
tradictorily stating next:
However, although the Soviet delegation would have
preferred a more radical solution it will be ready
to support the draft resolution of India, Mali and
Nigeria, if the Arab countries the victims of
aggression, do not oppose it.°8
The draft's position on the incompatibility of the
threat or use of force with the Charter and the call for
respect of the political independence and territorial
integrity of states was novel and welcome from fhissia.
The subparagraph concerning innocent passage used the
three-Power phrasing "in accordance with international
agreements" which India already had offered to delete as
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causing possibly too much ambiguity. Novel too for the
Soviet State were the calls to end the state of belligerency,
the arms race and for area states to fulfill their Charter
and other international obligations. It was indeed
encouraging to see both superpowers calling for an end to the
arms race, but sad to see both anomalously arming state
parties to the conflict according to their separate justifica-
tions. There was no mention of the point of arms limitation
in Resolution 2i|2. This draft contained elements of
flexibility, but came toe late and contained too many features
objectionable to Israel and the growing Council consensus
to permit its acceptance.
The actual voting was suspense-ridden. The resolution
had been so carefully constructed, word-by-word, the com-
promise was so delicate and tenuous, the Russian draft was
so late and unexpected, there were so many probabilities
any one of which were it to become a reality could hobble
the unanimous vote sought by Lord Caradon and those whom
he had encouraged, cajoled, pushed and led to the discharge
of their own and the United Nations' higher responsibility.
Israel was unhappy with the portion on withdrawal and the
inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war. The
Arab states were not gratified by the acknowledgement of
Israel's sovereignty, territorial integrity, political
independence, and secure and recognized boundaries. And
the Soviet Union was embarrassed at not having obtained
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Israel's condemnation.
At the request of the sponsors, neither the three-
Power nor the American draft was put to vote. The United
Kingdom draft was next, followed by the Soviet draft. The
United Kingdom draft was brought up for the vote. The vot
was unanimous and the Soviet delegate withdrew his Govern-
ment's draft. Finally, success, as Caradon would put it,
was theirs. Now the struggle of implementation would
begin.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
Law and organizations in any setting are not tested in
moments of calm and quiet. it is in those tumultuous times
of violence and crisis that the trial comes. As international
law and international organization have unfolded, they have
been accorded great inherent strength by few observers. The
bisection of their evolution by the "Middle East conflict"
was a test indeed. For this conflict is a£ once acute,
episodic and chronic. Acute because it regains overall the
single flash point most laden with the tinder of conflagra-
tion. Episodic because, as Chapter I indicates, the
proximate sources of crisis tend to be each time somewhat
novel and unique. Chronic because, as Chapter II demonstrates
the basic elements of conflict in 19i;8, 1956 and 196? remained
constant and may be subsumed to a legal analysis. The succeed
ing chapters attempted to show how international law and
international organization met with this episodic crisis
and ultimately dealt with it as a chronic conflict so as to
fulfill the object of all law: "To define the interests of
the parties concerned in a controversy and then to provide
adequate procedures for settlement on the basis of rational
argument."-^ In so doing, that international organization.
the United Nations, sought to fulfill its primal objective
as it is now constituted: "to further political and
national security" for its members. ^ to our salvation
international law and international organization did not
break down under the stress of the 196? war. To their
credit law and organization produced what might even be
termed an embryonic peace treaty in Resolution 21+2 for the
warring states. But there are limits to this credit.
Between the inception of this crisis in mid-May and
the passage of Resolution 21+2 in late November, a great deal
went on which might be aptly put under the twin headings of
statecraft and its absence. Statecraft includes not only
transcendent law and the procedures of organization, but
threat, pressure, negotiation, compromise, shrewdness, luck,
ideals, morality, bargaining, drive and adjustment. The
surge toward war and the actual hostilities themselves were
notable for the lack of these elements. The environment in
which the crisis played itself out was much different from
the one in which the Arab-Israeli conflict had last been
brought to the U.N. in 195^. Then the international order
was much tighter in its bipolarity. John Foster Dulles was
the American Secretary of State who personally presented the
United States case to the United Nations. His views on the
immorality of neutralism are well-known. There were not so
many actors to control in the United Nations, and there was
much more a habit of command, or at least predominance and
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accession to the American efforts. It was an age of alliances,
and conflict and struggle in the United Nations marked more
by contention than cooperation. Smaller states played lesser
roles. But as Dulles passed from the scene and decolonization
produced more members both for ultimate U.N. membership and
the international system, the smaller and newer states began
to seek out policies sometimes quite discontinuous with the
past wishes of the superpowers. Both "congruence and dis-
continuities" began to appear in the international system
as the new states began to realize independence not only in
their domestic, but in their foreign policies as well."^ With-
in the United Nations, life became more than a matter of
getting the opinion or tacit support of the senior partners.^
The relationship of the superpowers with the Middle
Eastern situation and states also had changed. Unlike what
happened in 1956 there was not the flagrant victimization of
the sovereign rights and invasion of the sovereign territory
of a weaker Egypt on the most shallow of justifications. Nor
was there the cheap complicity of formerly colonial overlords,
thus raising the specter of imperialism, or the callow double-
cross of a trusted ally, the United States. Instead, at a
time of economic weakness for both Eshkol and Nasser^ by
bluff and miscalculations the Arabs, led by an adventurous
Damascus and an iraprovisational Cairo provided Jerusalem
plenty of provocation. The growing escalation of the Israeli
responses gave perceived proof to the Arab interpretation of
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Israeli intentions. Amidst all the uncertainty present when
one risks the existence of a state, Israel's policy-makers
put into action a plan more than sixteen years old,^
implemented by armed forces of whose worth they had no
question, and with whose capabilities the United States
intelligence services shared a high estimation.^ But while
the 1967 episode was more area-confined in its proximate
delimitations the superpowers, and especially the Soviet
Union, were more deeply committed than in 1956.
The Soviet Union contributed by playing up reports of
Israeli troop concentrations against the shaky Syrian regime
which Moscow sought to buttress. And while the existence of
these concentrations remains unproven today, reports of
Israeli threats in mid-May which, at the time, could not be
researched in a scholarly fashion, triggered Nasser's entry
into the fray to reassert his Arab-world ascendancy.
Also, these threats lent credence to the Soviet-circulated
Q
intelligence. Soviet obstructionism in the Security Council
not only helped guarantee the outbreak of hostilities, but
also greatly contributed to the near bankruptcy which the
U.N. experienced in the vital realm of peace keeping. Prior
to June 5 the Soviet Union appeared disinterested in the idea
of restraint. True, there were midnight contacts made by
Soviet Ambassadors to Israeli Prima Minister Levi Eshkol and
Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, -^^ but within the
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vehicle of the United Nations little urgency can be detected.
We do not hold that the Soviet Union sou^t a war. But we
do hold that as the crisis developed, Kreralin leaders saw
an opportunity to further divorce the Arab world from the
United States by accentuating a pro-Israei American stance,
simultaneously drawing the Arabs more tightly into its
ambit, and furthering Russia's paramount aim of ejecting, or
at least drastically lessening the United States position
in the oil-rich and strategically vital Middle East land
bridge. We hold, with C. B. Marshall, that while the
Kremlin leaders have no precise timetable, their prime aim
is to erode U.S. influence and to become a "regional arbiter
exercising paramount influence among a diversity of client
states. "^^ With its erosion of ideology, and consequent
loss of direction and purpose, fragmentation of decision-
making and globalization of foreign policy since Khruschev,
Soviet foreign policy has become more Ru.ssian in its drive
to the south and in its willingness to cooperate with states
12less on the basis of ideology than national interest. This
in no way conflicts with the Russian drive to outflank NATO
to the south, to grab as much gain as the traffic will bear,
and to simultaneously threaten ^^merican security with "a
possible shift in the global balance of power comparable to
Cuba in 1S62."-'-^ While it is unquestionable that both old
and new occupants of the Kremlin wished to be active in the
Middle East, one wonders how far their influence would
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extend without the Arab-Israeli conflict; by and large,
Russia has been "invited" in by the Arab states as Laqueur
says, in response to the threat they perceive from Israel.
However, the danger in building such spheres of influence
are two-fold, given that all policies acquire a momentum of
their own: first, that Russia may be drawn in more than it
desires to be; and second that it may commit itself more
deeply than the area warrants . "'^ Therefore, much depends on
the course Kremlin leaders choose and find themselves drawn
into.
As the Israeli Government has correctly stated:
Moscow is not merely engaging in policy support and aidfor Egypt
. . .
[or other Arab states]. ... It is
pursuing a fundamental strategy of its own, one that is
dictated by its own self-interests and calculated to
achieve major Soviet goals. The U.S.S.R. is striving
for power in the Middle East. In so doing, it has sought
to make maximum mileage out of the Israel-Arab dispute to
enhance its own presence and influence in the region and
to achieve predominance at Western expense. 1°
However, for the Arabs as Curt Gasteyger has pointed
out, this relationship:
, . . is, of course, a function of their conflict with
and fear of Israel. As long as this conflict lasts the
Soviet Union has a welcome pretext for continuing both
its presence in the Mediterranean and its influence in
the Arab world. The main focus of the Soviet objectives
is the U.A.R., not only because it is the leader of the
"progressive" Arab states, but because it provides s key
to Africa and via the Suez Canal, to the Indian Ocean. 1/
In addition to the deep sense of humiliation which Arab
society in general suffered at the hands of Zionism, Arabs
fear Israeli expansionism and seek to restore the political
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community of Arab Palestine There ia hardly a viable
convergence here of Soviet and Arab interests as the events
of 1967 so nearly catastrophically proved. As the Soviet
influence deepened, so did their commitmeat, but the com-
mitment came without adequate control, as Chapter I in-
dicates. The engine of Soviet imperalist ambi tion--the
Arab-Israeli conflict--exploded in the face of Moscow for
reasons quite beyond Moscow's control.
The Soviet press during this period viewed the war
as part of a deliberate CIA-Pentagon "Salame" policy or
"local war doctrine" to "fight the national liberation
movement, to suppress revolutions in Asia, Africa and Latin
19America." The perception in the Soviet press was that:
The "local war doctrine" seeks to attain piecemeal
what the total war doctrine was to attain all at once.
The idea is to unleash a local war first in one spot,
then in another, then in still another. If these local
wars are successful the influence of progressive
principles will wane, the local wars vill merge and
gradually approach the borders of U.S. imperialism's
main enemy. ^0
According to this doctrine the prevention of a communist
takeover in South Viet Nam, and the "liquidation of pro-
gressive regimes in the Arab countries" were major elements
of U.S. policy. With this there can be no argument. And
certainly these were part of the overall global balance of
power. But although De Gaulle appears to be right in his
view that Viet Nam made peace in the Middle East more
difficult to achieve following the hostilities, there is
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no historical evidence that any sort of a "deal" was struck
between Moscow and Washington linking these two areas. On
the other hand, one of Washington's fears was the "Nasser-
ization" of the remainder of the Middle East, as we shall
see below. Nasser too reiterated this Soviet perception of
Washington's desire to hasten the downfall of "progressive
regimes" in the Arab world in his July 23, 1967 speech on
the 15th anniversary of the July revolution. ^-^ The Soviet
case, however, was careful not to charge the United States
with actively planning and initiating the war. While the
Soviet view did make a "connection" between the local wars
in the Middle East and South Viet Nam, it pointed out:
Needless to say this connection should not be turned
into a dogma, for it would be wrong to regard every
aggressive action of the imperialists ss a step of the
Pentagon devised and planned beforehand. Life is more
complicated than any plan. But the U.3.A. encourages
and supports all local conflicts if they coincide vrith
their "local war doctrine" and if they can be used for
a general offensive against the national liberation
movement of Asian, African and Latin Ar.erican peoples.
Acting as the agent of U.S. imperialisn in the Middle
East the Israeli government pursues its own aggressive
aims, which in some details may not coincide with those
of their American bosses. Since Israel's interest does
not contradict V/ashington' s interest in principle the
U.S.A. encourages and promotes Israel's ventures, the
more so as they are directed against the national
liberation movement of the Arab peoples and can be
developed into a "local war" as part of their total
strategy, a war that will suit the U.S.A. to wage
through other people without deploying an American
expeditionary force.
According to this view, the "U.S. ruling circles would
not object" to an "aggressive front" anchored at one end by
South Viet Nam and at the other by the colonel's Greece.
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Asia would be encircled from the south by a chain of military
bases shielding newly independent East Africa, Southern
Arabia, and the Persian Gulf. In the Middle East, the
Israeli-occupied West Bank and Israel's attempt "to draw
Transjordania with Amman
. . . into its orbit ... [by
future subjugation or the threat thereof] ... in order to
come into direct contact with Saudi Arabia, where feudal
reaction still holds strong positions" would result in "an
imperialist corridor running across the Arabian Peninsula
from south to north." This would pose a direct threat to
the "progressive regimes" in Arab countries, permit the
British to retain influence in Aden and Saudi Arabia by
"going without leaving," and buttress the positions of
Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.
There are a number of points to make concerning this
view. First, it is predominantly geopolitical. In its wide
expanse, it envelops a view of the global balance of power
between the Soviet Union and the United States which was
reciprocated by Washington. Secondly, the fear for the
safety of "progressive Arab regimes" while having its
ideological undertones, also served the Kremlin's great
power aims most handsomely. Third, this doctrine goes
beyond the mere satisfaction of the Arab states in con-
sidering the Soviet insistence on Israeli withdrawal from
the occupied territories; even beyond the principles of
international law the Soviet position would be threatened
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by an unwelcome and threatening "imperialist corridor."
Lastly, the doctrine totally ignored the issue of the
Palestine refugees and demonstrated the long-standing
Soviet view of the refugees as an issue to be kept alive,
but not solved so as to keep the Arab-Israeli conflict
suitably active in the Soviet Union's own interest. The
reopening of hostilities would most possibly result in
another Israeli victory, the further extension of Israeli
occupied land and the downfall of "progressive" Arab
regimes. The massive airlift-resupply of Arab states with
carefully selected defensive military supplies, the opening
of negotiations between Israel and the Arab states and the
"domestic protection and the retrenching of our revolutionary
system, and the consolidation of the Arab revolutionary
movement "^^ in Nasser's words, would all serve the Kremlin's
interest
.
We should also realize that the adamant Soviet support
of the Arab position in the U.N. was based upon another
factor. Moscow feared that Peking might utilize the poor
Soviet showing in the crisis to intensify its rivalry with
Moscow in the Arab states, and perhaps even offer nuclear
weapons to Nasser. In addition, a withdrawal by Israelis
from the banks of the Suez Canal and its reopening would
considerably shorten, simplify and cheapen the shipment of
military supplies to North Viet Nam by Moscow. Thus, some
of the complexity behind Soviet behavior in the United Nations
27k
becomes more clear.
The Soviet Union approved a cease-fire in the Security
Council before any of the Arab states accepted one. This
was looked upon as "a complete capitulation from the
position of support for the Arab states. It shows that the
Soviet Union fishes in troubled waters, but will not risk
its security on behalf of its friends in the so-called
26
third world." If this doctrine of "local wars" truly
reflected part of the thinking of members of the Politburo
during the hostilities, it may throw light uopn Chairman
Kosygin's hot line message to President Johnson during the
Syrian campaign on June 10: Johnson reported "Mr. Kosygin
said that they had reached a very crucial decision, that
they were prepared to do what was necessary, including using
the military. "^"^ It may be that Moscow foresaw the physical
seizure of Damascus with attendantly greater chances for the
downfall of the progressive Syrian regime.
With the conclusion of hostilities, the Arabs felt
outraged at what they saw as a Soviet betrayal and were
stunned by their defeat. Their own strategy in the United
Nations was to press for the indictment of Israel for
aggression and to secure the prompt and unconditional with-
drawal of Israeli military forces from territories occupied
during the recent hostilities. Here the Soviet Union was in
a quandary. On the one hand, it sought accommodation with
Washington to reduce the possibility of skirting the nuclear
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precipice once again. On the other hand, to further its
own policy, possibly roll back the U.S. "local war"
doctrine, and satisfy the Arab states, Moscow felt it
incumbent to behave on the basis of quite different in-
terests. A certain amount of tension and oscillation natu-
rally resulted.
As a general rule the Soviet Union perceives the
Security Council as a "forum of accommodation" and the
General Assembly as an "arena of conflict. "^^ Therefore,
following its failure to gain passage of its June 13 draft
resolution which condemned "Israel's aggressive activities"
and demanded the unconditional withdrawal of her troops,
Moscow requested the convening of the fifth emergency
special session of the General Assembly. Here, too, while
putting forward its own condemnatory draft resolution, it
worked diligently to secure the passage of the more moderate
non-Aligned draft which called for the unconditional Israeli
withdrawal to the positions held prior to June 5* Given the
split that occurred in the General Assembly between this and
the Latin American draft resolution, the Soviets again faced
the humiliating prospect of leaving an organ of the U.N.
empty-handed. Accommodation with the United States was
sought in the privately worked out draft resolution of
July 19, 1967. However, there was no mention of Israel's
condemnation, as well as ambiguity concerning the terms of
withdrawal. And so it was rejected by the caucus of Arab
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states. Activity returned to the Security Council in the
Pall where the norm of accommodation was more prevalent.
The Soviet representative to the Security Council approved
the November 22 resolution with a clear emphasis on the
"first necessary principle for the establishment of Just and
lasting peace in the Near East. We understand the decision
taken to mean the withdrawal of Israel forces from all, and
we repeat, all territories belonging to Arab states and seized
by Israel following its attacks on those states on
5 June 1967. "^"^
United States policy toward the Middle Eastern states
epitomizes contradiction. The main juggling act simul-
taneously tries to keep in the air policies of support for
Israel and influence with Arab states. But within these
basal strictures, alternate policies have been introduced.
The 1950' s are the best example. For the Arabs U.S. policy
veered from strong support for Nasser early in his tenure^^
to great antagonism after he had concluded the misnomered
Czech arms deal in 1955 much against his wishes. 31 In turn
this led to the abrupt withdrawal of American financial
support for the Aswan dam which embarrassed and insulted
Nasser, and led to his nationalization of the Suez Canal
Company, and the sorrowful scenario which led up to the
1956 war. Since then, with the exception of the Kennedy
years when a new attempt at deepening understanding was made
between President Kennedy and Nasser, the relationship
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between Washington and Cairo tended, at best, to be formal
and correct. Beginning in early 1966, U.S. footdragging
on a variety of matters, but in particular on a PL i;80
food program on which the U.A.R. was particularly vulnerable,
led the Egyptians to suspect "a growing hostility on the part
of the United States, and a very active endeavor on our part
to overthrow the regime in Egypt and to isolate Egypt from
the rest of the Arab world. "^^ This had the effect of
making American influence in Cairo negligible on the eve
of the June I967 war.
Policy took its twist towards Israel too. From the
blatant partisanship of President Harry S. Truman, Secretary
of State John Poster Dulles and President Dwight Eisenhower
attempted to institute a policy of "friendly impartiality"
and even-handedness
. Early Dullesian efforts to entice
Egypt into a Middle East defense pact scared Israeli leaders
half to death while U.S. threats, for example, forced Israel
both to cease work in October 1953 on the Jordan River hydro-
electric project it was continuing in defiance of a United
Nations Truce Supervision Commission injunction, and to with-
draw from the Sinai in 1957.^^ Dulles' policy of "friendly
impartiality," paradoxically enough, drove Cairo toward
Moscow and Tel Aviv toward Paris. All these and others had
the effect according to Abba Eban of giving:
. . .
the Israeli public the impression that American
friendship for Israel had been a fleeting and accidental
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circumstance of history, linked organically with theTruman administration
. . . therefore a greaterpolicy of militance should develop in Israel fortwo reasons: both as a compensation for American
rriends.iip and perhaps, as a way of forcing theUnited States to recoil from any change adverse toIsrael
.
the response in Israel was toward greater
self -reliance, a very active policy of retaliation onthe frontiers.-}"
What has this to do with the American contribution to
the 1967 crisis? This is more than a residue of history.
Eban's words provide us with a very profou?id insight into
the evolution of the crisis.
In Washington in 1967 there was a very strong feeling
that one crisis was about all the United Spates could handle
at a time. And the White House and Pentagon were immersed
in handling Viet Nam. Eban's meeting with Johnson on the
evening of May 26 was "friendly but indecisive . "37 ^^d
while the President made it clear that he vould need the
full support of Congress on, for example, imerican efforts
outside the U.N. to open Aqaba, he was not clear on what he
would do if such support was not forthcoming. While U.S.
and Israeli intelligence reports concurred on the superiority
of Israel's military forces, Israel alone and again was left
to test the speculation. So Eban did not return to Jerusalem
on May 27 with any but the most ambiguous and vague of
assurances if that. Eban's report to the Israeli cabinet
was a stormy one because his trip had forestalled any
military measures while producing nothing tangible. The
bankruptcy of American policy in Israeli eyes was at its
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worst on the question of free passage through the Straits of
Tiran. President Johnson seemed to have forgotten Eisenhower
verbal promises and Secretary of State Dean Rusk appeared
unable to find Dulles' 1956 memorandum to Eban on this matter
For a people whose collective consciousness told them to
expect the turning away of Gentiles at the moment of crisis,
the sinking feeling of abandonment once again brought to
the fore the chief lesson of Zionism, that in the last
analysis Jews could rely only on themselves. Once again
Israel was alone because Washington's studied inaction had
placed the major responsibility for the crisis upon Israel.
Antithetically coupled to this American inaction was
the rising swell of pro-Israel sentiment which was sweeping
. , illthe country. And, for what it was worth, there was the
characteristically Johnsonian pique at American liberals,
often Jewish, who were "doves" on Viet Nam, but sudden
"hawks" on Israel. These antagonistic riptides of
pressure helped lead to inaction and indecisiveness , verbal
huffs and puffs, as Alastair Buchan put it,^-^ by Johnson
as contrasted with the forceful actions of Eisenhower in
the disorganized hallucinogenic trip toward war the world
was taking in 196?.
The Middle East is an area of real and significant
value to the interest of the United States:
. . . The region is still the fastest, cheapest
transportation route--by air or sea--between Western
Europe and Asia. And still more important, beneath
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its desert sand lies close to 300 billion barrels of
Sorrd'rn;nf three-fourths of the non-Commnis?
S ?r T"''^'^^^'- • • • According to oil con-sultant Wplter Levy, the complete loss of this oilcould not be made up by any combination of other
sources within a decade-if at all. Western Europeimports 5,600,000 barrels of Arab oil each day
65 percent of its requirements, snd Japan 1,200,000(60 percent). if the Russians should achievedomination of the Arab countries, as many Arabs nowfear they will, they could blackmail both WesternEurope and Japan by threatening to turn off the taps
and cripple their economies. The ultimate price for
assured oil supplies, some /American diplomats grimly
speculate, could well be a sharp diminution of U.S.influence in Europe and Asia.^
But of great importance to the decision-making calculus
was the strategic position of the Middle East placed, as it
is, to the rear of NATO's eastern flank and to the southeast
of Europe itself in relation to a perceived drive to complete
the "Nasserization" of the Arab Middle East.^^
American policy toward the area has been balanced on
the horns of a dilemma. A realization of the area's sig-
nificance would prompt policies of friendship with the
majority Arab inhabitants of the area while domestic support
and sympathy for Zionist aims, especially after the un-
imaginable holocaust of World War II, would encourage a
policy of friendship with the much smaller state of Israel.
While both factors have deeply conditioned U.S. policy in
the region, on balance, Washington has come to be identified
as a protector of Israel (especially since the polarization
which began once Moscow started moving into the area in the
1950' s).
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The chief question which arises in considering the
behavior of the United States is to explain the shift in
U.S. policy on the point of national sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity concerning Middle Eastern states. The Tri-
partite Declaration of May 25, 1950 stated that the Govern-
ments, of the United Kingdom, France and the United States
unalterably opposed:
. . .
the use of force or threat of force between any
of the states in that area. The three Governments,
should they find that any of these states was preparing
to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would,
consistently with their obligations as members of the
United Nations, immediately take action, both within
and outside the United Nations, to prevent such
violations
.
These principles were reaffirmed by President Eisenhower
on November l5, 1955, Secretary of State Dulles on February 2k.,
1956, by White House statement on April 9, 1956, by Article 2
of the "Eisenhower Doctrine" approved on March 9, 1957, and
again by Secretary of State Dulles on September 10, 1957.
President John F. Kennedy provided continuity to these prin-
ciples on August 5, I960 and May 8, 1963. President Lyndon B.
Johnson associated himself with these principles in June,
1961;>7
Majc Frankel provided a prescient view of what would
later transpire in a New York Times article published on
June 8, 1967.^^ In it he wrote of the White House's plans
for a review of policy in the hopes that the war had
stimulated the chances for energetic peace efforts. The
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dispatch f.on, Washington continued that the administration
expected "stirfer" terms fro. Israel concerning a withdrawal
from occupied territory than in 1956, and that there was
"measured sympathy for the Israeli decision to seize an
improved bargaining position" rather than wait for the
Western powers to challenge Nasser's blockade of Tiran.
Prankel's dispatch continued:
A decisive Israeli viotorv f^ t,.
Claims to what has been Arab territory
decll?ati^n*th«r?^ "rfT^ *° ^^^^^^^'nt Johnson's
:u^p:rran°^I^nnex^?l-^iri1^a:^!^^!l?-:f„%-
c^rta^rs?^:?:^!? '''r^'' desirf to co^mLde in strategic positions for which thev have rs-
^^inel'^h'^'' ^^^^ who^e^rd Mr. Rusk
hllTJt i^P^^s^io" that the United States would favor
a fu?l '''^ '"^"^^ P^Pa^^^ positions whilel -scale peace was negotiated. ^7
On June 5 and again on June 19, President Johnson voiced
and echoed sentiments to the effect that this conflict had
become a "burden to world peace" and that the international
community should insist on proper steps to resolve it.^°
John C. Campbell has noted:
On the conclusion of the war, the United States took theposition that an attempt should be made to reach adurable peace settlement instead of merely restoring the
armistice arrangements, which had proved inadeauate tokeep the peace. The desired settlement was to 'include,in addition to withdrawal of forces, all the major
issues which were at the heart of the Arab-Israel con-
flict: frontiers, refugees, freedom of navigation,
renunciation of belligerency, recognition of the right
of all states to exist.
. ,
.51
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In 80 doing the United States sought a middle ground
between the exclusive stands of Israel and the Arabs,
Washington:
i^Anli?"®^ v^^^ ^® totally identified withIsrael's cause but its apparent acceptance of theIsrael view that no Arab territory need be given udexcept as part of a comprehensive sett^ement^s to^heArabs convincing evidence of total partiality .52
This line of analysis is buttressed in the U.S. case
by an unusual insight into the thinking of at least one
American decision-maker afforded by Eugene V. Rostow, former
Undersecretary of State for Middle East policy during the
period under study. Professor Rostow fo^and the Mediter-
ranean to be a cockpit of Soviet Cold War ^nachination and
felt that the weakening or destruction of Israel "would be
a long step towards complete Soviet control of the vast
region between Morocco and Iran."^^ He stated that the
British and French withdrawals, the velocity of Soviet pene-
tration, and the State of Arab politics had induced a review
of Middle East policy which led President Johnson zo conclude
in Winter 1966-6? - Spring 196? that Western economic,
political and strategic interests were "threatened" by
"Nasserization" such that NATO and the U.S. would face "a
security crisis of major and potentially catastrophic pro-
portions."^^ Rostow went on to write that an Arab-Israeli
war should be perceived "not as a local conflict but as a
stage in a process which threatened the security of Europe
and the United States in fundamental ways."^^^ Rostow felt
281+
that Nasser's imposition of a blockade on Tiran was the
prime precipitative act leading to hostilities and "Justified
Israeli military action" under U.N. Charter Article 51. On
the point of aggression, Rostow later backtracked a bit and
called the question of who fired the first shot one of
"Byzantine complexity" for the provocation Nasser supplied.
"Before that mystery, sober opinion refused to reach the
conclusion that Israel was the aggressor. ^nd no serious
attempt was made to obtain a resolution declaring the United
Arab Republic to be the aggressor . "^"7 Mr. Rostow then
clearly states "... the experience of the international
community with the understanding which ended the Suez Crisis
of 1956-1957 led to the conclusion that Israel should not be
required to withdraw from the cease-fire lines except as
part of a firm prior agreement which dealt with all the
major elements of the crisis. "^^ On the key issue of "to
what boundaries should Israel withdraw?" the Armistice
Agreement of 1914-9 was cited in those critical sections which
provided that the Armistice Demarcation Line "is not to be
construed in any sense as a political or territorial
boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights
claims or positions of either Party to the Armistice as
regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question. "^^
Because the Armistice Agreements were to facilitate the
transition to permanent peace all nonmilitary "rights,
claims, or interests" were subject to "later settlement"
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in agreement among the parties in the transition to per-
manent peace.
These paragraphs, which were put into the
I^r"^!^^?®] * : .agreements at Arab insistence, werethe le^al foundation for the controversies over thewording of paragraphs 1 and 3 of Security CouncilResolution 2i|.2
, of November 22, 1967.^0
Professor Rostow stated that while the "new and
definitive boundaries should not represent 'the weight
of conquest'
. . . they need not be the same as the
Armistice Demarcation Lines. The walls and machine guns
that divided Jerusalem need not be restored." Rostow con-
tinued by citing paragraph 2 of Resolution 214.2 as further
bases for "adjustments and boundaries
. This series of
points is somewhat surprising because it appears to adopt
the Arab legal position on the existence of a continued
state of war, boundaries, and the demilitarized zones.
Rostow reviewed the point that Resolution 2I[.2 calls
for a withdrawal "from territories occupied" rather than
"from the territories occupied. "^^ (Emphasis mine.)
Repeated attempts to amend this sentence by inserting the
word "the" failed in the Security Council. It is there-
fore not legally possible to assert that the provision
requires Israeli withdrawal from all the territories
now occupied under the Cease-Fire Resolutions to the
Armistice Demarcation Lines.
This aspect of the relationship between the Security
Council Resolution of November 22, 196? , and the
ArirJ.stice Agreements of I9I4.9 likeivise explains the
reference in the resolution to the rather murky prin-
ciple of the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by war." Whatever the implications of that
obscure idea may be, it would permit the territorial
adjustments and special security provisions called for
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by the Security Council resolution and the ArmisticeAgreements of 19[|.9.63 ^® nn L
Rostov went on to state that "Israel has said re-
peatedly and officially that it has no territorial clai,
as such; that its sole interest in the territorial probl*
is to secure its security and to obtain viable guarantees
of its maritime rights. ... The assurances by Israel have
been the foundation and the predicate of the American
position in the long months since June ^196? . "^^ In order
to implement Resolution 21^.2, Rostow called for NATO's "con-
certed Alliance diplomacy to protect its interests in the
Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East. But thus
far, unfortunately, those resolutions have not_ been used as
the basis for a credible policy of warning and deterrence."
Rostow also proposed that U.S. troops be kept in Europe in
part, for possible physical commitment to the Middle East
in a crisis, and that a NATO-U.S. guarantee of the peace be
offered Israel and the Arab states on the basis of
Resolution 21^2.^^
Rostow also addressed himself to the question of which
nations have "accepted" Resolution 2i4.2? He feels that
"this is not a real issue, since the key parties to the
hostilities gave it advance assurances to the British and
American governments that they would cooperate with the
Secretary-General's representative to promote the agreement
66
called for in the resolution."
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We have quoted at length because of the near-uniqueness
of the source, and because the intent was to gain whatever
insight is possible from the writings of participants in
official American thinking and decision-making at this
critical juncture. Professor Rostow perceived a threat and
conceived the problem primarily on a geostrategic plane to
U.S. interests and reacted on that basis. He termed the
Arab-Israeli conflict secondary. While we hold that some
boundary rectification would be beneficial to long-term
peace, given that a peace settlement was achieved, we cannot
submit that the principle of the Charter of the "inadmis-
sibility of acquisition of territory by war" possesses quite
the murkiness or obscurity to which Mr. Rostow attributes it.
Indeed, had the tables turned and the war theoretically gone
against an Israel which was truncated, but still in existence
due to U.N. action, Jerusalem can be expected to have appealed
to the same norm, and quite justly. For there is a reciprocity,
a basic equity to this norm which lies at the very heart of a
stable international system--a condition which Mr. Rostow'
s
conception does not seem to recognize. The decision to
strive for a complete peace agreement is al30 quite under-
standable in view of the breakdown of the 1907 arrangements.
For in the view of one American intimately involved with
policy-making, "The Soviet Union and its chief Arab associates
wished to have Israel declared the aggressor and required,
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under Chapter VII if possible, to withdraw to the Armistice
Demarcation Line as they stood on June 5, in exchange for
fewest possible assurances
.
"^"^
The experience "with the
understandings which ended the Suez Crisis of 1956-195? led
to the conclusion that Israel should not be required to with
draw from the cease-fire lines except as part of a firm prio
agreement which dealt with all the major issues in the con-
68troversy .
"
Since Johnson apparently did not choose to link a
cease-fire with a prompt Israeli withdrawal behind the
armistice lines and did not insist on an Israeli withdrawal
following the cessation of hostilities (as Eisenhower did
in 1956-1957), we can only conclude that U.S. policy in
1967 appears to have envisioned the withdrawal of Israeli
military forces as part of an overall settlement reached
among area states. If this view is accepted and combined
with the "hidden veto" which a traditionally predominant
United States was able to exercise in the U.N.^^ along with
Soviet subordination (both now changing) and coupled to the
somewhat less predictable third world nations, we may derive
a clearer idea of why the battle in New York was so hard
fought and why the formulation closer to Washington's
than Moscow's stand finally was approved.
Short of the publication of a set of documents akin
to the Viet Nam Pentagon Papers, we cannot be absolutely
sure of the weight which should be ascribed to Mr. Rostow's
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pronouncements, especially those concerning U.S. policy
toward the Charter principle of "inadmissibility of
acquisition of territory by war." However, a certain con-
gruence on the question does emerge from Kax Frankel's
June 8, 1967 New York Times dispatch, John Campbell's
insights and Mr. Rostow's writings: Washington appears
to have envisioned Israeli troop pullbacks from occupied
territories as part of a larger peace settlement between
the parties directly involved. In The Vantage Point . Lyndon
Baines Johnson, then President of the United States, re-
viewed the "strong commitment" of the United States to
territorial integrity in the area."^^ After reviewing the
Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and the public reaffirma-
tions of this principle by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower,
71Kennedy and himself, Johnson cone luded: "But in the 1960'3
it was Israel whose territory was threatened by hostile
72
neighbors." No further specific mention of this principle
was made. In concluding his treatment of the 1967 crisis,
President Johnson wrote:
I was convinced that there could be no satisfactory
future for the Middle East until the leaders and the
peoples of the area turned away from the past, accepted
Israel as a reality, and began working together to build
modern societies unhampered by old quarrels, bitterness
and enmity.
Clearly the parties to the conflict must be the
parties to the peace. Sooner or later it is they who
must make a settlement in the area. It is hard to see
how it is possible for nations to live together in
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peace if they cannot reason together.
The Soviet Union and the United States were in a
dilemma. Both sought to. avoid worldwide nuclear war. But
neither sought to regulate the crisis. Where the Soviet
Union did not wish to pay the price of Jeopardizing its
influence in Arab capitals, Washington was paralyzed by
the contradiction between fear of another overseas in-
volvement, with far greater chance for a superpower con-
frontation, and the domestic support favoring Israel. '^'^
This is one reason why "the keys to the crisis were in
Cairo, Damascus and Jerusalem" rather than in Washington,
ISMoscow or New York. There was an acute abrogation of
responsibility here. There was little coordination of
superpower efforts.
There were a variety of points where, had cooperation
than conflict ruled the supe2*power relationship, the out-
come might have been different. A joint peacekeeping force
under U.N. auspices might have replaced UNEP, ships might
have been sent through the Straits of Tiran in a joint
venture, or perhaps led by the U.S., but with Russia's
tacit approval. Either one or both of these alternatives
would not have left Nasser "face-to-face vfith an infuriated,
mobilized Israel with no intervening hand between them,"
while allowing Nasser to de-escalate the crisis in a face-
76
saving way while relieving the threat to Israel. Stern
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and parallel action in the Security Council prior to June 5
could have been utilized in tandem with diplomatic bilateral
contacts with client states to let them know that hostilities
would not be tolerated. Once fighting began Jordan and
perhaps Syria might have been pressured into staying out of
action entirely. The United Arab Republic might have been
induced to accept a cease-fire earlier than June 10, thus
making less weighty the problem of withdrawal from occupied
territory. Washington might have held Israel to her professed
desire for a cease-fire earlier and, once having accepted it,
might have been persuaded not to break it to invade Syria.
On a grander, but perhaps more realizable scale, the super-
powers could have instituted controls on arms shipments to
the area. And, on a greater but more profound basis, there
could have been a drive toward settlement of the fundamental
questions by the U.S. and Soviet Union in years past.
The superpower split, the nature of international organ-
ization and of the people who happened to hold policy-making
decisions also played a role in the crisis through the period
of hostilities. For the first, it would appear dubious that
a Secretary-General such as Dag Hammarskjold would have per-
mitted the U.A.R. to have so easily or quickly effected the
withdrawal of UNEF forces.'''''' Hammarskjold in 1957 outlined
the procedure for the withdrawal of UNEF forces which included
notification of the Advisory Committee of UlTEF by the
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Secretary-General of such a request which would then
determine if the question would be brought to the attention
of the General Assembly. Only then could the Secretary-
General act on his own.'^Q Moreover, Derek Bowett points
out that Hammarskjold repeatedly made it clear after 1956
that UNEF had been created by a bilateral agreement between
Egypt and the United Nations: "were either side to act
unilaterally in refusing continued presence or deciding on
withdrawal an exchange of views would be called for toward
harmonizing the position. ""^^ However, U Thant's pre-
cipitative action is ameliorated by the unadorned fact
that three weeks passed after the request for UNEF with-
drawal and the opening of hostilities, during which time
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. did little to amend the situation.
Trouble may be the United Nations' chief business,
80
as Andrew Boyd put it, but during both the swing toward
hostilities and during the hostilities themselves, the U.N.
did not do a very good job of it. From the Achaean League
on doivn through history, international organizations have
faced the problem of the reservation of sovereignty on the
part of its members. In addition, the permanent seats which
Article 23 of the Charter accords to China, France, the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
and the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security" conferred upon the
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Security Council by Article 2k and almost all of Chapters VI
and VII point to the ascendant role of the great powers in
peacekeeping. But the wartime unity upon which the concept
of the concerted peacekeeping by great powers was constructed
had long since passed away. The fact that the representative
of China held the Presidency of the Security Council during
the month of May did far more to hinder than help peace-
keeping efforts. For because of diplomatic tensions between
his country and various Council members, the informal
processes in which the Security Council excels because of
its small size were hamstrung. If we add to this, Russian
obstinacy through June 6 against any Council action at all,
the difficulty of the U.N. emerging with sny independent role
becomes obvious. While the United States was more active
and consistent in its calls for moderatioD and peace during
this period, it too exercised only the mildest restraint from
its cockpit in the Security Council.
Oran Young suggested two roles for D.N. activity in
this crisis: direct political action and service roles.
He pointed out that while the U.N. machinery in the Middle
East was able to act as a go-between in ccoinuni cations between
the Arabs and Israelis, was able to send Titally needed
information back to Council sessions, and was instrumental
in helping tc effectuate the Israeli -Syrian cease-fire, the
"partisan disagreements of the interventionists" paralyzed
29k
the U.N. in its political action role and dealt it a heavy
82blow. once again, the tension at the core of international
organization was 30 taut, due to commitment to client states
and the unwillingness to pay the price of superpower co-
operation, that very little space remained for the U.N. to
work out an independent role amidst the fast pace of events.
So long as the superpowers pursued competitive than co-
operative interests, so long was the United Nations unable
to muster peacekeeping strength of its own.
The bewildering pace with which events unfolded and
Israel won its military objectives introduced a high element
of risk and uncertainty in superpower restraining action.
On the first day of the war, June 5, the Soviet Union
evidenced little interest in a cease-fire and the United
States was either unable or unwilling to push hard for
one. It was not until the second day of the war, as the
enormity of the Arab defeat became clear that the Soviet
Union brought forth a demand for a cease-fire conditional
upon the condemnation and withdrawal of Israeli forces which
was at the heart of the Arab demands.
One may glean an indication of the gap between the
Soviet Union and the U.A.R. by realizing that it was not
until June 10 that Egypt agreed to a cease-fire. And while
the United States was consistent in its cells for a cease-
fire, throughout the war, it also was consistent in not
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including withdrawal in its draft resolution as it had in
1956, a move which served to strengthen the hand of Israel
after the 196? hostilities, but then barreling on to
victory. Finally, of course, in behavior which was to be-
cone a pattern, the Soviet Union moved toward the U.S.
formulation for an unconditional cease-fire which ultimately
prevailed. In fact, it was not until after the invasion
of Syria began that Ambassador Goldberg announced that his
Government was "willing to concert its actions with every
member of this Council ... at any time
. . . under any
circumstances." Or again, that on the full authority of
his Government, he wished to let it be known that: "The
United States strongly opposes aggression by any one in
the area, in any form, overt or clandestine."^^ It is more
than interesting to note that President Johnson recently let
it be known that in a "hot line" call after the Israeli
invasion of Syria had begun, Kosygin threatened to take
"necessary actions, including military" unless Israeli
military activities were not quickly restrained by
Washington.
There was little recourse to law in the conflict
phase. The prime goal was to stop the fighting. And here
the superpowers began to demonstrate the degree to which
their positions were rigidifying parallel to the views of
the clients who represented them in the area. And
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unfortunately, in a quick-moving situation in which the
vital interests of smaller powers are involved, the latitude
for superpower influence was not wide-whether or not this
was chosen to be so by Washington and Moscow. Because of
their contrary commitments, because the war ran out from
under them, because the superpowers chose to emphasize
their competitive than cooperative interests, the United
Nations emerged from the hostilities in a state of shambles.
Axiom: the United Nations has little relevance to peace-
keeping in times of fluid flux when the superpowers disagree.
Failing to satisfy the Arab states with a satisfactory
resolution in the Security Council, the Soviet Union moved
the scene of action to the General Assembly. The Soviets
reflected Arab interests, but they began to exhibit a role of
their own in acknowledging the de jure existence of Israel
which the Arabs did not though Soviet relations with Israel
had been severed. But in reflecting Arab interests, the
Soviets overstepped the line of partisanship. So Arab and
Soviet support focused on the Non-aligned resolution. The
rationale and chief thrust behind this was that Israeli
withdrawal must occur behind the positions held on June 5
on the basis that any other alternative would reward
aggression. The non-aligned states were on strong ground
here and could appeal, especially, to the self-interest of
smaller states in a manner which rang of legality. Certainly
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this is the basic norm of the international order: that
neighboring states shall not strike the first blow, seize
territory and then demand negotiations and concessions
before sovereign territory would be returned. While the
Arabs spoke of belligerent rights which justified blockade
and invoked the phantom of the Palestine Arabs who had been
refugees for so long, they too concentrated their efforts on
the point of Israel's use of force to violate this most basic
of legal norms. However, the Arab states were strangely
quiet concerning their own threats to use force which had
contributed so mightily to the crisis.
Israel was not about to let them forget this. Abba
Eban presented a tight legal case which concentrated on
the many Arab threats against Israel's existence and the
blockade of Tiran which Eban identified as an act consistent
only with a state of war. Focusing his verbal eloquence
upon Israel's right to exist under the Charter, and on Israel's
right to defend itself since neither the United Nations as a
body nor the Security Council had demonstrated excellence in
this area, Israel felt compelled to sit tight atop the Arab
lands until a settlement satisfactory to national security
needs v;as forthcoming. Israel, adamant on face-to-face
negotiations concerning an Israeli Jerusalem and an "inde-
pendent quest" for peace and security outside the bounds of
the United Nations, did not conform to the thrust of other
efforts in the United Nations. For Israel Arab "aggression''
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Helped Justify her continued retention of Arab territories
which she claims to have occupied in "self-defense."
The United States draft resolution was in keeping on
9iany points with its announced search for a fundamental and
4uPable peace in the area. Many elements of this General
Assembly draft ultimately can be found in Resolution 2I|.2.
Fop all its foresight and comprehensiveness, the United
States draft was as visionary and distant in application
in the beginning as the Soviet draft was partisan and
Immediate. Ultimate virtue here was an immediate flaw
as there were insufficient, pragmatic and interim steps to
lead to the more distant principles evoked. More important,
the U.S^ draft suffered from haziness and ambiguity on the
ftll-important question of withdrawal. Here the Israeli
position drew strength, here the U.S. and Soviet Union could
i^Q^ actualize the norm of cooperation.
Into the breach Lord Caradon had been trying so
valiantly to stem came the Latin American states with their
own draft which judiciously strove to lift the debate out of
the context of purely political positions and to place them
on the plane of legal principle and Charter norms. With the
failure of the League of Nations on the points of armed in-
vasion and territorial aggrandizement in the nineteen-thirties
ringing in their ears, the Latin Americans made the greatest
single contribution in the genesis of Resolution 214.2 by
linking Israeli withdrawal "from all the recently occupied "
territories" with the termination of the state of belligerency,
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the establishment of the conditions of coexistence and good-
neighborliness and reliance upon Charter provisions for
peaceful settlement in all cases. It was this linkage of
basic norms, founded upon the reciprocity end mutuality
which underlie all law, which later broke the deadlock in
the Security Council. This is an example of how an appeal
to law and the effective operation of international organiza-
tion can go hand-in-hand. It is not necessary to review the
other paragraphs of the draft here since we have dealt with
them earlier. Suffice it to say that in their open and
consistent resort to sound legal principles they provided
the format and created an atmosphere in which the efforts
were removed from the sterility of a conflict between parties
to a level on which the approach taken was what is legal,
what is right?
As deadlock in the emergency session loomed imminent
the Soviets on July 18 and 19 twice came to the United States
representative, physical acts whose diplomatic import should
not be overlooked, and agreed on a proposal to meet the
crisis. Below the surface rigidity which marked Assembly
sessions, both powers were aware of the necfsssity for
momentum to meet the challenge to civilization posed by the
continuance of inaction. Cooperation had unexpectedly gained
ascendancy over contention as, for the first time we are
aware, the superpowers closed the gap between them and chose
a parallel course of action. However, the maneuverability of
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the Middle Eastern states was not yet that circumscribed
and the Arab states were not yet ready to compromise. The
suddenness of the Soviet shift left little time for the
Arabs to react flexibly and the proposal was rejected.
Although the emergency special session was formally fi-niit-
less, a sense of consensus did emerge among the membership
which was to have echoes later in the Security Council.
The assistance and consultations which the smaller nations
had initiated was to bear fruit in the Fall.
In the grand sense, the behavior of France in this
crisis was directed by President Charles De Gaulle's drive
to reassert the great power status of France by assuming
an independent, non-aligned status between Washington and
Moscow, and thus contributing to the balance of power between
nations which he saw as vital to peace. One of France's
roles, therefore, was as "a potential conciliator. "^^ A
chief avenue here would be a four-power conference. De Gaulle
suggested this to Abba Eban in Paris on Kay 2l\.,^'^ Another
similar proposal to have the big powers settle the crisis
was turned down by Moscow on May 30, 196?.^® Premier Georges
Pompidou' s journey to Moscow in early July with a four-
power conference as at least, one of the objectives received
89
a similar rebuff.
A second facet to De Gaulle's perception of France's
role was the emphasis upon "deliberate objectivity by
90
Paris." France opposed sending a vessel through the Straits
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of Tiran to test Nasser's blockade. Following the outbreak
of war, Paris announced the withholding of arms shipments to
all parties to the hostilities . ^2 p^^^^^y^ fearing in general
a drift toward war by the great powers and specifically the
outbreak of war in the Middle East, De Gaulle warned Eban on
May 2ky 196? not to make war by firing the first shot and
announced on June 2 that Paris would not give support or
bestow its approval to the party commencing hostilities.*^^
Later, De Gaulle publicly announced that Prance would not
become entangled by going to the assistance of either side
and would determine its stand on the basis of "who fired the
first shot." This melded into France's stand on its own
neutrality when it became the first Western power to refuse
to support Israel's territorial claims flowing from the
hostilities. At the same time Paris announced that while
only a freely negotiated settlement was realistic the
physical and psychic effects of the war were so great that
Israel and the Arabs needed the four powers to bring them
together. ^ Thus, De Gaulle wanted no French involvement in
a Middle Eastern war beyond France's soil (especially after
the costly involvement of 195^), sought to regain French
prestige, and maneuvered toward a diplomatic position free
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to encourage ultimate negotiations.
But, of course, the seat of diplomatic activity was
the United Nations, not a four-power conference. France, of
course, voted for all the cease-fires during the hostilities.
It abstained from the vote on the Soviet draft in the Security
Council on June 11;, calling for Israeli condemnation and with-
drawal, probably on the grounds that during the "long road
before us" discussion and agreement by all parties on all
issues would eventually be necessary if peace was to be
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restored. During the emergency special session of the
General Assembly, Prance abstained on the Soviet draft resolu-
tion which called only for withdrawal without further activity
under Council supervision which might lead to a settlement.
Understanding France's position on withdrawal and provisions
for Council action which might lead to a settlement, it
comes as no surprise that France lined up with the Soviet
Union in supporting the non-Aligned draft resolution. On
September 1, 196? France announced its support of the
British draft resolution which was essentially passed as
Resolution 214.2.^®
The Security Council certainly was an appropriate
framework for action in France's eyes, given its great power
presence. In a statement to this body on November 22, 196?
the French representative pointedly said:
I must confess that . . . the three power-draft, or a
draft based on certain ideas of the Latin American
text proposed in the General Assembly in July would
in our opinion have had considerable advantages. It
appeared, however, that the desired agreement could not
be achieved on those texts, whatever their merits. 99
France voted in favor of Lord Caradon's draft, but only
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after pointing out its ambiguity of language, its view of the
"equally authentic" French text which speaks of withdrawal
"des territoires occupes," though in general, approving of
the other enunciated princ iples . "^^^
France's independence certainly turned out to favor
the Arabs. In consequence, French influence, commerce, and
its cultural presence climbed sharply after the events of
1967. France hoped for, but was disappointed in, the award
of oil concession agreements, but was not disappointed in
her sale of military jet aircraft to both Iraq ($70 million)
and later Libya ($1+00 million), while maintaining at the same
time an arms embargo upon the same type material (heavy tanks
and the vital Mirage-fighter-bombers) to the direct parties
to the conflict. This affected Israel more than the Arab
states. With the U.S. bearing Arab enmity and Britain
steadily seeping out of the area, only France was left in
De Gaulle's eyes to provide "balance" in the area to counter
the possibility of Soviet "hegemony . "'''^^ De Gaulle believed
also that "all world tensions had one root--Viet Nam"--
and that there was no chance for world peace until the
102American involvement in Viet Nam ended. By urging this
upon V/ashington, by being the only western state on the
scales counterbalancing the Soviet presence in the Middle
East and by being a potential conciliator in the crisis,
De Gaulle was, in his vision, serving world peace. But
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certainly, in serving the interests of world peace, De Geulle
also served the interests of Prance-and vice-versa. Even
Raymond Aron who was highly critical of what he perceived as
an anti-Israel policy by De Gaulle tried "to provide a basis
for the interpretation of General De Gaulle's diplomacy
in 1955 he was thinking of a move aimed at strengthening the
non-Arab or non-Muslim minorities in the area, today he is
backing the Arabs, not because he is anti-Zionist or still
less anti-semitic
,
but in the interest of France. ""^^"^
Over the summer and into the autumn Israel settled yet
farther into the occupied lands, parts of which it deemed so
vital to security. At the same time, the full weight of
defeat settled more heavily upon the Arab states. Israel
was a victor and, as defeats go, it was more for the
vanquished to compromise. The submission of the three-
Power draft was an admission of this. We need not re-
capitulate the debt openly acknowledged to the Latin American
effort. Withdrawal was called for, but so was the termination
of the state of belligerency, the right of all states to
peacefully exist without threats or acts of war, and respect
for the political independence and territorial integrity of
area states. Not only had Charter and legal principles been
incorporated, but the organizational nature of the United
Nations--a place where all states were represented, in close
contact and with the opportunity for consultations--began to
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be felt as time passed and this quality asserted itself. ^0^^-
Unthinkably in 1956, the smaller states played and were
even asked to play as large a role as they could in the
urgent drive for a resolution although final approval by
the superpowers was necessary. Their cumulative and united
efforts, as Lord Caradon might have said, together with the
parties involved, directly and indirectly, were successful
as the three-Power and the United States drafts were success-
fully bridged by Lord Caradon in the most delicate and astute
of negotiations.
Caradon came from a non-superpower state. Great Britain's
association with the Middle East has been long and intimate,
if not always satisfying. Peter Mansfield, an acute British
observer of the area, has noted: "Britain cannot dsny a
heavy share of responsibility for the present condition of
the Middle East. It was perhaps the least successful of all
our overseas enterprises
.
""^^^ If this be so, then British
policy toward what was termed the ''Jewish" or "Palestine"
question certainly ranked near the bottom of its Middle
East enterprises. From the alternate and deliberately
ambiguous promises held out to both Arabs {the Sherif
-Husayn-
McMahan Correspondence) and Zionists (the Balfour Declaration)
in World War I to the admission of chaotic failure which
attended the formal termination of the British Mandate over
Palestine at midnight. May Ii;-15, 19i|.8. British policy was
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riddled with inconsistency and incompatibility, m the same
postwar period major changes were occurring. Indian in-
dependence in 191+7 marked the start of the process by
which the Suez Canal was transformed from the lifeline of
empire to an artery pulsing with petroleum. The rise
of nationalism in the area simultaneously deprived Britain
of many of her land, sea and air bases while her economic
weakness prevented her from exercising dominant power in the
Middle East without bases--as the United States came to do
through its Sixth Fleet. The Tripartite Resolution of
May 25, 1950 which sought to ensure the armistice lines of
191;9 and to limit arms to both sides, and the Baghdad Pact
of 1955 which was the Middle Eastern reflection of the
American containment policy (after 1959 the Central Treaty
Organization [CENTO] after Iraq's withdrawal) were at least
symbols of a British presence. Whatever the reality of bheso
moves, Britain's influence was dashed in the wreckage of
the 1956 British-French-Israeli war against Egypt. Following
this debacle and the assassination of the loyal Nuri es-Said
and the royal family in Baghdad in July 1958, Britain's con-
tracting strategic interests appeared limited to Cyprus,
Aden, Bshram and Sharjah in the Persian Gulf and other sheik-
doms and sultanates along the fringes of the Arabian
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Peninsula. It v;as during this time that a Chatham House
Study Group set down their analysis of Britain's interests
in the area:
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Britain's first and paramount interest in t-h« onoounder study is to obtain oil under fair com^^Pcralconditions from the states which produce Jt^nd tobring it to Europe by the cheapes? and 3afe;t routeHer second interest is to keep open trade andother communications to the lands east of Sue/
friendnnei^irr^'' I' encouragement of'mutuali lendli ess and respect among the states of the area
maL ?nr^''''/° r'^""^ developments Which wouldake for social and political stability
V
,^"®^/ourth interest is that the Middle East landbridge to Africa should not fall under the Influence orpossession of any Great Power hostile to Britain. 1(^9
C. M. Woodhouse, former Director-General of the Royal
Institute of International Affairs refined and buttressed
the points further:
^° ^ generation ago the importance of theMiddle East was that it lay across the route to India,today Its main importance lies in its oil resources
Its geographical position, at the crossroads of the*
east-west route between Europe end India and the
north-south route between Russia and Africa, is still
a matter of great importance, but not for the timebeing of primary importance. What is vital for the
present is not where the Middle East ia so much as
what it has in it. HO
Earlier Woodhouse made the useful distinction that
while Washington tended to look upon the area more in the
older British geostrategic view, to London the Middle East
wa3 vital as a source of oil and its impact upon England's
economy
.
vrhy was this so? A brief resuin^ will suffice.
In 1966 Britain imported 69 percent of its crude oil
IIPfrom the Middle East.-^-^*^ British oil investments in the
Persian Gulf area alone were estimated to be in the vicinity
of $2.1| billion and provided a payments surplus of $750
million. At the same time Britain enjoyed a favorable
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balance of coimnercial trade with the area of $2?? million
in 1967, In the mid-sixties Middle Eastern countries held
about $1.5 billion of Great Britain's total external
liabilities of $5.3 billion. Finally Britain is a major
weapons supplier to the area (though especially since the
entry of the Russians and French, a proportionately declining
one), supplying arms to both Jordan and Israel , "'•'^ and
having, for example, concluded a $300 million arms deal
with Saudi Arabia on December 7, 1965. -^-^^
A 1959 Memorandum submitted by the Minister of Supply
to the Select Committee on Estimates listed six main reasons
why the Government and private British manufacturers sell
arms abroad. "^"^^ Standardization of equipment of allied
(especially Commonwealth) forces, additional recovery of
research costs, more efficient use of armaments factories,
and outlets for obsolete weapons were listed as four of such
reasons. Foreign currency earnings certainly are another
reason for such sales. During the nineteen-f ifties , Britain'
total arms exports averaged $14.00 million annually (and were
increasing) while on February 10, 1966 Denis Healy, Minister
of Defense explained to Commons:
While the Government attaches the highest importance to
making progress in the field of arms control and dis-
armament, we must also take what practical steps we
can to ensure that this country does not fail to
•secure its rightful share of this valuable commercial
market . 117
The sixth and final point was that the ''supply of arms
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as
to overseas governments may help to strengthen political
well as military ties. Obviously Britain derives a great
deal from and relies quite heavily upon the Middle East.
Yet, despite its great investments, Britain's power and
position have been contracting in the area, speeded along,
of course, by the anti-imperialistic and nationalistic
efforts of such Arab leaders as Gamal Abdul Nasser. It
could be that in certain English policy-makers' eyes,
Israel represented as much of a counterbalance to the
forces Nasser symbolized as the conservative Arab regimes
within whose borders British-owned oil installations were
found. Arms shipments might indicate this. For as time
passed British arms shipments increasingly went to the more
traditional, conservative and often oil-rich monarchies such
as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan and, to a lesser degree,
Israel and virtually ceased to the less pro-Western, repub-
lican-militarist states of the United Arab Republic and
Syria with whom, presumably, the Anglo-Arab community of
interest was smaller. Or Britain in its then junior-
partner status, may have, in certain ways acted as an
American proxy. We cannot pinpoint the perceptions which
drive policy-makers to attempt to realize certain interests.
We can only speculate in an inconclusive fashion until,
perhaps, in future decades, British archives are opened.
What we can be sure of in an immediate sense is the
gravity of the economic consequences for Britain of the
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hostilities. Indeed, Harold Wilson, then Prime Minister
affords us an insight.
The economic consequences of this June week were
extremely serious for Britain. The closure of theCanal alone, it was authoritatively estimated was
costing Britain h 20 million a month on our balance
of payments. No less serious was the loss of MiddleEast oil. We had to seek to replace this from other
areas at a higher price and, in the main, at muchhigher freights. Supplies from Libya, the one source
west of the Canal, were cut for a time. Nor could we
make up a substantial part of the loss from Nigeria,
our other short-haul source. Within weeks, the civil
war there cut off all our Nigerian supplies too. Wehad to shop for supplies in the United States andLatin America, at high cost, high freights and in
competition with other hard-hit countries. We had
'^^AA
^"^^^^^^3 for the following winter
. . . [196?-
1968],
.
. .
The crisis was a serious blow. By the early
autumn with other difficulties arising, it seemed almost
a fatal one to our economic recovery.
. . . The MiddleEast crisis of June 196? was the biggest contributingfactor to the devaluation which came five months later.
Confidence in sterling was eroded by the war and further
weakened when the monthly figures reflecting its con-
sequences were published. From a strong and improving
balance of payments position, we had returned by the
autumn once again to a vulnerable position and domestic
events, notably two damaging dock strikes together with
some manoevering on the Continent, were sufficient to
bring sterling down. Without the impact and continuing
effects of the Middle East crisis we could have weathered
these disturbances without grave deterioration in tha
pound. It was to be two years more and at heavy cost
--economic, social and political--before we were able
to regain our surplus position. 118
Great Britain was no disinterested spectator in the
drive to bring peace to the Middle East in 196?. Indeed,
her economic viability was gravely endangered by the conse-
quences of the hostilities and their continuation.
As often occurs, while the greater powers were wrapped
up in defending the interests of those states whom they
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represent, or in partisan or visionary proposals, it is the
smaller states which, given the relaxation of the bipolar
matrix, especially in the U.N.
, are able to jockey and
negotiate the necessary compromises. Caradon was a superb
man for the job he took on. He epitomized for this issue
the best elements of statecraft. He appealed to transcendent
law. He invoked members' higher responsibilities to this
world organization and the peoples it represented. He knew
when to threaten the ominous price of failure if inter-
national organization could not fulfill its purpose as his
faith told him it could. But perhaps the basic point was
that Caradon embodied the ancient art of statecraft whose
tradition he carried on in the finest manner. Lord Caradon
did not possess the coercive power of a major state, but he
did utilize the "institutionalized moral pressure" provided
by the principles and on which the very continued existence
of the United Nations itself relied . '^''"^ In the seventh
decade of the twentieth century he used the advantages pro-
vided by the forum of international organization to breathe
the breath of law and principle into this episode in a long-
standing, tragic conflict. H. G. Nicholas has delineated the
basic techniques of pacific settlement of disputes In the
Security Council as investigation, interposition, conciliation,
recommendation and appeal. ''"^^
Nicholas goes on to draw a parallel betwean pacific
settlement by the Security Council and ''government conciliation
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machinery in a democratic state." This analogy limps as all
analogies do. The chief deficiency lies in the deviant
expectations which the national and international roles place
upon Security Council representatives. But the analogy also
is insightful. For both bodies do tend to restrict them-
selves to "fact-finding, conciliation
. .
. [and] ... the
making of recommendations"; while both bodies may "bring
moral pressure to bear on one side or the other ... it
does not impose any settlement." Most importantly:
.
. .
just as the democratic state relies ultimatelyfor the settlement of its industrial disputes upon
P^^^^^ opinion on the disputants, together
with the disputants' own awareness of where their realinterests lie, so the Security Council acts by
mobilizing opinion and trying to get the disputants
to see reason. 121
There is a certain congruence here between Nicholas'
perception of Security Council activity and our earlier-
stated objective of international law: "to define the
interests of the parties concerned in a controversy and then
to provide adequate procedures for aettleroent on the basis
of rational argument."
But two points need to be made here. First, that
according to these conceptions, much of international law
and Security Council activity is voluntariatic on the part
of the parties directly involved. Or, as Eugene Rostow
put it: resolution 2ii2 "is not self -executing. "^^^ In
the last analysis it will be up to the parties themselves
to make peace if peace is to be made. Moshe Dayan put it
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succinctly not only for the Israelis, but for the Arabs as
well: "We must learn to live with the Arabs," he said,
"face-to-face, without the intermediary of even our best
12Llfriends." Second, both conceptions explicitly state that
settlement would come only through the exercise of reason.
Once again, while the world should hope for this if it
wishes to avoid incineration, there has been too precious
little of it demonstrated in the past.
The principles of international law found in Resolution
21^2 arrived at, as they were in an international organization,
were a consequence of policy choices, jockeying and the per-
ceived interests of states. Unsurprisingly, perhaps the
greatest interest here operative was self-interest. The
Christian Science Monitor reported on November 1, 196?
that the U.N. was then faced with the "gnawing belief that
the seeds of another Arab-Israeli war are now taking root
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unless they can be dislodged by diplomacy." An editorial
in the Manchester Guardian published on November 22, clearly
stated what was at stake and the almost negative motivation
in the drive toward approval:
The British coirnromise plan for the Middle East has been
attacked by both Israelis and Arabs. That in itself might
be promising, for it was intended to stir b middle course
between an Afro-A'^.ian resolution which had been acceptable
to the Arabs and a U.S. one which had been acceptable to
the Israelis ... no Security Council member wants to
take the responsibility for precipitating a final break-
down. . . . True an agreed resolution in the U.N. will
not pacify the Middle East. But it is the only chan'^.e
VrZ T.l ,
^^^Pi'^'g a dialogue going. The alternative
n^Lf!^r
to consolidate her conquest for the Arabsto prepare for the next round, and for the refugees torot m their camps. I'^o
It is interesting to note that interpretations of Resolution
21^.2 varied distinctly, and perhaps dangerously so, even be-
fore passage. The representative from Syria, Georges Tomeh,
announced his country's "non-acceptance of the draft resolu-
tion" even before the vote on it."^^*^ Tomeh justified this
action by saying that the resolution ignored the roots of
the problem, the rights of the Palestinian refugees , "^^^
would reward the aggressor and thereby violate the basis
of international law and order. "^^^ Ambassador Parthasarathi
of India announced his Government's understanding that the
British draft "if approved by the Council, will commit it
to the application of the principle of total withdrawal of
Israel forces from all the territories—I repeat, all the
territories-'occupied by Israel as a result of the conflict
which began on 5 June 1967."'^-^° In light of this, India,
Mali and Nigeria announced they would not press their draft
to a vote then. Lord Caradon recognized these diversions
of opinion when he stated: "All of us, no doubt, have our
own views and interpretations and understandings. I explained
my own when I spoke on Monday last. On these matters each
1 31delegation rightly speaks only for itself." ^ Ambassador
Goldberg then stated: "We will vote for that . . . [British]
, . . draft resolution. We do so in the context of, and
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because we believe to be consistent with, United States
policy as expressed by President Johnson on 19 June and as
subsequently reaffirmed in statements made by me to the
132Security Council." ^ Abba Eban made it clear that Israel's
position remained unchanged: That Israel would stay where
it was until a permanent peace directly negotiated and con-
tractually binding was arrived at which provides guarantees
in the areas of boundaries, free passage, and others of
interest to Israel. Eban also, as will be recalled, sent
only the English text of Resolution 2^.2 to his Government ."^^^
We have earlier reviewed the position of France and here
note only the emphasis placed upon withdrawal from all the
territories."'"'^^ The stand of the U.S.S.R. here reflected
its concern for an Israeli withdrawal and "to implement
without delay the decision which has been taken. ""^-^^ The
delegates both from the U.A.R. and Jordan emphatically
reiterated the points of withdrawal of Israeli troops and the
restoration of Palestinian rights. ^-^^ But while bargaining,
adjustment, pressures and compromise were realistically
reflected, the net content of the resolution appealed to the
most basic nonr.s of contemporary international law. The
"inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,"
the "termination of all claims or states of belligerency,"
the "acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity
and political independence" of states and their "right" to
live "free from threats or acts of force," the "freedom of
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navigation through international waterways," and, "a Just
settlement of the refugee problem" all reflect such basic
norms. A. the actual hostilities and the passions aroused
by war receded in time, the structure of international
organization which encourages constant, close and confidential
consultations merged with the essential purpose of the United
Nations expressed in Article I and began more to live up to
its responsibilities:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that
end: to take effective collective measures for theprevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace, and to bring out by peaceful means, andin conformity with the principles of justice and inter-
national law, adjustment or settlement of international
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of
the peace.
The legal approach taken by the Latin /American countries
lifted the dialogue from the plane of a dispute between
parties, rancorous and long-lasting, to a plane of principle
and law in which the essential question to be answered con-
cerned principle and right. As time passed law reasserted
itself as a factor in the conflict. Basic conduct norms
were reaffirmed: Charter article llik) "all members shall
refrain from the threat or use of force," article 11(3) "all
members shall settle their international disputes by peace-
ful means," and article 11(1) states the United Nations "is
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members" were among them. The basic legal principles of free
passage and the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory
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by war" were also notable. Whereas the neglect of law was
one of the chief reasons for the acceleration of the crisis
into conflict, its reaffirmation in Resolution 2^2 which
provided the parties with "collectively legitimized"^^?
guidelines for settlement assisted in passage of the resolu-
tion.
The beginnings of the crisis and the hostilities them-
selves illustrated the dependence of the international
organization upon the agreement of the superpowers in times
of crisis. The purposes of this world body were ignored and
the actions of the area states, fettered only by the perceived
interest and pressures of the superpowers, were followed.
During the fighting and most of the emergency special session
of the General assembly, parallelism of policy in the United
Nations was between area client states and superpower pro-
tectors, as U.S. and U.S.S.R. positions rigidified. But
there prevailed the fundamental reason for cooperation be-
tween the superpow0rs--the avoidance of nuclear holocaust--
which was coupled with the U.S. policy of judiciously pro-
viding the means for resolving the conflict without prej-
udicing the positions of the direct participants who, them-
selves, must ultimately find peace. Of utmost importance,
the United States respected the position of Israel on with-
drawal against those advocating a return tc the old status
quo perhaps less to protect Israeli gains than to prcriote a
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more durable peace. ^^8 attempt by both the Soviet Union
and the United States to produce an agreement on July 18-19
points in this direction.
As the superpowers came closer to cooperation on this
point, a more dynamic, viable role for the United Nations
became more possible. The vital role of the smaller states
in negotiating a compromise, encouraged but limited by the
big powers, cannot be overlooked. The acceptance by the
three-Power draft of the legal, principled approach of the
Latin American states was crucial and contributed greatly to
the final resolution. The general intent of the United
States Security Council draft indicated the desire for agree
ment by the superpower trying to represent its own and
Israel's interests. The very structure of organization, the
proximity and opportunity it provides states for intimate,
quiet and continuous contact coupled with the fact that in a
large sense, the future of the United Nations was involved,
provided the means and a vehicular motivation for effort.
The fact that the United Nations was the vessel here more
than symbolized what was at stake. For a failure by this
world body could only presage a failure and worse for all
the states and peoples of the globe. This historical
accident of Lord Caradon's presence was of inestimable good
fortune. Men, not organizational purpose or legal principle
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populate this planet. And it took someone pragmatically
aware of politics, but possessed of ideals and contagious
faith to make the resolution become a reality.
Amidst all the considerations of geopolitics, balances
of power, penetrations and "local wars," amidst the issues
of free passage through international waterways, states of
war and recognition, the danger is consistently run that
the direct parties to the dispute, the Israeli Jews and
Palestinian Arab3--both seeking political community and
national life on the same land—will be forgotten. We
have reviewed in Chapter II the legal positions of the
parties to this question. Beyond the legal claims and the
charge and countercharge of irresponsibility and lack of
good faith, there rests a question of humanity and morality
for both sides. In the introduction to his fine book, The
United States and Israel , Nadav Safran wrote:
Of course, one cannot write about Israel, and accept her
as an established fact--which is what I do--without
thereby taking an implicit stand on the Palestine issue.
If a reader wishes to interpret such a stand as placing
the author morally on the side of Israel against the
Arabs, he is of course free to do so. For my part,
I believe that fundamentally both Arabs and Jews have
an unassailable moral argument. A person who cannot
see how this is possible does not understand the
essence of tragedy; much less does he realize that
his position serves only to assure that the Palestine q
question should have another sequel, and yet another.
To ignore this problem— one at the root of the conflict
--is to embark knowingly upon a dangerous course, one of whose
sequels may bring great tragedy to us all. The events of late
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May and early June 196?, are frightening reminders of why
the, in one sense, misnomered Arab-Israeli dispute is perhaps
the most persistent and dangerous flashpoint in the world.
The readmission of the Palestine refugees, Israel says,
poses grave problems. There is the security risk and the
tension of a larger non-Jewish minority in a Jewish state.
Palestinians invoke the uncompromising right to return to
what they claim is their land, property, and their own
national and political community. An Israeli, Amos Oz,
has written: "This is our country; it is their country.
Right clashes with right. 'To be a free people in our own
land' is a right that is universally valid or not valid at
all.""^^^ It is platitudinous but necessary to state in view
of this that the problem is indeed complex. Simple solutions
appear either ruthless or naive. The tension is acute: The
Arabs cannot defeat Israel; Israel cannot remove itself from
the presence of her Arab neighbors.
We have no great store of instant solutions to bestow
upon the world concerning this problem. We agree with Don
Peretz that: "If the key issues between Israel end the
Palestine Arabs can be resolved then points of dispute with
the neighboring countries can be settled. ""^"^ But the super-
powers have been woefully inadequate in moving toward such a
goal. Until 196? the Soviet Union had not contributed one
ruble to help the refugees and "frequently opposed Arab
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attempts to have the U.N. General Assembly order the Con-
ciliation Commission to enforce U.N. resolutions dealing
with refugee repatriation and compensation. "^^^ president
Harry S. Truman attempted to alleviate the refugee problem
in 191^9, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles in 1955, and President John F.
Kennedy in the early 1960's with the aid of special repre-
sentative Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. "^^^ But all these efforts
foundered, generally because they involved compromise on an
issue looked upon as uncompromi sable by one party or the
other. Obviously the problem of the refugees is difficult.
We can only endorse the general outline of the principles
of a settlement on this point sketched by Quincy Wright:
Israel should permit as many refugees as she deems
possible to return to their homes over a period of
time to permit returning groups to accommodate them-
selves to Israeli citizenship before the number becomes
so large as to endanger Israel's security. Full com-
pensation should be given to those not permitted to
return, the amount to be determined by the International
Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal . ^^M-
Obviously in its assumptions and manifest fo2?m such a
sketch of principles satisfies neither side. And it would
require hard negotiating and good faith by the parties to go
beyond principle to implementation. But in the safeguard
allotted to Israel and the alleviation afforded the refugees,
such a settlement might open a new psychological stage for
the future development of more normal relations between
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states and peoples of the area. Granted this involves con-
cessions which both sides find distasteful. But if Israel
is not to become overwhelmed by the economic and spiritual
costs of a heavy military establishment, if the plight of
the Palestinian is to begin to be alleviated, if the Arab
states are to perceive Israel as a state with whom normal
relations are possible, and if the world is to be spared
another dangerous war, the issue of the Palestinian refugees
must enter a new era, however small and faltering that first
step may be.
In this episode the United Nations, while it could not
prevent the fighting, provided a means to halt it and put
some limit on its spread. That four cease-fire resolutions
were necessary was a sign of the U.N.'s weakness, however.
After the fighting ceased the U.N. provided a forum where
the Arabs feeling aggrieved could make their case without
resort to direct negotiations, while it enabled Israel to
justify its actions in the matrix of undeniable past threats
and provocations while laying out its own proposals for
future peace.
It is difficult to conceive a document such as Resolu-
tion 2I4.2 emerging from any source except the United Nations.
While it is more than symbolic that it came out of the big
power-dominated Security Council, the resolution involves
elements of principle in state interplay in a balance that
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direct negotiations, four-power talks, or a Judgment by
the International Court of Justice probably could not have
equaled. The Court might have provided the legal principle,
but not the state interplay in quite the same fashion. Direct
or four-power talks ipso facto formally exclude one or the
other of these parties, as well as the other members of the
international community. Plenty of state interplay certainly
would have occurred, but one wonders if there could have
been such an appeal to the principles of international law,
had not the vehicular balance-wheel of the Latin American
states for example, been present. Only in the institutional
matrix of the United Nations, then, were all these actors
and elements present.
But while it is necessary to extol the virtues of an
organization or action, it is also important to realize
its limits. U.N. usage and resolutions become effective
only "at that point at which states regarded themselves as
legally bound by the prac tice
.
""^^^ And since international
law is at base a weak law for its placement in a "fragmented
competitive coexistence of rival societies , ""^^^ both law and
U.N. resolutions rely upon the voluntarism and reason which
affected parties choose to exercise. On the other hand,
within the definitions both of international law and organiza-
tion cited above. Resolution 2i4.2 was a success: it defined
the interests of the parties to a conflict, provided them
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with procedures for a rational settlement and reaffirmed
the transcendence of norms which had been violated. It
reflected greater common agreement on norms and issues than
had been ever before realized since the beginning of the
19-year-old conflict. But because of the passions, psy-
chological, strategic and negotiating elements involved,
its promise remains yet unfulfilled.
On the other hand, until the parties choose in a
voluntary and rational fashion to mutually realize the means
and ends of international law and organization made avail-
able to them and isolated by Resolution 21^.2, the approach
to peace may not be near. Lieutenant-General E. L. M.
Burns, former Chief of Staff, UNTSO and Commander, UNEP,
has made this clear on the basis of his earlier experiences:
Mr. Haramarskjold and his envoys could appeal to reason,
point out that certain courses of action would probably
lead to unfortunate results, and advise that more con-
ciliatory lines should be followed. But it seemed to me
that eventually the U.N. negotiators were reduced to
trying to produce a protocol, a form of words to which
both sides could agree. However, when the objections of
both sides had been circumvented, these protocols usually
turned out to be so vague that each side could later
adopt the interpretation which suited them, end the inter-
pretations of the two sides would of course be conflicting.
There was no provision that either side would accept an
independent interpretation (by U.N. of other arbiters)
if they felt it to be to their disadvantage . J-m-'
In a very realistic sense Burns' words do no more than
to describe a very natural phase of the negotiating process.
But unless parties go beyond the stage, only sterility can
result
.
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The chief operational failing of Resolution 2i^2 is
that it remains ambiguous on the question of the precedence
of withdrawal or termination of belligerency and recognition.
While it is unequivocable that the occupied territories should
be returned as a matter of principle, the resolution has left
this question of precedence to discussions which have ex-
perienced unfortunate deadlock. Abba Eban was careful not
to Jeopardize Israel's position in future negotiations on
borders by publicly announcing the transmission of the English
rather than the linguistically stronger French version of
the text to his Government. The dropping of the word
"occupation" coupled to "acquisition of territory" in the
Latin American text--provides Israel with stronger legal
grounds to occupy territory taken in 196? until a formal
peace treaty is signed, much like the case of Berlin.
Substantively, the absolute nature of the "inadmis-
sibility of the acquisition of territory by war" was weakened
by the ambiguity introduced by the textual elimination of
the word "the" before "territories." Arabs claim that
absolutely all occupied territories must be returned, while
Israel claims otherwise. Nor did the resolution deal in a
substantive sense with the question of aggression or self-
defense in relation to the competing claims to the land.
Israel claims self-defense in the face of Arab aggression,
and therefore legitimate occupation of the territory.
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Israel insists on conditional withdrawal from Justifiably
occupied territory to help protect Israel from future such
similar acts by Arabs which precipitated Israel's original
self-defense. Arabs claim self-defense in the face of
Israeli aggression. The illegitimate occupation of Arab
territory cannot permit preconditions to its return. Only
its unconditional return to help protect Arab states from
the persistence of Israeli aggression into the final
settlement. Possible future resort to Arab claims of duress
and the argument rebus sic stantibus may be used to challenge
the validity of any future settlement. Procedurally,
Resolution 21+2 did not specify the method of settlement.
This was cause for delay. Moreover, the resolution's
absence of a "tiered approach" to settlement, the call
instead by Israel for a "total" agreement, and by the Arabs
for a "total" withdrawal has served only the cause of
delay. li^S
The clear intent of the resolution, that Israel with
withdraw, was balanced with a detectable feeling on the part
of the U.N. membership that Israel is entitled to peace
and security as a state--just as much a bulwark of the
international order as the return of conquered land. The
basic freedom of navigation in international waters is
undiluted and the recognition of the territorial integrity
and inviolability of states is clear. While Israel's
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boundaries would be "secure" from Arab commando raids.
Arabs could feel secure from the Israeli expansionism
they fear. Israel finally would be recognized and the
"recognized boundaries" it has sought would replace the
cease-fire lines. There is no implicit undertow toward
direct negotiations which the Arab states rejected;
rather, a Special Representative of the Secretary
-General
is specified.
It is regrettable that the provisions concerning area
arms limitations, perhaps the one best way the superpowers
can control the level of conflict, was dropped at the in-
sistence of a Soviet Union intent upon rearming the Arab
states. Resolution 2i;2 points in many directions to a
just peace, one lasting, strong and juridically defined.
But it touched only most fleetingly on a basic, underlying
and fundamental issue: The Palestinian refugees who have
not yet been allowed to return to their homes, or receive
compensation for their property. Israel's security will
always be subjected to raids, and incessant deaths and
destructions will continue to plague the citizens of Israel
until the Palestinian refugees can feel that they have re-
ceived justice. A settlement more specific than the norm
of Resolution 2[|.2, "a Just solution to the refugee problem"
is necessary. But if any single provision of Resolution 214.2
awaits final and precise agreement between the aggrieved
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parties themselves, it is this vital and emotional issue.
While Resolution 21^.2 is promising, it remains un-
fulfilled. The many reasons for this are cited above.
But law and organization while normative and purposeful,
cannot be divorced from their political context as the
genesis of this resolution has demonstrated. The path of
the past must be the path of the future. It will take
the same sort of political dynamic to realize this promise
if law is to prevail.
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MIKE WALLACE: "... Then the President told for thefirst time the frightening details of a hot line messagefrom Soviet Premier Kosygin during the Six-Day War in
the Middle East in 196?. You were awakened with a
telephone report that war had broken out between Israel
and the Arab States, and that must have been the begin-
ning of one of your toughest weeks in the White House.
MR. JOHNSON: Yes, that's true, Mike. When I hung up
the phone after being told by Mr. Rostow what had
happened - Mrs. Johnson had awakened and asked me, said
what was that message about? And I said, "It looks like
that we have a war on our hands." You see in the picture
here meeting in the Situation Room after the hot line was
first activated. The hot line had been used before for
transmitting messages at Christmastime or something; but
this is the first time it had actually been activated in
a serious international situation. Here on June the 10th,
early in the morning at eight o'clock, I received a
message that "Mr. Kosygin desires the President to come
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^K^IJ r?"^' ^^^^ ''^^ Russian way of saying
to the Sitl.-'"' ^"^^^ reinstituted. So I hurrieduation room as quickly as I could and themessage came across shortly thereafter in which
fn^i^ ^7 prepared to do what was neces-
?h7;nr^^ " i""^ '"'^J'^ l^^ military, that it-he mentioned
"?nH«^r^H P^^^.^^tastrophe." He mentioned the words^^independent decision." He mentioned the word
military, and Secretary Rusk said, "Reread that
message. Ambassador Thompson, and be sure that the
word 'military is used." "So, Mike, when the leader
of another state talks about a very crucial moment,
and he forsees the risk of, quote, a "grave catastrophe,"
and he_ states that unless Israel unconditionally halts
operations within the next few hours that the SovietUnion will take necessary, quote, "necessary actionsincluding military," that's pretty serious business.
While Secretary Rusk had Ambassador Thompson reviewing
the message to be sure the translation was accurate, I
spoke to--on the side of Secretary McNamara and askedhim where the Sixth Fleet was then located. He checked
with the Joint Chiefs and said--I knew it was in the
general area it was in but I didn't know exactly its
specific location--and he said about three hundred miles
off the Syrian coast. They were under orders to stay
at least a hundred miles from the Syrian coast. I
asked him how fast the fleet traveled if it changed
directions and were turned around. He said about
twenty-five knots. I then said to Secretary McNamara,
"Let's modify the fleet's orders. Let's change it from
a hundred miles off the Syrian coast to fifty miles off
the Syrian coast." Of course, every man in that room
knew, and all the leaders of the Soviet Union knew that
every movement of that fleet was being monitored by
the Soviet Union; and any change in a direction would
immediately be intercepted by the Soviet Union and be
known to them.
WALLACE: So that was in a sense a signal to the Soviet
Union from the United States that if they intended
military action they were going to have to deal with
you?
MR. JOHNSON: That was a signal that the United States
of America and its Government was prepared for the
situation that would confront it if it were confronted.
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